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Abstract
It is widely accepted that monetary policy exerts a powerful influence on financial
markets. In this dissertation, I use micro level data to study the e↵ects of unantici-
pated monetary policy decisions on stock returns, credit spreads, and firm investment.
By focusing on the unanticipated component, I am able to estimate the causal e↵ects
on financial market variables and by using micro level data, I explore how firm hetero-
geneities can give rise to di↵erent e↵ects. The first two chapters of this dissertation
studies the e↵ect on bank stock returns and firm level credit spreads. The third chap-
ter builds upon the second by studying how policy interacts with credit spreads to
a↵ect investment.
In the first chapter, I study the e↵ects of monetary policy surprises on bank
stock returns. Banks are unique because the e↵ects of rising interest rates on their
value is ambiguous. On the one hand, higher interest rates lower their stock price
by discounting future cash flows more and on the other hand, raises its stock price
through higher net-interest margins. I provide event-study evidence that a reversal
e↵ect occurred, where prior to the Financial Crisis, bank stock returns declined upon
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a tightening surprise and that during the zero-lower bound period, bank stock returns
increased.
The second chapter assesses the impact of monetary policy surprises on firm level
credit spreads. I estimate that a 100 basis point tightening surprise leads to a 30
basis point decline in credit spreads - a result that is in stark contrast to traditional
theories of monetary contraction. I find that this decline is mostly driven by a com-
ponent related to risk premia and not by expected default. I rationalize the negative
relationship between tightening surprises and credit spreads by theories of preferred
habitat which state that policy has a higher pass-through e↵ect on safer bond yields
rather than riskier ones.
In my third chapter, co-authored with Yoshio Nozawa, I study the investment
channel of monetary policy by exploring di↵erences in the cost of external financing.
I find that a one standard deviation higher level of credit spread leads to a 2% decline
in the investment sensitivity to monetary policy. This implies that safer firms increase
their investment much more during expansionary policy. My results shed light on the
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Chapter 1
The E↵ects of Monetary Policy
Shocks on Bank Stock Returns
1.1 Introduction
We know that under normal circumstances rising interest rates reduce stock re-
turns. But, we do not know if this e↵ect holds in a low and unchanging interest
rate environment for all firms. One particular type of firm that is especially exposed
to interest rate changes are banks. Banks, which are in the business of borrowing
and lending, are directly a↵ected by interest rates and provide a natural appartus
for which to study stock return responses in both environments. While bank stock
returns face the same negative e↵ects of interest rate increases as other firms, their
revenues from lending are positively a↵ected by higher rates making the overall e↵ect
1
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of tightening ambigious. Do bank stock returns react di↵erently from other firms in
response to monetary policy surprises before and during the zero lower bound?
This paper addresses the di culty of assessing the impact of a rise in the policy
rate on stock returns by using changes in market expectations of interest rates around
Federal Reserve announcements. Commonly referred to as monetary policy shocks,
this measure over a short interval ensures that it is driven purely by monetary policy
news and is uncontaminated by other types of information that may occur throughout
the day. More importantly, this approach disentangles the impact of policy response
towards changes in stock returns which is an endogeneity issue that can plague event
studies. Because futures contracts exist before and during the zero lower bound, I
can measure these shocks and aligning them with stock returns over the same time
interval, seamlessly evaluate its e↵ect on bank stock returns in both periods.
Event study results show that there exists a reversal interest rate e↵ect for banks,
where their stock returns decline in response to tightening surprises prior to the zero
lower bound and increase during it. Banks seem to uniquely benefit from a monetary
policy surprise tightening during the low interest rate environment suggesting that
rate hikes are perceived to be good news above and beyond the negative discount rate
e↵ect all firms face. More specifically, this traditional discount rate channel posits
that higher interest rates reduce the present value of future cash flows which subse-
quently lowers stock prices. Banks, on the other hand, have an additional channel of
interest income which increases along with interest rates. What then is driving the
2
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di↵erential response to monetary policy shocks between banks and non-banks? What
bank characteristics explain cross sectional di↵erences in response to these shocks? I
find that riskier banks, as defined by items on their balance sheet, face an amplified
e↵ect on their stock returns. In addition, I find that banks with a larger maturity
mismatch between their assets and liabilities as well as those with greater market
power over deposits face an attenuated e↵ect on their returns. To make sense of these
empirical results, I combine a standard banking model with features of market power
over the deposit market to draw implications on how sensitivities should di↵er cross-
sectionally. Furthermore, I turn to the literature of Campbell and Shiller (1988a) who
show that stock return movements can be decomposed into news about cash flows,
real rates, and expected returns in order to uncover what source of news is driving
the monetary policy sensitivity.
Section 1.2 discusses relevant literature, Section 1.3 describes the data, Section
1.4 documents the event study results, Section 1.5 motivates the model, Section 1.6
empirically examines the source of news driving the results, and Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
A number of papers have used event studies to analyze the e↵ects of monetary
policy on financial markets. The seminal work of Flannery and James (1984) found
that bank stock returns move inversely with unanticipated interest rate changes and
3
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that this sensitivity is positively related to the size of the maturity di↵erence between
a bank’s nominal assets and liabilities. The idea is that all else equal, unexpected
inflation a↵ects the value of nominal assets rather than real assets. Firms with fewer
nominal assets relative to nominal liabilities will therefore benefit from unanticipated
monetary policy and this e↵ect is directly related to the term structure of its nominal
position. This maturity mismatch hypothesis predicts that di↵erences in the maturity
composition of net nominal assets can explain di↵erences in the interest rate sensitiv-
ity of bank stock returns. Aharony et al. (1986), Bae (1990), Kwan (1991), and Akella
and Greenbaum (1992) all reach similar conclusions that interest rate sensitivities are
highly correlated with the maturity structure of financial institutions. However, all
of these papers proxy monetary policy in a similar way by simply computing the dif-
ference in interest rates over an event period. Therefore, interpreting their reported
sensitivities raise endogeneity concerns because their assumption of exogenous mon-
etary policy is questionable.
The issue of endogeneity and finding a reasonably exogenous measure of mone-
tary policy is inherently di cult when one uses changes in the short term interest
rate because of the Federal Reserve’s reaction to developments in the macroeconomy
1. For example, how can we isolate interest rate changes that are exogenous from
rate changes due to broader economic conditions? This issue was first addressed by
Kuttner (2001) who separated changes in the federal funds rate target into an an-
1Rigobon and Sack (2003) identifies monetary policy based on the heteroskedasticity of stock
market returns and Wright (2012) uses heteroskedasticity of monetary policy shocks to measure its
e↵ect on long-term interest rates.
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ticipated and an unanticipated component around Federal Open Market Committee
announcements. By replacing interest rate changes of the aforementioned studies
with a “surprise” targets fund rate change, they are better able to capture exoge-
nous movements in policy and define them as monetary policy shocks 2. Following
Kuttner (2001)’s methodology, a voluminous literature on using monetary policy sur-
prises emerged. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) studied the impact of monetary policy
on equity prices by focusing on days in which the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) decided to change the target federal funds rate and found that on average,
an unanticipated 25-basis-point cut in the target rate is associated with a 1% increase
in value weighted stock returns. In addition, they take a more structured approach to
disentangle these stock return movements into the contributions of expected future
dividends (cash flows), future expected real interest rates used to discount them, and
equity premiums that come from holding stocks. They find that most of the stock
returns reaction occurs through expected future dividends and the equity premium.
Following the same spirit of focusing on FOMC meetings, Gurkaynak et al. (2004)
applied an intraday event-study to show that monetary policy is captured not only
by the current federal funds rate “target factor”, but also a factor associated with
the “future path of policy”. They find that the path factor has a greater e↵ect on
the long end of the yield curve but only a small e↵ect on the stock market. Subse-
quent literature on understanding the e↵ects of monetary policy shocks have largely
2FOMC announcements of target rate changes began in February 1994. Prior to that, the market
inferred its target based on the Fed’s behavior through open market operations
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followed in the footsteps of Kuttner (2001) and Gurkaynak et al. (2004) and have
motivated structural models using these reduced form results 3.
A more related work by English et al. (2018a) re-examines the relationship be-
tween interest rate sensitivity and maturity mismatch by estimating the reaction of
intraday bank stock returns induced by monetary policy announcements. In line with
the literature, they first find that bank stock prices decline following an unanticipated
increase in the level and slope of interest rates. By utilyzing bank balance sheet infor-
mation on maturities of their assets and liabilities, they conclude that banks heavily
engaged in maturity transformation face a smaller decline in their stock price following
a surprise steepening of the yield curve. This result is in line with the conventional
structure of banks as maturity transformers who benefit from a steep yield curve.
While this study and others that have preceeded it allow us to study the net e↵ects
of monetary policy surprises on the financial health of a bank, we are unable to guage
whether the institution is increasing its risk and adjusting its portfolio. The under-
lying changes that we see from stock price changes reveal nothing about the choices
that financial institutions make to adjust its risk profile 4.
More recently, Chodorow-Reich (2014) studies the e↵ect of unconventional mon-
etary policy during the winter of 2008-2009 on banks and life-insurance companies.
These unconventional policies included lowering the federal funds target rate to zero,
3For example, Ottonello and Winberry (2018) uses these monetary policy shocks to find that
firms with low leverage and high credit ratings are more responsive to monetary policy
4One approach by Begenau et al. (2015) finds that banks do not completely hedge their duration
risk from its portfolio.
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purchases of Treasury and mortgage-backed securities and other agency securities,
and forward guidance on the future path of the target rate. Using high-frequency
event studies of the impact on credit default swaps, yields, and stock prices of banks
around unanticipated FOMC announcements, Chodorow-Reich (2014) finds a strong
and stabalizing impact on banks and life-insurance companies. In particular, he finds
that CDS premiums fell and stock prices rose following the introduction of unconven-
tional monetary policy.
My paper adds to the literature by comparing the period prior to the Finan-
cial Crisis with the period during the zero lower bound and how monetary policy
announcements a↵ected banks di↵erently. The recent low interest environment has
garnered additional interest as banks begin to slowly adjust towards policy normal-
ization. Moreover, media attention has focused over the recent period, on how low
interest rate environments a↵ect bank health and profitability, with a fairly divisive
conclusion 5. A recent working paper by Wang et al. (2018) separates the e↵ects
of changes in the two-year Treasury yield on bank stock returns between low and
high interest rates environments. They find a similar reversal e↵ect where bank re-
turns increase in a low interest rate environment. In addition to documenting the
reversal e↵ect on bank returns, this paper also asks whether di↵erent balance sheet
characteristics a↵ect this sensitivity.
5WSJ (2018): “Low Interest Rates Don’t Hurt Bank Profits” and St. Louis Fed (2016): “Are
Banks More Profitable When Interest Rates Are High or Low?”
7




Nearly all work studying individual banks require using the quarterly Consolidated
Reports of Condition and Income (Call Report) filed to the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC). All commercial banks in the United States are required to file
the FFIEC 031 and FFIEC 041 forms, where data can be obtained directly from the
FDIC. Bank holding companies are required to submit the FR Y-9C form which can
be accessed from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago database. The FR Y-9C form
is prepared by banks that have at least $500 million worth of assets. Bank holding
companies (BHC) typically own commercial banks and can themselves also be owned
by another holding company. I focus on bank-holding companies, which are publicly
traded and therefore, have an associated stock return. Some crucial bank information
such as the maturity structure of assets and liabilties, however, are only available at
the bank subsidiary level and I aggregate them to the holding company level.
In the baseline event study, I estimate regressions of intradaily stock returns for
both banks and nonbanks on monetary policy surprises (defined below). This in-
formation comes from the NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) database which provides
millisecond intraday transactions data for all securities listed on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and the NASDAQ National
Market System (NMS) starting in 1993. I calculate the price at a particular time
8
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by taking the average of the recorded bid and ask prices and compute the one-hour







where Pt is the price of the security at time t.
My subsequent analysis requires a larger sample of banks than those listed in TAQ
and which have available balance sheet information. While I’m unable to recover high-
frequency intraday prices from other institutions, I gather daily and monthly stock
price information for other banks from The Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP). Using a link-table provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, I am
able to match these banks with their corresponding Call Report indentifier (RSSD) 7.
With each bank from CRSP having an associated RSSD identifier, I can easily match
stock returns with balance sheet information. This is also matched with data from
Compustat which provides financial and market information such as book and equity
value on all global firms.
6The choice of using a one-hour window follows that of Gurkaynak et al. (2004) and English et
al. (2018a) and allows time for price-discover by the market to occur. Using a wider window may
introduce news other than monetary policy
7https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html
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1.3.2 Monetary Policy Shocks
Monetary policy surprises are measured as intradaily changes of various interest
rate futures contracts around a one-hour window of FOMC announcements 8. This
narrow window period is chosen in order to avoid contamination from other sources of
information besides monetary policy. More importantly, this approach disentangles
the impact of policy response towards changes in economic developments which is
an endogeneity issue that can a↵ect event study estimates. Positive values of these
shocks are interpreted as surprise tightenings and negative values as surprise easings
9. Federal Open Market Committee meetings typically occur eight times a year and
announcements are released at approximately 2:15 PM (Eastern Standard Time). It is
important to note that in February 1994, the FOMC began this practice of issuing post
meeting announcements and most of my sample captures the one hour window around
this. However, shocks also existed prior to 1994 and the market received information
of policy stances by interpreting the size and type of open market operations. I
consider FOMC meetings from February 1st, 1984 to April 27th, 2016 which is a
total of 317 meetings 10. All other interest rate variables come from the FRED and
Bloomberg database.
8I thank Jonathan Wright and Eric Swanson for providing me with this data set
9A notable surprise easing occurred on March 18, 2009 when the Federal Reserve announced an
additional purchase of $ 750 billion of agency mortgage-backed securities. As a result, the 10-Year
Treasury fell 40 basis points within the hour
10There has, however, been intermeeting policy moves where announcements occurred unscheduled
and did not necessarily occur at 2:15PM. These include October 15, 1998; January 3, 2001; and April
18, 2001
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1.4 Event Study Results
1.4.1 Time Series
1.4.1.1 All Firms
In order to test whether my sample is reflective of the literature, I begin by
examining whether my event study results on the aggregate stock market are in line
with what previous authors have found. Among the futures contracts available, I
measure monetary policy shocks as the surprise in federal funds rate futures contract
in the current month scaled by the number of days in the month and denote this by
MP111. Given the presence of unconventional monetary policy, I split the sample
into two periods: the pre-zero lower bound (pre-ZLB) period (February 4, 1993 -
December 16, 2008) and the zero lower bound (ZLB) period (January 28, 2009 -
April 4, 2016). While MP1 is appropriate during the pre-ZLB period, there were no
surprise changes in the target funds rate during the ZLB period. Therefore, during the
ZLB, I use the surprise changes in the fourth eurodollars futures contract ED4 which
measures the market’s expectation on what the LIBOR rate will be in a year. This
variable has been described by Gurkaynak et al. (2004) as an appropriate indicator
for the path of future policy and in fact, during the onset of the Financial Crisis
(2009), the market priced ED4 as if lift-o↵ would occur in the next six months. I also
11This measure is also used by Kuttner (2001), Gurkaynak et al. (2004), and Bernanke and Kuttner
(2005)
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consider the residuals from the projection of changes in the fourth eurodollar futures
contract ED4t onto the target surprise MP1t. These residuals, PATHt represent
all aspects of FOMC announcements that move futures rate for the upcoming year
without changing the current federal funds rate.
On the firm side, I remove companies that have fewer than 30 observations of
intradaily returns on FOMC days and remove the September 17, 2001 meeting which
followed the terrorist attacks12. Taking an average across all firms, I compute an














ED4t + ✏t t 2 ZLB
(1.2)
where R̄t is the average across all intradaily returns of all firms in the NASDAQ
on FOMC meeting t.
12The FOMC had an unscheduled meeting on September 17, 2001 to cut interest rates by 50 basis
points
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Table 1.1: The Response of Average Stock Returns (NASDAQ) to Monetary Policy
Shocks
The table reports the results of a regression of average intradaily returns on FOMC meeting t for
both the period before the zero lower bound and during it. Prior to the zero-lower bound, returns
on FOMC meeting t are regressed on the surprise component of the change in the federal funds
target (MP1) and on the PATH factor. The PATH factor is the residual from a regression of ED4
on MP1. There are 7,291 firms included in the sample. All variables are expressed in decimal form
and are interpreted as the response of stock returns to a surprise of a 1% point surprise rise.
Column (1) corresponds to the period prior to the zero-lower bound and Column (2) includes the
zero-lower bound. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors reported in parenthesis
Table 1.1 reports the results of the time-series regression. Prior to the zero-lower
bound, a 1% surprise increase in the target rate is associated with a 2.27% decline in
the average stock market. This value is closely aligned with Bernanke and Kuttner
(2005) and Gurkaynak et al. (2004) who find a value of 5% and 4% respectively. The
path surprise leads to a statistically significant decline of 2.5% decline in the aggregate
stock market 13. Using the fourth eurodollar futures contract drastically increases the
sensititivity to 7%. Given that there is limited literature that has focused exclusively
13Gurkaynak et al. (2004) finds an insignificant e↵ect of the path surprise on the S&P 500 which
could be due to the di↵erent sample of firms used and time period of 1991-2004
13
CHAPTER 1. THE EFFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS ON BANK
STOCK RETURNS
on the e↵ects of these shocks during the zero lower bound, this magnitude is di cult
to compare. One exception is Ampudia and Van den Heuvel (2017) who find that a
100bp increase in the Euro OverNight Index (EONIA) corresponds to an 8% increase
in European bank stock returns during crisis periods with low interest rates.
Rigobon and Sack (2003) Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) Gurkaynak et al. (2004) Yuan (2019)
Identification Heteroskedasticity Survey Futures Futures Futures
Data SP500 SP500 CRSP-weighted SP500 NASDAQ
 
1
-6.2% -5.5% -5.3% -4.03% -2.27%
Table 1.2: Comparisons with the Literature
The table reports the identification methodology for monetary policy surprises, the data-set
considered, and the sensitivity of equity returns to these surprises. All  1 coe cients are negative
and correspond to a 1% surprise tightening.
In Table 1.2, I compare my return sensitivity during the pre-ZLB period with
the literature to determine whether the surprises generated sensible results in my
sample of firms. My estimate is smaller than what previous authors have documented
which can be attributed to them studying the aggregate S&P 500 which comprises
di↵erent firms. All of the aformentioned papers also focus on daily returns around
announcements which could contain news other than monetary policy. If this is the
case, they are overestimating their coe cients because of returns being potentially
driven by other variables.
1.4.1.2 Banks
There are large heterogeneities across banks in my sample which a↵ect its time
series aggregation sensitivities. For example, riskiness, leverage, and its overall size
14
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make the banks in my sample vastly di↵erent from one another. In order to test
whether there are significant di↵erences between the sensitivity of bank stock re-
turns and all other returns, I run industry-by-industry time series regressions using
returns from daily industry portfolios from Kenneth French’s website. The portfolio
is constructed as follows: each NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stock is assigned to an
industry portfolio at the end of June of year t based on its 4 digit SIC code at the
time. Returns are then computed from July of t to June of t+1. I estimate for each of
the 49 industries, the same time series regression as given by Equation 1.2. For each
of the industry portfolios, there is a statistically significant decline in daily returns
following a monetary tightening shock during the pre-ZLB period. Figure 1.1 plots
the estimated coe cient for each of the 49 Industry portfolios before (green bar) and
during (red bar) the zero-lower bound. It is clear that for the period prior to the zero
lower bound, a monetary policy tightening surprise led to a negative e↵ect on stock
returns. When turning over the zero lower bound sample, all industries continue to
face a negative coe cient except for Banks. In particular, in the pre-ZLB period, a
1% surprise increase in the fourth eurodollars futures contract led to a decline of 6%
in bank stock returns. During the ZLB period, however, this same a↵ect led to an
increase of 2% in bank stock returns which suggests a reversal e↵ect that exists in the
time series. I now turn to cross-sectional evidence using my data of intradaily returns
to examine whether banks and non-banks faced di↵erent sensitivities to monetary
policy surprises and whether this reversal e↵ect exists.
15
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Figure 1.1: Regression Coe cients From French 49 Portfolio Daily Return
This bar graph shows the estimated   coe cient on ED4 for each of the 49 Industries using
Kenneth French’s data library. The green line bar corresponds to the sample period prior to the
ZLB and the orange bar corresponds to the same period during the ZLB
1.4.2 Pooled Regression
I now consider the universe of firms for which I have intradaily data from TAQ and
separate them into banks (b) and nonbanks (nb). Banks are defined as institutions
that have an RSSD ID which is a unique identifier assigned by the Federal Reserve.
Again, I split the sample time period to account for di↵erences between the pre-ZLB
with the ZLB. For the two groups, I run the following pooled regression (over the
cross-section and time series) with standard errors clustered at the FOMC date level:
Ri,t =  0 +  1MPSt + ✏i,t (1.3)
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where Ri,t is the intradaily return of firm i and MPSt is the intradaily monetary
policy surprise. Similar to the aggregate time series results in Table 1.1, I define
the monetary policy surprise MPSt as the surprise component of the change in the
federal funds target (MP1) and the PATH factor prior the zero lower bound and
changes in the fourth eurodollar futures contract (ED4) during the zero lower bound.
Table 1.3a shows the estimation results for non-banks. For non-banks, prior to the
zero lower bound, a 1% surprise tightening in the path factor leads to a 2.27% decline
in returns and a 2.54% decline during the ZLB. This is quite similar to the aggregate
time series results of Table 1.1 which is unsurprising given that most of the sample are
non-banks. Clustering standard errors at the FOMC announcement date level allows
for correlation among firm stock returns within a meeting but independent across
meetings. The results for banks is presented in Table 1.3b and shows the existence of
the reversal e↵ect that we see from Figure 1.1. Prior the zero lower bound, bank stock
returns behaved quite similarly to non-banks with a 1% surprise tightening leading
to a 1.8% drop in returns. During the zero-lower bound, however, this sensitivity
reversed signs and became a 1.20% increase.
As a robustness check, I re-estimate the cross-sectional regression using monthly
returns from CRSP and find a similar reversal from negative 96 bp to positive 165bp.
The results presented thus far assume that bank stock returns are impacted only by
monetary policy surprises during the FOMC event window considered.
17
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(a) Pooled Regression of Non-Bank Stock Returns on Monetary Policy Shocks
(1) (2)









(b) Pooled Regression of Bank Stock Returns on Monetary Policy Shocks
(1) (2)









Table 1.3: Pooled Event Study Regressions
This table reports the results of estimating Equation 1.3, a pooled regression (over the
cross-section and time series) of non-bank (Panel 1.3a) and bank (Panel 1.3b) intradaily returns
Ri,t on FOMC meeting dates for both the period before the zero lower bound and during it. Prior
to the zero-lower bound, returns on FOMC meeting t are regressed on the surprise component of
the change in the federal funds target (MP1) and on the PATH factor. The PATH factor is the
residual from a regression of ED4 on MP1. There are 5,803 non banks included in the sample. All
variables are expressed in decimal form and are interpreted as the response of stock returns to a
surprise of a 1% point surprise rise. Column (1) corresponds to the period prior to the zero-lower
bound and Column (2) includes the zero-lower bound. Returns are winsorized at the 2% and 98%
level. Standard errors are clustered at the FOMC date level
However, interest rates fluctuate daily and it is important to address whether
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these normal movements also a↵ect bank stock returns in the same way suggested
by these event study results. In other words, are the e↵ects on bank stock returns
purely based on interest rate changes or on FOMC induced interest rate surprises?
I show in Appendix A.5 that FOMC days are indeed unique and produce di↵erent
sensitivities on bank stock returns. For example, I show that regressing bank stock
returns on changes in various Treasury yields display a reversal e↵ect only on FOMC
meeting days (Table A.1) but not on all other non-FOMC days (Table A.2) suggesting
a unique e↵ect on announcement days. Furthermore, I show that during the pre-ZLB
period (Table A.4), a 1% increase in the 2-Year Treasury yield had a 5.5% larger
negative e↵ect on FOMC days relative to non-FOMC days. This could occur perhaps
because on non-FOMC days, the positive e↵ect of yields on bank stock returns is due
in large part to a macroeconomic e↵ect where a stronger economy is associated with
higher yields and returns. The relationship on FOMC days, however, could better
capture unanticipated shifts in policy. Finally, in Appendix A.6, I show that the re-
versal of bank returns also exists when I estimate the event study and identify shocks
by heteroskedasticity, which assumes that the variance of monetary policy shocks is
greater on FOMC days vs non-FOMC days.
While these results are informative of the change in direction of bank return sensi-
tivities, they do not explain what characteristics of banks could impact its magnitude.
In the next section, I describe a model to motivate why a bank’s maturity mismatch,
riskiness, and market power could have a di↵erential impact on a bank’s sensitivity
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to monetary policy shocks. Finally, I use these three characteristics and ask which




Motivated by the reversal e↵ect that I find empirically for bank stock returns,
I consider a model that can account for this as well as bank characteristics that
should show stronger or weaker sensitivities to monetary policy. There has been an
emerging literature that explores the prolonged e↵ects of remaining at the zero lower
bound. Also known as a “liquidity trap”, standard New Keynesian models predict
that the economy enters into a deep recession where consumption and growth can
be stimulated by forward guidance and promises to keep interest rates low in the
future. Moreover, these models suggest that growth is bad and that the destruction
of output, capital, and productivity can raise GDP (Cochrane (2013). These results
seem to suggest that the laws of economics flip signs during prolonged periods of low
interest rates. I consider a model in which the same reversal occurs for bank stock
returns during the zero lower bound period.
Brunnermeier and Koby (2018) has argued that the bank lending channel reverses
during this period and that a lower policy rate can become contractionary. This
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occurs because the recapitalization gains from accomodative policy are o↵set by de-
creases in the bank’s net interest margin. More specifically, banks with long term
fixed assets benefit from a surprise rate cut because they continue to receive high
interest payments and can refinance it at a lower rate. This increases the value of
the bank’s equity which relaxes any regulatory constraints they face. However, the
lower policy rate also contracts the bank’s net interest margin. Under the case of a
perfectly competitive financial market, a lower policy rate will pass through to both
loan and deposit rates leaving the net interest margin una↵ected. Therefore, banks
unambigiously benefit from an accomodative policy surprise. This implication will
change when we consider the more realistic fact that banks have market power and
do not perfectly adjust deposit rates for their customers. During normal times, any
tightening surprises will induce capital losses on banks but also lead to higher net
interest margins. If the former e↵ect is greater than the latter, banks will face an
overall decrease in their net worth leading to tighter capital constraints and a reduc-
tion in its stock return. However, if the e↵ects on higher net interest margin surpasses
its capital losses, this will lead to an increase in overall net worth, loosening capital
constraints and increasing the bank’s stock return. Brunnermeier and Koby (2018)
defines the point at which this occurs as the “reversal interest rate”. My empirical
results test the implications of this theory and how this mechanism is a↵ected by a
bank’s maturity mismatch, risk, and market power.
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1.5.2 Set-Up
I consider a partial equilibrium banking model similar to that of Brunnermeier
and Koby (2018). In the model, banks choose an interest rate to charge on loans
iL, an interest to pay on deposits iD, and a quantity S of safe assets to hold. Banks
have some market power and can mark-up iL and mark down iD. Banks also have an
equity endowment E which represent their portfolio of long term asset holdings.
1.5.2.1 Banks
Assets
Banks issue loans L according to some loan demand function L(iL), where L
0
< 0.
A higher loan rate is associated with more expensive cost of investment and thus
leads to a lower demand for loans. In this partial equilibrium setting, loans are only
a function of the nominal loan rate that the bank chooses iL. We can think of these
loans as standard consumer, credit card, and commercial loans. Banks can also choose
to invest in some quantity of safe asset S which are available in a perfectly elastic
supply. These safe assets can include bonds, reserves, or cash and o↵er a return equal
to the nominal interest rate i which is determined by the central bank’s policy rate.
Liabilities
Banks use deposits D from households to fund their lending and investment activity.
These deposits are determined by the deposit function D(iD), where D
0
> 0. A higher
deposit rate is attractive for households who wish to earn a higher return on their
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savings. I assume that households in this economy can shop around for better rates
if the rate o↵ered iD is too low.
In addition, banks also have some initial book equity E
0
(i) which is a function of
the nominal interest rate i. Banks can potentially acquire unexpected capital gains
following an easing shock or capital losses following a tightening shock. This occurs
because of the duration risk that banks face, where a lower policy rate induces capital
gains on long term assets they hold. In addition, risky assets that banks hold will be
discounted at a lower rate and thus increase the price of these securities leading to




Capital and Risk Constraints
Banks face a regulatory constraint that limits how much risky loans they can issue.
If we assume that  L is some risk weight determined by regulators, then the amount
of risky loans that can be issued must be covered by the bank’s profit.
 LL  ⇡ (1.4)
Liquidity Constraints
Banks also face a liquidity constraint where its safe asset holdings S must cover a
certain fraction of deposits  D. This constraint reflects the fact that banks need to
have a bu↵er of assets in the event of a sudden outflow of deposits and cash above
and beyond what is covered by deposit insurance. It can also be interpreted as the
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recent Liquidity Coverage Ratio regulation where banks need to hold highly liquid
assets S in order to meet short term liabilities D.
 DD  S (1.5)
If we interpret S as reserves, Equation 1.5 can also be thought of the bank’s reserve
requirement. The bank must keep a fraction  D of deposits as reserves. Since I
assume that banks do not earn interest on excess reserves, they will not hold excess




(1 + iL)L+ (1 + i)S   (1 + iD)D
subject to L+ S = D + E
0
(i)
 LL  ⇡





where ⇡ is the maximized profits of the bank, iL is the loan rate the bank chooses to
charge, L is the loan demand function the bank faces, i is the nominal interest rate
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chosen by the central bank, S is the quantity of safe assets the bank chooses, iD is
the deposit rate the bank chooses to pay, and D is the deposit supply function the
bank faces.








 L    
D


















where ✏f is the semi-elasticity of the function f with respect to the loan and deposit
rates,  L and  D are the Lagrangian multiplier on the capital and liquidity constraint,
respectively. From Equation 1.7, we can see that there is a mark-up relative to the
nominal interest rate on rates that banks charge on loans and from Equation 1.8, a
mark-down on deposit rates paid out. Equation 1.8 shows that the bank does not
allow the deposit rate to fall below zero which is the zero lower bound constraint.
When the capital and liquidity contraints are both slack, the multipliers  L and  D
are simply zero.
In order to see the role that market power plays in determining deposit rates,
suppose for simplicity, that liquidity and capital constraints are slack. We can then
rewrite the optimal deposit rate as:
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is the mark-down that banks charge over the deposit rate. Define the
spread that bank i charges its depositers as follows:
si ⌘ i  iD (1.10)
Intuitively, the larger the spread si is, the more bank i is able to extract from depos-
itors in order to earn more profit. The spread si is determined in equilibrium by the
amount of deposits that households demand. I now turn to the household’s problem
of choosing deposits.
1.5.2.2 Households
The representative household is modeled similar to Drechsler et al. (2017) where
each maximizes utility over final wealth W and liquidity services l according to a













where   is a share parameter that describes the relative importance of liquidity over fi-
nal wealth and ⇢ is the elasticity of substitution between wealth and liquidity services.
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I assume that ⇢ < 1 which corresponds to wealth and liquidity being complements.
Liquidity services l are also a composite of cash holdings M and deposits D according











where   measures the liquidity of deposits relative to cash and ✏ is the elasticity of
substitution between cash and deposits. Equation 1.12 captures the fact that both
cash M and deposits D are used in transactions and contribute to liquidity needs
and substitution between these types will determine the behavior of spreads. Like
Drechsler et al. (2017) and Tella and Kurlat (2017), I assume that deposits and cash
are substitutes and therefore ✏ > 1. Because this model requires some di↵erentiation















where 1 < ⌘ < 1 is the elasticity of substitution across banks. Deposits are imperfect
substitutes which give banks market power over the spreads they charge si. It is







weights by the amount of bank i’s deposits over the total amount of deposits. The
budget constraint of households is:
W = W
0
(1 + i) Mi Ds (1.14)
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where the final wealth W is equal to the return they earn on their initial wealth W
0
by investing in the nominal interest rate and the amount they forego from holding
cash M . This expression is somewhat unconventional, as most banking models have
depositors earning a deposit rate iD. However, recall from Equation 1.10 that s is
a spread and thus, accounts for the fact that depositors are paid a deposit rate iD.
Households choose the amount of deposits to leave at bank i, Di by taking as given
the mark-up or spread of the bank si subject to the constraint that aggregate deposits



















Interpreting the weighted average deposit spread s as an overall cost of deposits D,
we can show that in a symmetric equilbrium that the elasticity of demand for bank
















Equation 1.16 shows that as bank i increases its spread si, it will face outflows from
two sources: an aggregate e↵ect and an inter-bank e↵ect. By raising its spread si, this
makes the overall spread s greater and results in deposits D being more expensive
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overall. This e↵ect is especially large if banks are located in more concentrated areas
with fewer competitors (low N). The second source occurs when the bank’s spread
si increases by one percent, the average spread will rise by
1
N
. Therfore, bank i’s
relative spread increases by 1- 1
N
and outflows will occur at the rate ⌘, the elasticity of
substition across banks. Drechsler et al. (2017) assumes that the elasticity of demand
for bank i’s deposits is -1 and using this fact, we can arrive at the following expression
for market power 14:
  @D/D
@s/s
= 1  (⌘   1)(N   1) ⌘ M (1.17)
The expression in Equation 1.17 is a quantity that can be interpreted as market
power, as it is greater when there is fewer banks competing (low N) or because its
deposits are less substitutable (low ⌘). Our ultimate goal is to understand how bank
stock returns respond to interactions between monetary policy shocks and measures
of market power M. In order to solve Equation 1.17 for s in closed form, I follow
Drechsler et al. (2017) and assume that   ! 0, which removes the impact of the





















14The proof for this derivation is provided in Appendix A.2
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which shows that the household’s elasticity of demand for deposits is a weighted
average of their elasticity of substitution to cash ✏ and bonds ⇢. It is worth noting
that Equation 1.18 gives implications for the spread during high and low interest rate
environments. Suppose that the nominal interest rate i is high. This makes cash a
relatively expensive source of liquidity and any substitution that households make is
towards bonds. The elasticity of demand @D/D
@s/s
is therefore close to ⇢ which is a small
number less than 1. As a result, a high interest rate environment makes the household
demand for deposits relatively inelastic allowing banks to charge a high spread s. On
the other hand, low interest rate environments make cash a less expensive source of
liquidity and households move towards ✏, a number greater than 1. In other words,
during low interest rate environments, the elasticity of demand for deposits is elastic
and banks charge a low spread to avoid large outflows. I show in Appedix A.3 that
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Figure 1.2: Deposit Spread
This is a plot of the aggregate deposit spread charged by the bank as a function of the nominal
interest rate i. It is evaluated at low market power (dotted blue line), medium market power
(black solid line), and high market power (red dotted line). I assume an elasticity of substitution
between cash and deposits ✏ = 6.6077, liquidity of deposits relative to cash   = 0.10, elasticity of
substitution between wealth and liquidity services ⇢ = 0.93
Figure 1.2 plots the simulated aggregate deposit spread as a function of the nom-
inal interest rate i. As in Drechsler et al. (2017), the spread s(i,M) is increasing in
the interest rate as well as in the market power. For a given nominal interest rate,
higher values of market power M, are associated with larger speads. This yields one
implication of the model that can be tested empirically. Banks that are located in con-
centrated areas associated with greater market power charge a higher deposit spread
and thus should face a smaller negative stock return response to monetary policy
shocks. In the subsequent empirical section, I proxy M using Herfindahl-Hirschman
index (HHI) of banks’ share of the deposit market in each county.
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1.5.3 Monetary Policy E↵ects
I now consider how monetary policy surprises can a↵ect the bank’s profit, which













Using the definition of µ, the multiplier on the budget constraint from above and
substituting in, we get:
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Define the net interest margin NIM as:







Therefore, Equation 1.21 can be written as:
d⇡
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Net Interest Margin Channel
Positive







From Equation 1.23, it is clear that bank profits will increase following a surprise
tightening if the positive net-interest margin e↵ect dominates the negative capital
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losses e↵ect. If however, capital losses following interest rate increases are su ciently
large, bank profits will decline. Any sign switches in the stock price reaction to news
about interest rates between pre-zero lower bound and during the zero lower bound
can thus be attributed one channel dominating the other.  L, the Lagrangian mul-
tiplier, will magnify the response if the capital constraint binds ( L > 0). At this
point, banks are unable to increase loans and must partially increase its holdings on
safe assets S. With a higher holding of risky assets, banks will become more sensitive
to monetary policy surprises through Equation 1.22. The net-interest margin also
depends on the sensitivity of the spread with respect to the nominal interest rate
which as I’ve shown in Figure 1.2 depends on the bank’s market power M.
The model I’ve described accounts for the event study results presented in Section
1.5, where the sensitivity of bank stock returns reversed prior to and during the zero
lower bound. I found that prior to the zero lower bound, bank stock returns declined
following a tightening surprise, which using Equation 1.23 must be attributed to cap-
ital losses dominating any increases in the net interest margin. During the zero lower
bound, however, bank stock returns reacted positively which suggests that higher net
interest margins dominated any capital losses that banks faced. As maturity trans-
formers, banks benefit from a steeper yield curve because they fund long term assets
by borrowing short term liabilities. Therefore, a testable implication not explicitly
modeled is whether surprise increases in the slope of the yield curve dampen the cap-
ital losses channel for banks who engage heavily in maturity transformation. In other
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words, for banks that have a large maturity gap between their assets and liabilities,
do steeper yield curve surprises dampen the negative e↵ect of stock returns? In the
next section, I test this cross-sectionally and find that the answer is yes which is in
line with English et al. (2018a).
Returning to the capital constraint in Equation 1.4, one can interpret the term
 L as a coe cient of risk on loans whereby banks are constrained on a fraction of
their loans that can be deemed risky. This constraint can arise from regulatory rea-
sons which place limits on how much risk-taking a bank can engage in. A su cient
increase in  L will bind Equation 1.4 ( L > 0 ) which can lead to an amplification
e↵ect on bank profits via Equation 1.23. A testable implication is whether increases
in bank risk, magnify the response of bank returns to monetary policy surprises - a
question that has not been addressed in the literature. I find that the answer is yes
both before and during the zero-lower bound period.
Adding to the conversation of how the market power of banks can play a role in
intermediation through its deposit rates (Drechsler et al. (2017)), I also test whether
banks located in regions of higher concentration face an attenuated response to mone-
tary policy shocks. The intuition can be found in Equation 1.22, where the sensitivity
of a bank’s net interest margin with respect to monetary policy surprises depends on
the sensitivity of its deposit spread. Banks located in highly concentrated regions
can charge a higher spread (lower deposit rate) than their counterparts in more com-
petitve environments. This occurs because there are less opportunities for depositers
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to switch across banks in concentrated regions. Therefore, banks that behave more
monopolistically, can pay a lower deposit rate and will face a less adverse shock to
their returns. I test this implication by using county-level bank data and measuring
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of each county, I find that banks located in
highly concetrated markets (large HHI) have about half the negative response in stock
returns than banks located in highly competitive markets (low HHI).
In the next section, I empirically test the implications of the model by regress-
ing bank stock returns on monetary policy shocks interacted with these di↵erent
bank characteristics. The coe cient on this interaction term reveals whether bank
heterogeneities produce di↵erent return sensitivities to monetary policy shocks. Fur-
thermore, using a panel Vector Autogression along the lines of Vuolteenaho (2002),
Campbell and Ammer (1993), and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) I ask whether news
about cash flows, expected returns, or real rates are driving these di↵erential sensitiv-
ities. The underlying mechanism behind the reversal e↵ect is that higher net interest
margins dominate the negative e↵ects of the discount rate channel. A decomposition
of return sensitivities into news related to cash flows and discount rates would allow
me to ascertain whether news about real rates dominated in the pre-ZLB and cash
flow news dominated during the ZLB.
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1.6 VAR Analysis
1.6.1 Components of Returns
Stock returns are driven by shocks to expected cash flows, discount rates, and
expected returns. In studying the sensitivity of returns to policy shocks and why a
sign change occurred, it is useful to decompose its change into these three di↵erent
components in order to understand which piece is driving its variation. This decom-
position began with Campbell and Ammer (1993) and Campbell and Shiller (1988a)
who posited that movements in stock returns can be well summarized by the three
components.
Three Components : Cash Flows, Expected Returns, and Real Rates
Despite most of the literature finding a negligible role of real interest rates in driving
stock returns, it seems reasonable to include them for banks because of its inherent
exposure to them. Movements in stock returns are assumed to be driven by changes
in expectations of future cash flows, real interest rates, and expected returns. I follow
Campbell and Shiller (1988a) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) who linearly decom-
pose the excess equity returns into three components: (1) news about real interest
rates, (2) dividends, and (3) future excess returns. I define the object of interest to
be the bank holding period stock return yt+1. This will have an unexpected return
(eyt+1) which can be expressed as revisions in the expectation of discounted future
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dividends (ẽdt+1), the real interest rate (ẽ
r






t+1   ẽrt+1   ẽ
y
t+1 (1.24)
This can be expressed as:













where ⇢ is a discount factor that is set to 0.9962. Equation 1.24 is a dynamic ac-
counting identity that comes from the basic definition of a holding period return and
applying a log-linearization. It says that if the unexpected stock return is negative,
then either expected future dividend growth is lower, expected future stock returns
are higher, or expected future real interest rates are higher, or any of them. Suppose
an asset with fixed dividends faces a decline in its price so that eyt+1 is negative. This
leads to a higher dividend yield and assuming no further capital losses, we should
expect to see an increase in the asset’s future return (i.e. a higher ẽyt+1). Therefore,
Equation 1.24 is consistent. The discount rate ⇢ reflects the notion that increases of
stock returns further out in the future is associated with a smaller decline in today’s
15I provide a proof of this decomposition in Appendix A.4
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stock price than increases closer to present day. Consider, for example, that there
is news that stock returns will be higher ten periods from today. This must result
in a large decline of the stock price today and subsequent smaller declines in the
remaining nine periods. These subsequent declines mechanically reduce the required
size of today’s dropped stock price.
Estimating Equation 1.24 requires empirical proxies for the expectations in Equa-
tion 1.25 and I again follow the approach of Campbell and Ammer (1993) to model
these expectations using a vector auto-regression (VAR). This monthly VAR includes
six variables: the bank’s stock returns, the real interest rate defined as the 3 month
Treasury bill minus the log di↵erence of nonseasonally adjusted CPI, the relative bill
rate defined as the 6 month Treasury bill minus its 12 month moving average, the
change in the six-month Treasury rate, the dividend-price ratio, and the Term Spread
between a 10 Year Treasury rate and a 3 month bill. An individual bank’s i state
vector zi,t can be written as follows:
zi,t =  zi,t 1 + ui,t
⌃ = E(ui,t, ui,t)
(1.26)
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where ey and er are 1 ⇥ np selection matrices for the return and real interest rates,
respectively. With this, I am able to assess the relative contributions of news about
real interest rates, cash flows, and expected future returns to movements in the current
stock return. There is, however, no monetary policy surprises in this framework, which
is my main focus. In order to incorporate monetary policy surprises in this framework,
I include the intradaily jumps during each FOMC meeting as an exogenous variable
by aggregating them to the month and quarterly level. This allows me to identify
the e↵ects of monetary policy surprises on future expected returns within the VAR
framework.
zi,t =  zi,t 1 +  MPSt + !i,t| {z }
ui,t
(1.28)
where !i,t is orthogonal to the monetary policy surprise MPSt and e↵ectively decom-
poses the forecast error term ui,t into a component related to news about monetary
policy  MPSt and a component incorporating other news 16. I estimate Equation
16Estimating  , which is an n x 1 vector can be done in two ways. The first and most obvious
way is to estimate Equation 1.28 directly by including MPSt as an exogenous variable in the VAR.
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1.28 which is a VAR augmented by a monetary policy surprise ED4.





r(1  ⇢ ) 1( MPSt + !i,t)
ẽdt+1 = e
y( MPSt + !i,t) +  
0
( MPSt + !i,t) + e
r(1  ⇢ ) 1( MPSt + !i,t)
(1.29)
where again ẽdt+1 is calculated by backing out the response of expected returns and real
rates. Taking the first derivative with respect to MPSt in each of the expressions in
Equation 1.29 will give the response of each component to a monetary policy surprise.
In other words, I decompose the response of stock returns to monetary policy surprises
into each of the respective components in order to assess which pieces of news is
driving the overall response. I calculate the t-statistic by estimating standard errors
using the delta method. Because I’m also interested in the heterogeneities of banks,
I form portfolios of bank stock returns along three characteristics before and during
the ZLB: maturity mismatch, risk, and market power. I consider banks in the lower
and upper decile along each of the three characteristics which yields a total of six
portfolios. These portfolios will be useful in understanding the di↵erential impact of
monetary policy for various bank characteristics. I estimate the derivatives of each
This, however, limits the sample period from 1984 to 2008, when monetary policy surprise data is
available. A di↵erent method would be to do a two-stage regression where a pooled regression of
zi,t is first run on its lag zi,t 1 to estimate the coe cient matrix  . The second stage would then
regress the VAR’s 1-step ahead forecast errors ui,t on monetary policy surprises MPSt to estimate
 . I take the first approach of including the shocks as an exogenous variable in the VAR.
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expression in Equation 1.29 with respect to MPSt and report the results in Table
1.4.
Table 1.4 presents the results of estimating the impact of monetary policy shocks
on the news components, where the shaded blue line denotes the news components
that dominates. In the pre-ZLB period (Panel 1.4a), I find that the negative e↵ect
of monetary policy shocks is due to news about real rates. This result di↵ers from
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) who finds that for the aggregate stock market, news
about future real rates don’t matter and that most of the sensitivity is driven by
future excess returns and cash flows. Turning over to the ZLB period (Panel 1.4b),
I find that most of the sensitivity is driven from news about future cash flows. This
result is in line with what we expect from the model’s prediction that the reversed
interest rate e↵ect is generated when the increased benefits of net interest margin
(cash flows) outweighs the negative capital loss e↵ect (real rate). To my knowledge,
the only paper that applies this decomposition to banks is Bredin et al. (2007). In
their paper, they estimate the same decomposition, except they use data from the
United Kingdom and consider di↵erent industries - one of which is the banking sector.
They find that from 1975-2004, tightening surprises had a negative impact on news
about dividends and expected excess returns, while having a positive impact on news
related to real interest rates. My analysis is di↵erent because I consider banks along
di↵erent characteristics (maturity, risk, and market power). The magnitudes of my
estimates are also extremely large while the overall net e↵ect is reasonable. A recent
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paper by Kontonikas et al. (2015) applies the same methodology to 10-year bonds
and finds a similar implication that while the sensitivity of each news component
is extremely large, the overall net e↵ect is reasonable. I do not put much value
on the magnitudes of each component, per-se, but rather use it to conclude that
whereas news about the real interest rate dominated the pre-ZLB period, news about
cash flows dominated the ZLB period. These magnitudes are backed out using the
accounting identity in Equation 1.27.
1.6.2 Maturity Mismatch
I test the hypothesis that banks more heavily engaged in maturity transformation
have an attenuated negative response to monetary policy surprises. The conventional
business model of banks is to borrow at the short term interest rate through demand
deposits and to lend at a higher rate in the form of loan issuance. The di↵erence in
rates is called the net-interest margin and is one measure of bank profitability. Using
the conventional theory that banks benefit from a steep yield curve, I test whether
cross sectional di↵erences among banks’ maturity gap play a key role explaining
di↵erences in reaction to monetary policy. It is important to emphasize that banks
benefit from a steeping of the yield curve, which is a more specific type of monetary
policy surprise. If there is a surprise level tightening however, it would seem that
banks with long term fixed assets that have not yet matured would not benefit from
higher interest income while also needing to pay out higher deposit rates through
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short term liabilities. Banks with a longer maturity gap, are in a sense, “locked-in”
for a longer period of relatively low interest income, and would be hurt by this type
of surprise. This would be the case for a shift in the level of interest rates as proxied
by MP1. Rather than using MP1 as my shock, I am using ED4, which is a bet
on the short term LIBOR rate four quarters ahead. This shock contains information
on both the level and slope of the term structure and depending on the direction it
a↵ects banks with greater maturity mismatch, will inform me of which dimension of
policy dominates. The interpretation is that banks with higher maturity gaps tend
to benefit from steeper yield curves because they’re able to extract higher interest
income and pay lower deposit rates for a longer time. It is true that banks face
immediate capital losses on their long maturity assets upon a slope tightening, but in
subsequent periods, banks will reprice their loans at a higher rate. This latter e↵ect
is arguably more important, if we interpret stocks as representing the total sum of
future discounted cash flows. In fact, Hanson and Stein (2015) finds evidence that
when the yield curve steepens, banks increase the maturity of their security holdings.
If the long end interest rates surprisingly rises while the short end falls, banks that
engage in more maturity transformation are rewarded longer. It is this mechanism
that I hope to capture in my regressions and the channel that English et al. (2018a)
explores.
English et al. (2018a) applies a similar reasoning in an event study framework and
finds that share prices of banks that engage heavily in maturity transformation have
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a significantly less negative response to tightening shocks. I find a similar result and
conclude that ED4 contains information about the slope of the term structure which
dominates any level e↵ect. Using their framework, I define a maturity gap Ti,t for
bank i in quarter t as the di↵erence in maturity between its asset and liability:
Ti,t = ⌅
A
i,t   ⌅Li,t (1.30)
where ⌅Ai,t and ⌅
L
i,t is the weighted average asset and liability repricing/maturity period






















where mkA is the maturity of asset category k, m
k
L is the maturity of liability category
k, Aki,t is asset k for bank i, and L
k
i,t is liability k for bank i. The value captures how
much longer it takes assets to mature before liabilities.
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Figure 1.3: Average Maturity Gap T̄ across all banks
For each bank i and quarter t in my sample, I compute its maturity gap Ti,t.
Details of this calculation is provided in Data Appendix A.7. Figure 1.3 plots a time
series of the average maturity gap T̄ across all banks in each quarter. The time series
pattern shows a gradual increase in the gap from 1997 to early 2000 followed by a
decline through 2005. There is also an upward trend from 2005 to 2015 reflecting
the growing di↵erence between the maturity of assets and liabilities of average bank
balance sheet. I then consider the bottom and top decile of banks by their maturity
gap to test the hypothesis that banks that have greater maturity mismatches face a
smaller decline in their stock returns. The average maturity gap Ti,t in my sample is
3.14 years which mean that bank assets face an approximately 3 year greater maturity
than their liabilities. The first decile is 1.375 years and the top decile is 5.98 years.
I test the implication using a cross-sectional regression and interact monetary
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policy surprises with the bank’s maturity gap which is an empirical approach similar
to English et al. (2018a)17. Because bank balance sheets are quarterly, I take an
average across monthly bank returns and monetary policy surprises over the quarter.
The quarterly monetary policy surprises are interacted with the quarterly balance
sheet variables. An important distinction between this specification and English et
al. (2018a) is that their dependent variable is the two hour intradaily return while their
interaction variable is quarterly. Under this methodology, many bank stock returns
will be associated with the same quarterly balance sheet variable, making variation
in maturity gap non-existent. The interaction regression is derived as follows:
Ri,t =  iMPSt + ✏i,t
 i =  0 +  1Ti,t
Ri,t =  0MPSt +  1Ti,t ⇥MPSt + ✏i,t
(1.32)
where the last line of Equation 1.32 comes from a simple substitution of  i. A positive
coe cient on the interaction term Ti,t ⇥MPSt supports the notion of an attenuated
e↵ect for banks with higher maturity mismatch. I document the results in Table 1.5a,
where a one year greater maturity gap leads to an attenuation of 1.83%. English et al.
(2018a) find an attenuated e↵ect of 46 basis points over a two-hour interval. Although
having an attenuated e↵ect, banks seem to benefit only in a relative sense because
overall stock returns are still negative in response to tightening shocks. Despite
17English et al. (2018a), however, also includes a variety of other characteristics such as demand
deposits, savings deposits, and leverage
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using di↵erent measurement horizons of variables, I am still able to capture the same
implication as English et al. (2018a).
Table 1.6 compares the e↵ects of monetary policy shock during the pre-ZLB period
for banks with low maturity mismatches (Table 1.6a) and those with large maturity
mismatches (Table 1.6b) in a VAR setting. The contemporaneous e↵ect of monetary
policy surprises on stock returns for the lowest decile by maturity gaps is -17 % which
is over double that for the highest decile of maturity gap -5.45 %. The attenuated
e↵ect of bank stock return sensitivity to tightening surprises for banks with larger
maturity gaps is in line with the result found by English et al. (2018a) and supports
the notion that banks benefit from a steeper yield curve. In the ZLB period, we find
a similar attenuation, although the sign is reversed and positive (Table 1.7) much like
the reversal e↵ect discussed earlier.
1.6.3 Bank Risk
Bank risk has been advent in the conversation of financial regulation since The
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Since the first Basel
Accord in 1988, banks have had to categorize their assets into di↵erent risk categories
in order to ensure adequate capital in events of unexpected losses. In the wake of the
financial crisis, Basel III of 2010 redesigned capital requirements by including mini-
mum amounts of common equity and liquidity ratios. The measurement and pricing
of risk is fundamental in finance and few papers have related how its presence in
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banks can lead to di↵erences in the transmission mechanism 18. Instead, much of the
literature has focused on the impact of changes in interest rates on risk perceptions
and tolerance of firms, a phenomenon known as the “risk-taking” channel 19. Instead,
I take the riskiness of assets as given and ask how this can give rise to di↵erential
responses of stock returns to monetary policy surprises.
Riskier banks tend to hold assets which are less likely to pay o↵ during times of
higher interest rates. By lending to high-risk borrowers, these banks optimally choose
to take on greater risk while satisfying capital requirements. However, these banks
also face a higher probability of losing value upon tightening which feeds into market
perceptions on expected future cash flows. To the extent that bank stock returns re-
flect news about future cash flows, we expect that banks which tend to be riskier, to
face a larger decline in their stock price upon a surprise tightening. Banks that hold
a higher fraction of risky loans will have a harder time receiving interest payments
and this feeds into a lower expectation of paying dividends to its shareholders. In
the model of Section 1.5.3 and Equation 1.23, it is clear that when banks increase
the fraction of risky loans which binds their capital constraint, there will exist an
amplification e↵ect as given by the Lagrangian (1+ L). I test the hypothesis that
banks which tend to be riskier, as defined by their balance sheet, tend to have a larger
drop in their stock returns upon monetary policy tightening shocks.
I measure bank risk by the amount of high risk loans as a percentage of Tier-1
18There has been a literature on the impact of capital standards on risk-taking by banks. (Santos
(2001))
19See Borio and Zhu (2012) for an overview of the risk-taking channel of monetary policy
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capital. Tier-1 capital is the most loss-absorbing form of capital and includes the
value of its common stock, retained earnings, and accumulated other comprehensive
income (AOCI). During times of financial distress, Tier-1 capital is the first to absorb
losses followed by other debt holders and investors. Accordingly, the amount of Tier-
1 capital signifies to shareholders how prepared a bank is to face unexpected losses.
High risk loans is reported on the Call Report and includes commercial and industrial
loans, nonfarm nonresidential properties secured by real estate, multi-family residen-
tial loans, and construction land developments secured by real estate. While the item
does not clearly define why it is high risk, presumably, banks assess the borrower’s
credit score, future business earnings, and other metrics in labeling the loan to be of
“high risk”. After computing my risk measure for each bank, I estimate an interaction
regression similar to Equation 1.32 except allow  i to depend on RISK. The results
in Table 1.5b suggests that banks with a 1% higher fraction of high risk loans face
a greater negative response of 20% - thus confirming the amplification e↵ect from
the model. Column (2) of Table 1.5b also shows the reversal e↵ect during the ZLB
period.
I also estimate for the bottom and top decile by risk, the contemporaneous e↵ects
of monetary policy surprises on stock returns in a VAR setting (Equation 1.28). Ta-
ble 1.8 estimates the 6 variable panel VAR by including the fourth eurodollar futures
contract ED4t as an exogenous monetary policy surprise. As the top panel shows
(Table 1.8a), a 100 basis point tightening surprise corresponds to a decline of 3.2 %
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in the stock returns of banks with a low risk to capital ratio. On the other hand, the
bottom panel (Table 1.8b) reports a 10 % decline in stock returns for high risk banks
- a magnitude much larger than that of low risk banks. This result points towards
evidence that high risk banks, which contain loan portfolios that are more susceptible
to default or late payment, are hurt more by monetary policy tightening surprises
and is in line with the amplified e↵ect suggested by my model. This could perhaps be
due to heightened uncertainty about future cash flows of riskier institutions. Turning
over to the ZLB period (Table 1.9), I find that there is a reversal e↵ect, although
riskier banks do not benefit as much from tightening surprises.
1.6.4 Market Power
As illustrated by the model and in Figure 1.2, banks that have greater market
power tend to charge larger deposit spreads to their customers. This allows them
to generate larger profits without losing their customer base to other banks. As an
empirical proxy for market power, I calculate the total amount of deposits for each
county and each quarter in the United States. I then compute each bank’s share of
this total which represents its deposit market share. In order to compute the HHI, I
sum the squared deposit market share of all banks that operate branches in a given
county in a given quarter, and average over all quarters. Each bank is then assigned
the HHI of the county of which it is located. A higher HHI indicates more market
concentration (monopoly) and a lower index represents more competitive markets.
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Figure 1.4: Market Power Across the United States
This is a figure which describes the market power as proxied by the HHI Index across the United
States at the county level. Data on county level deposits are from the Call Report data set.
Figure 1.4 shows the distribution of HHI indices across counties in the United
States with most of the market power concentrated on the East and West coasts.
I estimate a panel VAR on the top decile of banks that have large market power
and bottom decile located in more competitive environments. I test the hypothesis
that those located in more concentrated regions charge a higher spread and therefore
are hurt less by monetary policy surprises than their counterparts who are unable to
charge depositors a high spread. This again comes from Equation 1.22 which shows
that banks in more concentrated areas have a higher positive e↵ect of tightening on
their net interest margin. I estimate Equation 1.32 using HHI as an interaction vari-
able and document the results in Table 1.5c. The results suggest that banks located
in a perfectly competitive market that transition to a monopolistic one face a 7%
smaller negative response on their stock returns. This dampening of the negative im-
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pact from shocks confirms the intuition of the model and Equation 1.22 which states
that banks with greater market power benefit from charger higher spreads.
Table 1.10a provides VAR evidence and reports that a 100 basis point surprise
tightening is associated with a 6 % decline for banks located in the bottom decile of
market power. Moving towards the top decile for banks located in more monopolistic
regions, Table 1.10b reports that the sensitivity is reduced to half at 3%. This atten-
uated response suggests that banks located in more concentrated areas benefit more
than banks with more competitive deposit markets.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have documented that the sensitivity of bank stock returns reversed
from negative during the pre-ZLB period to positive during the ZLB. The theory
of Brunnermeier and Koby (2018) suggests that the sign of this e↵ect depends on
whether the positive e↵ect of higher net interest margins or the negative e↵ect from
capital losses (discount rate channel) dominates. I find that while during the pre-
ZLB, bank stock returns were mostly driven by news about real interest rates, this
became dominated by news about future cash flows during the ZLB - a result in line
with the reversal e↵ect. Furthermore, I augment their model with the deposit channel
of policy by Drechsler et al. (2017) to draw implications on how return sensitivity to
monetary policy can depend on bank characteristics. I confirm these implications by
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showing that banks with greater maturity mismatch and market power face a smaller
decline in their stock returns and banks that are riskier face a greater decline. The
results in this paper serve as evidence that banks are institutions that are uniquely
impacted by monetary policy.
53
CHAPTER 1. THE EFFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS ON BANK
STOCK RETURNS
(a) Pre-ZLB (1984Q1-2008Q4)
Low MM High MM Low Risk High Risk Low HHI High HHI
x̃dMP 0.947
⇤⇤ 0.106⇤⇤ 0.586⇤⇤ 0.617⇤⇤⇤ 0.692⇤⇤ 0.480⇤⇤
(0.459) (0.0503) (0.246) (0.284) (0.332) (0.243)
x̃rMP 1.11
⇤⇤ 0.193 0.605⇤⇤⇤ 0.823 0.761⇤⇤ 0.515⇤⇤
(0.454) (0.150) (0.227) (0.652) (0.333) (0.240)
x̃yMP 0.0034
⇤⇤⇤ -0.0286⇤⇤⇤ 0.0142⇤⇤⇤ -0.104⇤⇤⇤ -0.0005 -0.0016⇤⇤⇤
(0.0011) (0.004) (0.0028) (0.036) (0.0008) (0.0006)
Total E↵ect -0.170 -0.0584 -0.0332 -0.102 -0.0676 -0.0334
(b) ZLB (2009Q1-2016Q4)
Low MM High MM Low Risk High Risk Low HHI High HHI
x̃dMP 2.12
⇤⇤⇤ 0.175⇤⇤ 0.361⇤⇤ 1.270⇤⇤⇤ 0.0670⇤ 3.889
(0.671) (0.0890) (0.185) (0.398) (0.0342) (2.70)
x̃rMP 0.446 -0.0154 0.139 0.856
⇤⇤ 0.0723⇤⇤ 0.862
(0.564) (0.0350) (0.748) (0.370) (0.0293) (1.460)
x̃yMP 1.565
⇤ 0.0900 0.0653 0.120⇤⇤⇤ -0.0066 2.97
(0.923) (0.090) (0.143) (0.0352) (0.0105) (2.093)
Total E↵ect 0.109 0.100 0.157 0.294 0.0012 0.0570
Table 1.4: The Impact of Monetary Policy Shocks on News about Cash Flows, Real
Rates, and Expected Excess Returns
This table presents the estimated response of the three components of bank stock returns to
monetary policy shocks (ED4). x̃dMP is news related to cash flows, x̃
r
MP is news related to real
rates, and x̃yMP is news related to expected future excess returns. News components are extracted
from the VAR with lag 1. The state vector of this VAR is given by
[yt rt RELt  rt DIV/PRICEt TERMSPREADt], where yt is the stock return, rt is the
3 month interest rate, RELt is the 6 month rate minus its 12 month moving average,  rt is the
change in the 6 month rate, DIV/PRICEt is the dividend price ratio, and TERMSPREADt is
the di↵erence between the 10 year rate and 4 month rate. Panel 1.4a considers the pre-zero lower
bound period (1984Q1-2008Q4) and Panel 1.4b considers the zero lower bound period
(2009Q1-2016Q4). Each column corresponds to banks with characteristics in the bottom decline
(Low) and top decile (High). The characteristics are MM (Maturity Mismatch), Risk (Risk as
defined on Call Report), Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The light blue shaded rows are used
to illustrate which component of news is driving the response to monetary policy shocks. The
standard errors in parentheses are computed using the delta method.
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Table 1.5: Return and MPS Interaction Regression
This table reports the results estimating a regression of bank stock returns on a monetary policy
shock proxied by ED4, and an interaction of the shock with bank characteristics. The dependent
variable is the average of monthly returns over a particular quarter. The monetary policy surprises
are averaged over a quarter and interacted with computed bank balance sheet information from
Call Reports published in the same quarter. Ti,t is the proxy for maturity gap as is defined as the
di↵erence in weighted (by asset) maturity between assets and liabilities. RISKi,t is defined as the
ratio of high risk loans as a percentage of capital. HHI, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, is a
proxy of market power of deposit share.
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Credit Spreads and Monetary
Policy
2.1 Introduction
Corporate bond spreads are a useful barometer to gauge overall credit conditions
in the macroeconomy. The amount by which firms must pay above a risk-free rate pro-
vides insight to the overall default risk of the firm and the premium investors demand
to hold these assets. Other important factors that determine this spread include the
illiquidity and callability of the bond as well as preferential tax treatments given to
Treasury bonds. However, interest rates, and more specifically, expectations of future
rates, are the most obvious factor which will determine changes in these spreads. In
this paper, I study how shocks to expectations of future interest rates a↵ect monthly
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changes in corporate bond spreads and relate this sensitivity to its expected default
and risk premium component. Focusing on shocks to interest rates expectations, as
opposed to interest rate changes, is required in order to estimate the casual e↵ects
on credit spreads. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to study the e↵ects of
monetary policy announcement surprises on credit spreads and to decompose these
e↵ects into expected default and risk premia.
I measure these monetary policy shocks as changes in expectations of the cur-
rent federal funds target as well as the path of future rates induced by Federal Open
Market Committee announcements. These shocks reflect surprises of market partici-
pant’s forecast of what the short term target and path of interest rates will be. I find
that a 100 basis point tightening surprise reduces corporate bond spreads by 32 basis
points over a month and that more than half of this e↵ect arises due to changes in
the bond’s risk premium. While this negative relationship has been well documented
using changes in Treasury yields (Longsta↵ and Schwartz (1995), Du↵ee (1998), and
Collin-Dufresn et al. (2001)), I find that this e↵ect continues to hold when focusing on
the unexpected and exogenous change in interest rates. In order to understand this
empirical relationship, I turn to di↵erent theories o↵ered in the literature to reconcile
why credit spreads narrow as a result of monetary tightenings. Rather than taking a
stand on which theory is correct, I discuss how each lends credence to the negative
casaul e↵ect of monetary policy tightenings on credit spreads.
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The most pervasive structural model of studying corporate debt begins with Mer-
ton (1974). Under his framework, a firms value evolves according to a drift process
and default occurs when its value falls below its liability. If interest rates rise, this
increases the drift of the risk-neutral process for firm value and allows assets to grow
more. This then makes the risk neutral probability of default lower. A further im-
plication of the model is that riskier firms are closer to the default threshold and
therefore should face a larger sensitivity to interest rate changes. I test this im-
plication using bond ratings as a proxy for risk and find a monotonically increased
sensitivity of credit spreads as risk rises. Although I use monetary policy shocks to
understand innovations in interest rates, the role of monetary policy is largely absent
in Merton (1974) because the risk free rate is assumed to be fixed. Thus, the neg-
ative relationship between interest rates and credit spreads are a direct result from
the assumptions imposed on the dynamics of firm value and lack further economic
intuition. The next two theories of Fed information and preferred habitat fill this
void by building economic intuition.
A more recent theory by Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) suggests that surprise
tightenings lead to higher expectations of output growth - a result in stark contrast
with traditional models of monetary contractions 1. Under their “Fed Information”
hypothesis, surprise monetary tightenings encourage market participants to become
more optimistic of future economic prospects. They argue this occurs because each
1An earlier paper by Romer and Romer (2000) shows that the Federal Reserve has an advantage
over private sector forecastors on inflation and real output. They claim this explains why longer
horizon interest rates increase upon Fed tightenings
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FOMC announcement conveys information about the path of the natural rate of in-
terest. Commonly referred to as r⇤, this is the interest rate that would prevail without
pricing frictions and is of interest to market participants in gauging the trajectory of
the macroeconomy. While their study focuses on market beliefs about higher future
output growth, this implication is compatabile with a narrowing of credit spreads or
easier borrowing conditions for firms. An implication of this narrative, however, is
that monetary policy shocks that convey optimism for bonds should also be reflected
in the stock market in the form of increased stock prices. However, Nakamura and
Steinsson (2018) and I both find that stock prices decline following a monetary policy
tightening shock - a result that is di cult to reconcile with improved optimism.
The decline in credit spreads as a result from tightening shocks is equivalent
to Treasury yields rising far more than corporate bond yields. This di↵erential
pass-through e↵ect of policy has been documented by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2012) as a “preferred-habitat theory” which argues that it is driven by
safety attributes that investors will value depending on the supply of Treasuries. Un-
der their narrative, during times when the supply of Treasuries or other safe assets
are high, investors do not value safety and liquidity as much as they would if they
were scarce. As a result, the price of Treasuries are relatively low and its yield is high
relative to riskier assets which seem more attractive. Therefore, open market opera-
tions which seek to raise the interest rate by increasing the supply of Treasuries in the
economy raise the yield of safe assets more than that of riskier ones which reduces
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credit spreads. This argument is most relevant for recent episodes of quantitative
easing where the Federal Reserve purchased and reduced the supply of Treasuries in
the economy but di cult to reconcile with shocks outside from quantitative easing. In
the next section, I discuss related literature that has closely studied the pass-through
e↵ects of monetary policy. In Section 2.3, I introduce the data set used, Section 2.4
the empirical results, Section 2.5 the theory that support these results, and Section
2.6 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
The safety premium theory suggests that during times of monetary tightening,
Treasury yields rise above corporate bond yields because the price of Treasuries fall
by more than the price of corporate bonds. This mechanism occurs because monetary
tightening leads to (or the perception) of an increase in the supply of Treasuries (safe
assets) and lowers the safety premium that investors value. This requires evidence
that tightening (easing) corresponds to an increase (decrease) in bond supply. I
discuss a number of papers which have documented this correspondence.
In a Brookings paper written before the Great Recession, Bernanke et al. (2004)
reflect on three historical episodes that serve as an experiment for understanding the
link between the supply of Treasuries and Treasury yields. The first episode occurred
in 1999-2000 when a series of policy changes and economic forces led the US to have a
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budget surplus. The Treasury announced a debt buy-back program that would occur
in a number of stages. It cut the issuance of Treasury bills and long term Treasury
bonds and announced in August 1999 that it would consider buying back older o↵-
the-run issues. They argued that this represented a significant supply shock because
it amounted to 10% of outstanding stock of bonds and found that by bracketing each
announcement days, Treasury yields fell sharply.
The second episode occurred following the Asian Financial Crisis of 1998 where
the Japanese government was concerned about an appreciation of the yen against the
dollar. Japan intervened by purchasing around $ 300 billion in Treasury securities.
The authors o↵er suggestive evidence by estimating that Treasury yields fell sharply
on dates around Japanese interventions. The final and third episode occurred around
the summer of 2003 when the Federal Reserve was concerned with deflation. They
entertained ideas of unconventional monetary policy in the form of long term Treasury
purchases which drove yields down sharply. Although the FOMC never undertook
these actions, this episodes points to how an allusion of purchases a↵ected Treasury
yields. This e↵ect appears in my intradaily monetary policy shock data during the
FOMC meeting on March 18, 2009, where the Federal Reserve introduced a program
to purchase up to $ 300 billion of Treasury coupon securities. In their statement,
they write:
“Moreover, to help improve conditions in private credit markets, the Com-
mittee decided to purchase up to $300 billion of longer-term Treasury
securities over the next six months.”
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This came as a huge surprise as Bloomberg on the morning of that announcement
reported that Goldman Sachs and several other banks believed that they would not
engage in such a program. As a result, my monetary policy shock data reports that the
10-Year on-the-run Treasury yield fell by 44bp - the most among all FOMC meetings.
This o↵ers further evidence that an announcement of an intention to reduce Treasury
securities is enough to drive down Treasury yields.
A paper by DAmico and King (2013) shows that the Federal Reserve’s $ 300
billion purchase of Treasuries in 2009 reduced yields by an average of about 30 basis
points over the life of the program and shifted the yield curve down by 50 bp. Their
results are consistent with the theory that a withdrawal of Treasury supply reduces
yields. Furthermore, they find that the reduction of yields was strongest for securities
that were specifically bought and those with similar maturities.
The period outside of quantitative easing episodes, however, requires a di↵erent
narrative unrelated to open market operations. Vayanos and Vila (2009) o↵er a
di↵erent story of preferred habitats that involves the demand for safe assets. Under
their framework, the economy consists of investors such as pension funds who have
preferences for a specific maturity of assets and risk-averse arbitrageurs who integrate
markets by long-short positions on bonds. When the federal funds or short term
interest rate unexpectedly rises, this becomes an attractive asset to hold relative to
bonds. Because investors prefer to hold specific assets, they do not deviate from
their preferred habitat. Instead, risk-averse arbitrageurs buy (long) the short rate
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by borrowing (short) money from the Treasury market. This drives down the price




I construct the panel of corporate bond data from January 1973 to December 2016 by
combining five data sources: Lehman Brothers Fixed Income Database, the Mergent
FISD/NAIC Database, TRACE, DataStream, and Merrill Lynch. Among overlaps
that exist in these data sets, I prioritize in the same order listed above. I remove
junior bonds, bonds with floating rates and with option features other than callable
bonds. It is important to note that I remove traditional callable bonds which enables
the issuer to pay o↵ remaining debt earlier2. In a declining interest rate environment,
the incentives to call a bond will increase, thus complicating the interpretation of
monetary policy e↵ects on bond yields. However, I don’t discard make-whole callable
bonds in which the issuer must compensate the holder for any losses associated with
calling the bond. These losses are typically determined by discounting the bond’s
remaining contractual cash flows at an appropriate Treasury rate. Therefore, the
payo↵ of a make-whole callable bond option is zero and there is no economic benefit
2Du↵ee (1998) has shown that prior work relating credit spreads to interest rates did not account
for the callability of bonds in their empirical analysis.
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towards calling it before its maturity3. In addition, I apply three important filters
to account for erroneous reporting by the data source. First, I remove corporate
bond observations that have prices higher than a maturity matched Treasury bond.
Second, I drop price bonds below one cent per dollar. Third, I remove observations
that show a large bounceback in returns. Specifically, I compute the product of the
adjacent return observations and remove both observations if the product is less than
- 0.04. These filters lead to an unbalanced panel data of 937,418 bond month ob-
servations for 20,820 bonds over 528 months. Treasuries are matched with corporate
bonds by its maturity and is attained from the Federal Reserve’s constant maturity
yields data4. Credit ratings are obtained from Standard & Poors when available, and
Moodys ratings when Standard & Poors rating is unavailable.
Decomposition into Risk Premia and Expected Default
For event studies related to monetary policy, it is ideal to isolate a narrow window
around an FOMC announcement to avoid the possibility of other news besides mon-
etary policy contaminating the results. Typical windows that have been shown to
be useful in the literature include intradaily, daily, and weekly changes of the de-
pendent variable. I first estimate daily changes of credit spreads on monetary policy
3Elsaify and Roussanov (2016) o↵er a theory for the emergence of make-whole callable bonds
which are always “out of the money”
4A common issue that plagues micro studies of credit spreads is that of duration mismatch. Prior
work on constructing credit spreads simply subtracted corporate bond yields from a zero-coupon
Treasury security of the same security. Under this framework, monetary policy surprises could result
in smaller credit spreads simply because of a mechnical rise in the risk-free Treasury security above
that of the corporate bond yield. In constructing credit spreads, however, I mitigate this problem by
following Gilchrist and Zakraǰsek (2012) and construct a hypothetical matching Treasury security
with identical cash flows as the corporate bond. These cash flows are discounted using continuously
couponded zero-coupon Treasury prices.
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surprises as a benchmark result. However, because I am interested in decomposing
credit spreads into a component related to risk premia and expected default, I follow
the literature of Nozawa (2017) and Campbell and Shiller (1988b) and estimate a
monthly vector auto-regression (VAR) with my constructed panel of bond data. The
monthly event study that I subsequently estimate using these two components is re-
quired if I’m interested in understanding whether risk premium or expected default is
driving the sensitivity of credit spreads to monetary policy shocks. The state vector
of my VAR is :
Xi,t =
⇣





which follows the dynamics:
Xi,t+1 = AXi,t +Wi,t+1 (2.2)
where di,t is a vector of dummy variables for credit ratings defined as di,t = (1 dAi,t
dBaai,t d
Ba
i,t ) such that d
✓
i,t is a dummy for rating ✓, ⌧i,t is the duration of bond i, PDi,t is
its probability of default, and rEQi,t is the issuer’s excess equity return, and bmi,t is its
book to market ratio5. Utilizing an accounting identity that relates credit spreads to
risk premium and expected default and imposing structure on the coe cient matrix
5Campbell and Shiller (1988b) pioneered this decomposition framework by relating current stock
returns to the price-dividend ratio and dividend growth.
71
CHAPTER 2. CREDIT SPREADS AND MONETARY POLICY


















where Ft is the information set of agents at time t. Equation 3.5 shows that variations
in credit spreads can be decomposed into long run expected excess returns (rei ) or
credit loss (lti). I denote the risk premia component of Equation 3.5 as s
r
i,t and the
expected default component as sdi,t. Because exploring the properties of this decom-
position is not the focus of this paper, I leave out the derivation and assumptions
used in separating out risk premia and expected default from credit spreads. Instead,
I invite the reader to refer to Nozawa (2017) or Appendix C.1 of my third chapter for
full details on its derivation.
Monetary Policy Shocks
Monetary policy shocks, or the nonsystematic changes in policy, is required to esti-
mate the causal e↵ects of tightening on credit spreads. The goal of identifying a proxy
for monetary policy shocks is inherently di cult because we often think of monetary
policy as following a rule. If this is the case, movements in variables related to mon-
etary policy such as the money supply or the federal funds rate is attributed to the
systematic component of monetary policy rather than deviations from the rule itself.
However, standard macroeconomic models typically identify shocks as deviations from
a Taylor rule and there are no good theories as to what a structural monetary policy
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shock should be6. For this reason, many have attributed monetary policy shocks as
either surprises the market did not expect or changes in preferences of policy makers
(Owyang and Ramey (2004)). I focus on the former and follow in the direction of a
large existing literature that measure monetary policy surprises as intradaily changes
in the target federal funds rate around FOMC meetings. Beginning with Kuttner
(2001) and extended by Gürkaynak et al. (2005) to incorporate an additional “path”
surprise of monetary policy, these shocks have been shown to a↵ect asset prices in
event studies (Bernanke and Kuttner (2005))78 The target surprise, denoted by MP1
is the unexpected change in the current month federal funds rate target. The path
surprise, the residuals of regressing the fourth eurodollar futures contract ED4 onto
MP1 are by construction, orthogonal to the target surprise and a↵ect only expected
future rates. The path surprise of monetary policy was introduced by Gürkaynak
et al. (2005) who argued that quantifying this additional dimension better captures
monetary policy. The fourth eurodollars futures contract is a bet on what the 3-
month LIBOR rate will be one year ahead and contains information about the path
of future policy. By considering the residuals of ED4 on MP1, I am e↵ectively iso-
lating information related to the stance of future policy that is not explained by the
6Ramey (2016) provides an excellent survey on the literature of monetary policy shocks and
describes how its identification has changed over time
7A recent paper by Swanson (2015) features a third factor of monetary policy related to Large
Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP) shocks. As a robustness check on di↵erent types of monetary policy
shocks, I consider these “Swanson” shocks in my empirical analysis which can be found in Appendix
B.1.
8A non-exhaustive list of papers that have used FOMC announcement induced shocks to interest
rate futures include Gertler and Karadi (2015), Ottonello and Winberry (2018), Nakamura and
Steinsson (2018), and English et al. (2018b).
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current policy surprise. This approach, di↵ers however from Gürkaynak et al. (2005),
who apply principal components analysis to extract two factors and apply a rotation
and normalization to derive the target and path shocks. While my approach does
not use as much information on the term structure, it allows me to avoid a two-
step estimation and adjust my standard errors of generated regressors9. Finally, by
choosing to focus on a narrow window around FOMC announcements (2PM EST),
I am capturing news only related to monetary policy and not other developments
in the macroeconomy. More importantly, the changes that I am capturing are also
exogenous monetary policy surprises because the central bank is not responding con-
currently to asset price reactions generated by its announcement. This is important
in properly identifying exogenous changes in policy and largely unaccounted for by
previous papers which have used monthly interest rate changes. Details on the con-
struction of these monetary policy shocks can be found in Appendix C.2.2 of my third
chapter.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
The choice between using smaller and longer windows around FOMC meetings
in event studies is a clear one. If I hope to capture surprise changes in interest
rate expectations driven by monetary policy and uncontaminated by other news,
9Gilchrist et al. (2015) uses a similar methodology except they regress the 10-Year Treasury yield
on the 2-Year Treasury yield
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I should use a smaller interval around the meeting. A central goal in the paper,
however, is not only to understand how tightening surprises a↵ect credit spreads, but
also to decompose this e↵ect into expected default and risk premia. This requires
a decomposition using a VAR and therefore monthly data on credit spreads. The
tradeo↵ towards using monthly data to study this decomposition is the potential of
contaminating the event study with other information released during the month. In
order to motivate the empirical relationship between the shocks and spreads, I begin
my analysis using daily data and move towards monthly data in subsequent sections.
I show that the negative relationship between tightening shocks and credit spreads
holds both in the daily and monthly event study regressions.
2.4.1 Daily Results
I use data from Merrill Lynch and compute a face-value weighted average across all
bonds to create a daily time series of bond spreads from January 2, 1997 to December
31, 2016. I then estimate the following regression:
 SPREADt =  0 +  1MP1t +  2PATHt + ✏t (2.4)
where   is computed as a one-day change in the spread around FOMC announcement
date t10. Monetary policy surprises are defined with two intradaily components on
10If the FOMC announcement occurs on date t,   is computed as the di↵erence between t and
t  1
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date t: (i) the surprise in the current month federal funds rate target (MP1) and (ii)
the residuals from a regression of the fourth eurodollars futures (ED4) contract onto
MP1, which I denote as PATH. Table 2.1a reports the results and shows that a 100
basis point path surprise leads to a 15 basis point decline in credit spreads during the
full sample (Column 1), a 12 basis point decline in the pre-ZLB (Column 2), and a
45 basis point decline during the ZLB (Column 3). Tightening surprises as proxied
by changes in the current month target rate MP1 does not yield statistically signif-
icant results. Therefore, the results suggest that the negative relationship between
tightening surprises and credit spreads at the daily frequency is driven by surprises
to the path of policy - an implication that Swanson (2017) also finds.
Using daily data, however, raises issues of “stale” prices in which the spreads re-
ported on day t could have been agreed upon a few days in advance (t  1 or t  2).
Since corporate bonds trade infrequently, the use of “stale” prices in my event study
could underestimate the impact of policy shocks on credit spreads. This could be mit-
igated by either using a multi-day event window in order to properly capture actual
movements in bond prices, or by using data that is recorded on a transactions basis.
Because the former could potentially introduce additional news that occurs during
the expanded event window besides monetary policy, I address the concern of “stale”
prices by using TRACE data which are reported on a transaction time basis. In
other words, when two parties agree on a bond price on date t, this will be accurately
reflected on the data entry of date t as a transactions price. Using TRACE would
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mitigate concerns of stale prices. The results using TRACE transactions based data
is presented in Table 3.7b and shows the same negative coe cient as using Merrill
Lynch data except with a larger magnitude. This larger magnitude confirms the po-
tential of stale pricing that occurs in Panel 2.1a. I find that tightening surprises as
proxied by PATH result in a decline of about 43 basis points in the full and pre-ZLB
sample and 63 basis points in the ZLB sample.
The decline of credit spreads due to monetary tightening shocks has been docu-
mented by a number of papers in the literature. More specifically, Arai (2017), Raskin
(2014), and Swanson (2017) all seem to find a stronger pass-through of policy shocks
to safe bond yields. Because of di↵erences in our definition of spreads, shocks, and
time periods, these papers do not perfectly align with mine. In terms of identifying
policy shocks, the paper closest to mine is Swanson (2017), although both the def-
inition of spreads and shocks are di↵erent. In his paper, he focuses on the spread
between Moody’s Aaa and the 10-Year Treasury yield and measures shocks along
three dimensions: target rate, forward guidance, and large scale asset purchases11.
11I describe the construction of these shocks in Appendix B.1.
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PATH -0.149⇤⇤⇤ -0.120⇤⇤ -0.448⇤⇤⇤
(0.0541) (0.0572) (0.140)
Constant -0.000561 -0.00138 0.00117
(0.00401) (0.00558) (0.00443)
Observations 167 111 56











PATH -0.432⇤⇤⇤ -0.433⇤⇤ -0.629⇤
(0.164) (0.175) (0.326)
Constant -0.0166 -0.0400⇤⇤ 0.00990
(0.0118) (0.0172) (0.0154)
Observations 125 65 60
R2 0.108 0.154 0.0435
Table 2.1: Daily Changes in Credit Spreads Time Series Regression
February 5, 1997 - December 14, 2016
This table reports results from estimating Equation 2.4 of a regression of daily changes in credit
spreads on monetary policy shocks MP1 and PATH. The changes are taken around a one day
window of each FOMC meeting. In Panel 2.1a the data-source is Merrill Lynch and in Panel 3.7b
the data source is from TRACE. Column (1) presents results for the full sample (1997-2016),
Column (2) results for the Pre-ZLB (1997-2008), and Column (3) results for the ZLB (2009-2016).
Standard errors are robust White standard errors.
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I apply the same shocks that I use in Table 2.1 on the credit spread sample con-
sidered from Swanson (2017) and report the results in Table 2.2. There are several
di↵erences between our methodology that are worth noting. First, while I use MP1
as a proxy for the surprise changes in the federal funds rate target, Swanson (2017)
applies principle component analysis to strip out the component related to the target.
Second, our shocks to forward guidance di↵er as I use the residuals from the projection
of ED4 onto MP1 as the proxy and he again uses the second principle component as
its proxy. Third, he includes an additional dimension of large scale asset purchases
(LSAPS) as a shock only related to quantitative easing and finds that it is highly
significant during the ZLB even while controlling for forward guidance. These di↵er-
ences in monetary policy shocks arise by how we interpret the pass-through e↵ects of
monetary policy. Whereas Swanson (2017) measures the impact on credit spreads for
one standard deviation higher level of each factor of policy, I measure the response
to a 100 basis point surprise in the target (MP1) and PATH. In other words, my
coe cients are interpreted as how much of the 1% tightening surprise is transmitted
to credit spreads. Nonetheless, the analysis relating my measure of monetary policy
shocks with the Moody’s credit spread used by Swanson (2017) is important to un-
derstand whether there are large di↵erences when using di↵erent proxies for shocks.
In Table 2.2, I find that tightening surprises as proxied by both the target rate
(MP1) and forward guidance (PATH) correspond to a decline in credit spreads.
While it is di cult to compare the magnitudes of the coe cient with Swanson (2017)
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because of di↵erences of how the shocks are defined, the decline is similar along two
dimensions. First, the PATH surprise has a larger negative e↵ect on credit spreads
than MP1. Second, in comparing the pre-ZLB with the ZLB period, both Swanson
(2017) and I find that the e↵ect is stronger in the ZLB period. The stronger negative
e↵ect in the ZLB period corresponds to corporate bond yields responding less than
Treasury yields. This attenuated pass-through e↵ect of corporate bond yields during
the ZLB has been documented by Kiley (2016) who measures shocks as surprises
in 5-year, 10-year, and 30-year Treasury yields. Examining the reason for this time
varying e↵ect is outside the scope of this paper and requires a structural model to
disentangle channels related to duration, liquidity, and safety over time. There is a
concern that the negative relationship in Table 2.2 is entirely mechanical because I
am simply subtracting the 10-Year Treasury yield from corporate bond yields without
carefully matching its duration. The results in Table 2.1, however, addresses this con-
cern by creating a cashflow matched synthetic Treasury as in Gilchrist and Zakraǰsek
(2012). Nonetheless, my results in Table 2.1 also reveals a similar attenuation in the
pass-through e↵ect during the ZLB.
In terms of interpreting coe cients as the level of monetary policy pass-through,
a closely related paper is Raskin (2014) who uses an identification by heteroskedas-
ticity by exploiting di↵erences in the variance of policy shocks on days of FOMC
announcements compared with non-FOMC days. While he does not directly study
the e↵ects on credit spreads, he finds a greater pass-through e↵ect on corporate bond
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yields of safe AAA bonds relative to riskier BBB bonds which suggests a narrowing
of spreads between the two groups upon tightening. Arai (2017) applies the same
identification strategy to Japanese corporate bonds and finds a similar one to one
pass through for high grade corporate bond yields during Bank of Japan announce-
ment dates. Using unexpected changes in 2 and 10 Year Treasury yield, Gilchrist et
al. (2015) finds evidence of a complete pass-through e↵ect on most corporate bond
and Treasury yields leaving credit spreads largely unchanged. One notable exception,
however, is that they find a limited pass through e↵ect, and therefore a decline of
credit spreads for BBB bonds during the ZLB period. They attribute this di↵erential
behavior as reflecting poor liquidity during the financial crisis of 2008 which further
deteriorated the functioning of asset markets.
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(a) Moody’s AAA minus 10-Year Treasury











PATH -0.242⇤⇤⇤ -0.200⇤⇤⇤ -0.657⇤⇤ -0.564⇤⇤⇤
(0.0596) (0.0569) (0.237) (0.128)
Constant 0.00355 0.00129 0.00966 0.00333
(0.00261) (0.00280) (0.00780) (0.00641)
Observations 272 197 48 27
R2 0.187 0.201 0.239 0.458
(b) Moody’s BAA minus 10-Year Treasury











PATH -0.263⇤⇤⇤ -0.220⇤⇤⇤ -0.726⇤⇤⇤ -0.570⇤⇤⇤
(0.0616) (0.0586) (0.237) (0.121)
Constant 0.00386 0.00287 0.00526 0.00328
(0.00246) (0.00278) (0.00635) (0.00612)
Observations 272 197 48 27
R2 0.226 0.225 0.358 0.509
Table 2.2: Daily Changes in Credit Spreads Time Series Regression using Moody’s
Indices
November 2, 1988 - May 2, 2018
This table reports results from estimating Equation 2.4 of a regression of daily changes in credit
spreads on monetary policy shocks MP1 and PATH. The changes are taken around a one day
window of each FOMC meeting. In Panel 2.1a the left-hand side variable are daily changes in
Moody’s AAA minus 10-Year Treasury and in Panel 3.7b it is Moody’s BAA minus 10-Year
Treasury. Column (1) presents results for the full sample (1997-2016), Column (2) results for the
Pre-ZLB (1997-2008), Column (3) results for the ZLB (2009-2015), and Column (4) results for the
period known as “lift-o↵” (2016-2018). Standard errors are robust White standard errors.
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2.4.2 Monthly Results
Having shown that tightening surprises are associated with a decline in credit
spreads at the daily frequency, I now turn to event studies using monthly data. Al-
though using monthly data in event studies can introduce news other than monetary
policy, it is necessary in order to separate credit spread sensitivity into its risk pre-
mium and expected default components. Given that monetary policy shocks occur
at the daily frequency on FOMC meeting dates, while credit spreads are monthly, I
need to carefully match the shocks with the spreads. In order to match this daily
shock variable with monthly credit spreads, I sum up all the shocks in a particular
month and denote that as shocks during month t12. Let SPREADb,i,t be the spread
of bond b issued by firm i at the end of month t. The two components of expected
default and risk premium are denoted by sdb,i,t and s
r
b,i,t respectively. I first take an
average across all bonds b for each firm i at the end of month t to get SPREADi,t,
sdi,t, and s
r
i,t. Next, I take an average across all firms at the end of month t to generate
a monthly time series SPREADt, sdt , and s
r
t . Finally, I compute monthly changes




12There are a number of ways of aggregating high frequency FOMC shocks to a lower frequency.
Gertler and Karadi (2015) creates a cumulative daily shock and takes an average across all days of
the month. Ottonello and Winberry (2018) aggregates to the quarterly level by taking a simple sum
which is what I do
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2.4.3 Empirical Results using All Bonds



































where MP1t+1 and PATHt+1 are summed across all days in month t+1. This empiri-
cal specification make the timing of the shocks sensible. For example,  SPREADt+1
could be the change in average credit spreads from the end of February to the end
of March, while MP1t+1 and PATHt+1 are the aggregate monetary policy surprises




are properly capturing the e↵ects of
target rate and path shocks respectively over the month of March. Unlike most of the
prior literature which used samples before the Financial Crisis, I separate my anal-
ysis into the full sample (November 1988-December 2016), the pre zero lower bound
(pre-ZLB) period (November 1988-December 2008) and the zero lower bound (ZLB)
period (January 2009 - December 2016).
The results for the full sample, pre-ZLB, and ZLB period are reported below in
Table 2.3a, Table 2.3b, and Table 2.3c respectively. For the full sample, the results
suggest that a 100 basis point surprise tightening decreases monthly credit spreads
by 32 basis points, expected default by 6.5 basis points and risk premium by 22 basis
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points. The e↵ects seem to be particularly driven by the pre-ZLB period (Table 2.3b)
and are insignificant during the ZLB (Table 2.3c). Credit spreads and its compo-
nents are particularly a↵ected by MP1, the surprise component in changes of the
federal funds rate target, and not PATH, the residuals of ED4 that are orthogonal
to MP113
Similar to the daily results in Table 2.2, the monthly event study suggests that
tightening surprises as proxied by the target shock MP1 leads to a statistically sig-
nificant decline in credit spreads. There are, however, several di↵erences between
the daily and monthly event study. First, the standard errors in Table 2.3 are much
larger which comes from the fact that a wider window period introduces the possi-
bility that other non-monetary policy news is driving credit spreads. Second, while
the PATH surprise is particularly informative in driving credit spreads at the daily
frequency, the target shock MP1 is the primary factor driving monthly changes in
credit spreads. Most event studies such as Gilchrist et al. (2015) and Swanson (2017)
find that at the daily frequency, the path surprise plays an important role in deter-
mining credit spreads. By aggregating path shocks, I am perhaps losing information
that is otherwise informative about the future stance of monetary policy. This is
particularly problematic in the zero-lower bound period (Panel 2.3c) where the coef-
ficient on the path surprise is positive and insignificant. During the zero lower bound
13Swanson (2017) estimates a similar model using daily changes in the Aaa-10yr and Baa-10yr
spread. He finds an insignificant decline of 0.41 basis point decline for one standard deviation of
monetary policy surprise using shocks to the federal funds rate and a 0.60 basis point decline using
shocks to forward guidance.
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period, monthly changes in credit spreads do not seem to be driven by monetary
policy shocks. There is an abundance of evidence that the zero lower bound period
was marked by unconventional purchases of Treasury securities which drove down the
yields of safe assets relative to riskier assets.
Because I am able to capture this using daily changes from properly matched
Treasury securities with corporate yields (Table 2.1) as well as those from more con-
ventional Moody’s indexes (Table 2.2), it is likely that the monthly event study re-
gressions are too noisy for inference during the crisis period. The zero lower bound
period was also marked by significant developments in financial markets such as the
bailout of Bear Stears and the demise of Lehman Brothers which undoubtedly a↵ected
credit spreads outside of FOMC meetings.
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(a) Full Sample Time Series Regression November 1988 - December 2016
(1) (2) (3)
Spread Expected Default Risk Premium
MP1 -0.316⇤⇤⇤ -0.0650⇤⇤⇤ -0.218⇤⇤⇤
(0.101) (0.0245) (0.0652)
PATH 0.127 0.0542 0.0451
(0.241) (0.0678) (0.117)
R2 0.034 0.033 0.040
Observations 170 170 170
(b) Pre-ZLB Time Series Regression November 1988 - December 2008
(1) (2) (3)
Spread Expected Default Risk Premium
MP1 -0.312⇤⇤⇤ -0.0646⇤⇤⇤ -0.217⇤⇤⇤
(0.102) (0.0249) (0.0659)
PATH 0.116 0.0527 0.0355
(0.249) (0.0698) (0.121)
R2 0.036 0.035 0.042
Observations 138 138 138
(c) ZLB Time Series Regression January 2009 - December 2016
(1) (2) (3)
Spread Expected Default Risk Premium
PATH 0.542 0.113 0.415
(0.697) (0.168) (0.389)
R2 0.026 0.018 0.048
Observations 32 32 32
Table 2.3: Monthly Changes in Credit Spreads (and two components) Time Series
Regression
This table reports results from estimating Equation 2.5 where sd and sr is expected default and
risk premium respectively. Column (1) reports the results for monthly changes of credit spreads,
Column (2) for monthly changes in expected default, and Column (3) for monthly changes in risk
premium. Panel 2.3a presents the full sample from November 1988-December 2016, Panel 2.3b
presents the pre-ZLB sample from November 1988-December 2008, and Panel 2.3c presents the
ZLB sample from January 2009-December 2016. Standard errors are robust White standard errors.
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2.4.4 Empirical Results using Bond Portfolios by
Risk
The previous section considered all bonds together without controlling for any
bond characteristics. There is evidence that the pass-through e↵ect of monetary
policy di↵ers across firm risk (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), Ottonello
and Winberry (2018), Collin-Dufresn et al. (2001), and Raskin (2014)). I control for
bond risk by constructing bond portfolios across di↵erent ratings groups g. As in the
full sample, I first take an average across all bonds b for each firm i at the end of month
t to get SPREADi,t,g, sdi,t,g, and s
r
i,t,g. However, these bonds are now subscripted by
a risk group g, where g 2 {Aa+, A, Baa, HY}. I construct four bond portfolios, one
for each g by taking an average across all firms in group g at the end of month t. The





and SPREADHYt . I then compute monthly changes from the end of month t to the
end of month t + 1 and regress these changes on the sum of monetary policy shocks



































for g 2 {Aa+, A, Baa, HY}.
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The results for monthly changes in credit spreads, expected default, and expected
excess returns using the full sample are presented in Table 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 respec-
tively. Similar to the results using all bonds, the e↵ect on credit spreads is primarily
driven by shocks to the target rate MP1. Furthermore, there is a larger decline in
credit spreads for bonds that are higher risk (Column 4) compared with the safest
bonds (Column 1). More specifically, a 100 basis point shock to the target rate leads
to a decline of 44 basis points for the high risk bond portfolio and a 23 basis point
decline for the Aa+ portfolio. The di↵erences in sensitivity between the riskiest bonds
(Column (4)) and safest bonds (Column (1)), however, is statistically insignificant.
This is determined by estimating the coe cients jointly as a system and computing
a  2 statistic for the hypothesis that  
1
, the coe cient on MP1 is di↵erent between
safe bonds and high yield risky bonds. The fact that the di↵erences in sensitivity are
not statistically significant can arise from the noisy measure of credit spreads when
aggregating at the monthly level. Given that a one-day interval should better capture
heterogeneities of sensitivity, a more direct test of a di↵erential pass-through e↵ect
of monetary policy is to first take the di↵erence between high yield spreads and safe
investment grade spreads (Y = SPREADHY   SPREADAa+). This di↵erence is
e↵ectively the additional compensation that investors in riskier bonds require over
investment grade bonds. I can then take changes in Y over the one-day horizon and
regress it on monetary policy surprises. If it is the case that riskier bonds face a larger
decline in credit spreads, we should expect this coe cient to be negative. The results
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of this regression is presented in Table 2.7 and shows that tightening surprises as
proxied by PATH lead to a greater decline in credit spreads for riskier firms relative
to safer firms. The statistically significant results provides evidence that by focusing
on daily changes, as opposed to the monthly changes, I am better able to capture
di↵erences in credit spread sensitivity between safe and risky firms.
The results in this section provide support that the sensitivity of bond yields to
monetary policy shocks depend on the riskiness of a firm. While it is not statistically
significant using monthly credit spreads, it appears strongly in the results from daily
regressions. Riskier bond yields do not respond as much as safer bond yields when
shocks occur, which suggests a di↵erential pass-through e↵ect of monetary policy. In
fact, the narrowing credit spreads from tightening shocks support this notion, as the
safe yield rises above any increases in the corporate bond yield. In the next section,
I discuss various theories that support this notion.
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(a) Full Sample Time Series Regression ( SPREADgt+1)
November 1988 - December 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aa+ A Baa HY
MP1 -0.234⇤⇤ -0.384⇤⇤⇤ -0.383⇤⇤⇤ -0.438⇤⇤⇤
(0.0925) (0.0950) (0.0891) (0.143)
PATH -0.0103 -0.000874 -0.0334 -0.358
(0.0940) (0.117) (0.125) (0.226)
R2 0.017 0.045 0.040 0.043
Observations 283 280 280 280
(b) Full Sample Time Series Regression ( sdg,t+1)
November 1988 - December 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aa+ A Baa HY
MP1 -0.0456⇤⇤ -0.0742⇤⇤⇤ -0.0987⇤⇤⇤ -0.0946⇤⇤⇤
(0.0196) (0.0190) (0.0246) (0.0336)
PATH 0.00540 0.00924 -0.00123 -0.0781
(0.0202) (0.0245) (0.0335) (0.0512)
R2 0.015 0.040 0.035 0.035
Observations 283 280 280 280
(c) Full Sample Time Series Regression ( srg,t+1)
November 1988 - December 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aa+ A Baa HY
MP1 -0.187⇤⇤⇤ -0.306⇤⇤⇤ -0.255⇤⇤⇤ -0.212⇤⇤⇤
(0.0715) (0.0745) (0.0609) (0.0649)
PATH -0.0188 -0.0179 -0.0261 -0.160
(0.0712) (0.0893) (0.0811) (0.101)
R2 0.018 0.047 0.040 0.044
Observations 283 280 280 280
Table 2.4: Monthly Changes in Credit Spreads (and two components) Time Series
Regression by Risk (Full Sample)
This table reports results from estimating Equation 2.6 which regresses monthly credit spreads,
expected default, and risk premium on MP1 and PATH. Panel 2.4a contains results for monthly
changes in credit spreads, Panel 2.4b for changes in expected default, and Panel 2.4c for risk
premium. For each of the three panels, Column (1) reports the results for bond portfolios
consisting of Aa+ bonds, Column (2) for A bonds, Column (3) for Baa, and Column (4) for the
riskiest HY bonds. The full sample from November 1988-December 2016 is considered. Standard
errors are robust White standard errors.
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(a) Pre-ZLB Time Series Regression ( SPREADgt+1)
November 1988 - December 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aa+ A Baa HY
MP1 -0.223⇤⇤ -0.377⇤⇤⇤ -0.379⇤⇤⇤ -0.422⇤⇤⇤
(0.0930) (0.0950) (0.0894) (0.141)
PATH 0.00477 0.00161 -0.0286 -0.395
(0.0981) (0.123) (0.132) (0.240)
R2 0.019 0.052 0.046 0.058
Observations 219 216 216 216
(b) Pre-ZLB Time Series Regression ( sdg,t+1)
November 1988 - December 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aa+ A Baa HY
MP1 -0.0428⇤⇤ -0.0728⇤⇤⇤ -0.0985⇤⇤⇤ -0.0909⇤⇤⇤
(0.0197) (0.0190) (0.0248) (0.0335)
PATH 0.00911 0.0104 0.000911 -0.0886
(0.0211) (0.0258) (0.0357) (0.0541)
R2 0.016 0.046 0.040 0.047
Observations 219 216 216 216
(c) Pre-ZLB Time Series Regression ( srg,t+1)
November 1988 - December 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aa+ A Baa HY
MP1 -0.178⇤⇤ -0.301⇤⇤⇤ -0.252⇤⇤⇤ -0.202⇤⇤⇤
(0.0719) (0.0746) (0.0611) (0.0644)
PATH -0.00548 -0.0132 -0.0223 -0.177⇤
(0.0743) (0.0937) (0.0856) (0.107)
R2 0.019 0.055 0.046 0.057
Observations 219 216 216 216
Table 2.5: Monthly Changes in Credit Spreads (and two components) Time Series
Regression (Pre-ZLB)
This table reports results from estimating Equation 2.6 which regresses monthly credit spreads,
expected default, and risk premium on MP1 and PATH. Panel 2.5a contains results for monthly
changes in credit spreads, Panel 2.5b for changes in expected default, and Panel 2.5c for risk
premium. For each of the three panels, Column (1) reports the results for bond portfolios
consisting of Aa+ bonds, Column (2) for A bonds, Column (3) for Baa, and Column (4) for the
riskiest HY bonds. The pre-ZLB sample from November 1988-December 2008 is considered.
Standard errors are robust White standard errors.
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(a) ZLB Time Series Regression ( SPREADgt+1)
January 2009 - December 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aa+ A Baa HY
PATH -0.298 -0.111 -0.184 -0.0906
(0.337) (0.405) (0.394) (0.679)
R2 0.016 0.002 0.005 0.000
Observations 64 64 64 64
(b) ZLB Time Series Regression ( sdg,t+1)
January 2009 - December 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aa+ A Baa HY
PATH -0.0630 -0.0184 -0.0485 0.00541
(0.0753) (0.0849) (0.101) (0.148)
R2 0.016 0.001 0.005 0.000
Observations 64 64 64 64
(c) ZLB Time Series Regression ( srg,t+1)
January 2009 - December 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aa+ A Baa HY
PATH -0.267 -0.135 -0.136 -0.0439
(0.258) (0.322) (0.276) (0.299)
R2 0.021 0.004 0.006 0.000
Observations 64 64 64 64
Table 2.6: Monthly Changes in Credit Spreads (and two components) Time Series
Regression (ZLB)
This table reports results from estimating Equation 2.6 which regresses monthly credit spreads,
expected default, and risk premium on PATH. Panel 2.6a contains results for monthly changes in
credit spreads, Panel 2.6b for changes in expected default, and Panel 2.6c for risk premium. For
each of the three panels, Column (1) reports the results for bond portfolios consisting of Aa+
bonds, Column (2) for A bonds, Column (3) for Baa, and Column (4) for the riskiest HY bonds.
The ZLB sample from January 2009 - December 2016 is considered. Standard errors are robust
White standard errors.
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MP1 0.0211 0.0257 -0.443
(0.0991) (0.108) (0.604)
PATH -0.413⇤⇤⇤ -0.335⇤⇤⇤ -0.842⇤⇤⇤
(0.0861) (0.0857) (0.235)
Constant -0.00180 0.00429 -0.0150
(0.00730) (0.0102) (0.00949)
Observations 167 103 64
R2 0.112 0.0902 0.251
Table 2.7: Regression of Changes in SPREADHY   SPREADAa+
This table reports results from a time series regression of one day changes between the di↵erence of
high yield (HY) risky bonds and safe (Aa+) investment grade bonds on intradaily monetary policy
surprises MP1 and PATH. Callable bonds and financial firms (SIC: 6000-7000) are removed. The
time series is computed as a face-value weighted average across all bonds on a particular day.
Column (1) reports results for the full sample from February 1984 - December 2016, Column (2)
for the Pre-ZLB period from February 1984 - December 2008, and Column (3) for the ZLB period
from January 2009 - December 2016. Standard errors are robust White standard errors.
2.5 Discussion
The standard theory of the monetary policy transmission mechanism teaches us
that the yield on a private security is equal to the corresponding government yield
up to a first order (Gertler and Karadi (2015)). The paradigm for New-Keynesian
models is that under sticky prices, the central bank has control over the short term
real rate and can e↵ectively manipulate aggregate spending by seamlessly passing
through this rate to corporate borrowing rates. Under the credit channel of Bernanke
and Gertler (1995), however, higher interest rates not only raises the government
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yield, but also the external finance premium, making overall borrowing conditions
tighter. From this perspective of contractionary monetary policy leading to lower
output growth, the negative empirical relationship that I document between tighten-
ing shocks and credit spreads is surprising. If tightening shocks are associated with
shocks to the stance of monetary policy unrelated to macroeconomic conditions, one
would expect a positive relationship between tighter policy and credit spreads. This
is because a contractionary shock in the form of higher interest rates, should all else
equal, contract macroeconomic variables by making borrowing more expensive and
therefore tighten credit conditions. The financial accelerator model of Bernanke et
al. (1999) would also suggest that higher interest rates have an additional channel
where it reduce asset prices and therefore, the overall net worth of borrowers. This
additional channel could have an amplification e↵ect by making borrowers less likely
to repay loans and further increase credit spreads. However, the negative relationship
between credit spreads and tightening surprises can nonetheless be reconciled with a
number of theories. I discuss some of the theories which can rationalize my empirical
results and address its merits and shortcomings.
Structural models of debt begin with Merton (1974) who relates a firm’s credit
risk to its capital structure (assets and liabilities). While the model implies a nega-
tive relationship between interest rates and credit spreads, the mechanism is largely
mechanical and lacks economic intuition. Figure 2.1 plots the expected default and
risk premium component of credit spreads as a function of the risk-free rate. The
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figure is generated using the basic model of Merton (1974) and extended by Chen
et al. (2008) to allow for a separation of credit spreads into its expected default and
risk premia component14. This occurs if we associate the expected default component
with the natural (p) probability of default and the risk premia component with the
risk neutral (q) probability. As we can see from Figure 2.1, the slopes are steeper
for riskier bonds - that is tightening surprises have a larger e↵ect on riskier firms - a
result in line with the monthly regression results in Table 2.4a and the daily results in
Table 2.715. In this classical model, firm value is modeled as a Geometric Brownian
motion where the risk-free rate is its drift parameter. An increase in the risk free
rate increases this drift parameter which elevates firm value over time. A higher firm
value leads to lower default under both the natural (p) and risk neutral (q) probabil-
ity which decreases expected default and risk premium, respectively. Although the
model agrees with the empirical results I find, the mechanism is largely a byproduct
of the model’s assumptions. The model is silent about whether expected default or
risk premia is driving the sensitivity of credit spreads. I now turn to other theories
which o↵er more economic motivation.
14Details on this decomposition can be found in the Appendix A of Chen et al. (2008) as well as
Appendix B.3 in this chapter.
15Firm risk is defined by the amount of leverage. I take values from Table 2 of Huang and Huang
(2012) who empirically measure firm leverage ratio across di↵erent bond ratings.
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Figure 2.1: Comparative Statics of Merton (1974)
This figure plots the relationship between expected default (left figure) and risk premium (right
figure) and the risk-free rate that is implied by Merton (1974). Values of leverage that are used in
this figure are taken from Huang and Huang (2012). The original model by Merton (1974) does
not separate credit spreads into components. In order to decompose these responses, I follow Chen
et al. (2008) who relate the expected default component to the natural probability of default and
risk premium to the risk-neutral probability of default. Details on this decomposition can be found
in the Appendix A of Chen et al. (2008) as well as Appendix B.3 in this chapter.
What are the economic implications of the negative relationship between credit
spreads and tightening surprises? The Federal Reserve’s surprise increase in inter-
est rates lead to lower borrowing costs for firms relative to the risk free rate. As
mentioned, conventional theory would suggest the opposite e↵ect and that tighten-
ing by the central bank is used to lower output, curb inflation, and tighten credit
conditions. A recent theory proposed by Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) challenges
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this conventional narrative by describing surprise increases in interest rates as “good”
news. Under their Fed Information E↵ect theory, FOMC announcements convey in-
formation not only about tightening of rates relative to the natural rate, but also an
increase in the natural rate itself. An increase in the natural rate itself suggests to
the market that the economy is doing well and a higher trajectory of growth should
be expected16. By raising interest rates by more than what was expected, the Federal
Reserve is communicating an optimistic path of the economy which potentially leads
the market to reassess its prior beliefs. If this channel is present, one would expect
credit spreads to decline. Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) regress monthly changes
in survey expectations about output growth on a policy news shock and finds a
positive coe cient over four di↵erent sample periods. In a similar study, Campbell
et al. (2012) find that a positive shock to the federal funds rate is associated with
a decrease in unemployment forecasts. They explain this phenomenon as evidence
that professional forecasters interpret tightening shocks as an indicator for a stronger
economy. My monthly regression results in Table 2.3, Table 2.4, and Table 2.5 show
that the decline in credit spreads is almost entirely driven by the reduction in risk
premia rather than expected default. The risk premium component is defined as the
compensation to investors over and above lossess associated with firm default and
reflects additional perceptions of risk and uncertainty of holding the bond. The mas-
sive decline in this risk premium component relative to expected default as a result of
16Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) estimate a structural model by incorporating Fed Information
e↵ects and find that two-thirds of the monetary policy shock are shocks to beliefs about the future
natural rate.
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monetary tightening suggests that investors are less fearful of uncertainty in the bond
market and require less compensation to risk which is consistent with the Federal Re-
serve revealing a positive outlook. The marginal decline in expected default suggests
that the overall probability that firms miss coupon payments or file for bankruptcy
is una↵ected.
However, the Fed Information E↵ect theory raise a number of inconsistencies when
examined under how this optimistic information propogates to other assets such as
stocks. The value of a firm is split between bondholders and stockholders who each
have a claim on the firm’s value. If monetary policy shocks a↵ect firm value, this
should a↵ect corporate bond and stock values in the same direction. Under the Naka-
mura and Steinsson (2018) paradigm, good news revealed by the Federal Reserve is
good news for both stockholders and bondholders. I test this hypothesis by com-
puting monthly stock returns for the sample of firms above and find that tightening
shocks lead to a decline in stock returns. In particular, a 1% tightening shock leads
to a statistically insignificant drop of 1.4% in monthly stock returns in my sample
of firms (Table B.2 in Appendix B.2). Using the S&P 500, Nakamura and Steinsson
(2018) find a similar decline of 6.5% and argue that using their structural model with-
out a Fed information e↵ect channel, the decline would have been a massive 11.1%.
I am unable to quantify a similar counterfactual in my analysis, as I do not have a
structural model of this channel 17. The decline in stock returns from a tightening
17Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) model stocks as an unlevered claim to the consumption stream
in the economy
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surprise is a puzzle that is di cult to reconile with the Fed Information E↵ect theory
and is further complicated by the fact that it requires a model in which good news
a↵ects bonds but not stocks.
The negative relationship between tightening shocks and credit spreads is not
mechanical because Treasury prices are properly matched with the same duration
as recommended by Gilchrist and Zakraǰsek (2012). While it could certainly reflect
increased optimism of future economic activity, we can also understand the decline
in credit spreads through the simple fact that Treasury yields rise by more than cor-
porate bond yields. Why is it reasonable for Treasury yields to rise by more than
corporate bond yields when tightening surprises occur? This di↵erential pass-through
of monetary policy has been considered by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2012) in the context of the supply of safe assets. Under their preferred habitat the-
ory, tightened policy by the Federal Reserve involves the expansion in the supply of
Treasury securities in the economy. This abundance of safe assets lowers the safety
premium of the risk-free rate and drives the yield up of the Treasury bonds relative
to risky bonds. Furthermore, with a lower safety premium, investors choose to invest
in riskier corporate bonds which can also drive its yield down and lead to lower credit
spreads. They document this negative relationship between the supply of Treasuries
and credit spreads across a range of bond-indices and commercial paper (Table 2 of
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)). While the preference for safe assets
can be driven by its supply during the period of unconventional monetary policy, it
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is di cult to argue the same during normal times.
During periods of conventional monetary policy, the Federal Reserve did not en-
gage in asset purchases to drive yields down. Instead, decisions on the target rate
were simply announced during FOMC meetings and as long as the market found it
credible that it would engage in open market operations to reach that target, interest
rates in the market passed through seamlessly. A di↵erential pass through e↵ect can
nonetheless still occur if markets are segmented by investor’s risk preference. One
possibility is to interpret a variant of the prefered habitat theory of Vayanos and
Vila (2009) by considering di↵erent investors who target specific bond risk. Investors
prefer a certain class of securities (maturity or risk). A realistic example could be
pension funds who prefer bonds with maturities longer than 15 years in order to
hedge long-term liabilities and asset managers who prefer shorter term maturities or
mutual funds who are mandated to hold investment grade bonds in their portfolios.
A monetary policy surprise in the short term interest rate will lead to underpricing
and overpricing of securities in the market. For example, if the federal funds rate
unexpectedly rises, this becomes an attractive security to hold relative to the long
term interest rate. In this model, a risk-averse arbitrageuer would engage in a “carry-
trade” strategy by borrowing at the long term rate in order to buy the short term
security and integrate the segmented investors. However, if arbitrageurs are su -
ciently risk averse so as to buy and sell only safe assets but not riskier ones, this can
lead to a stronger pass-through e↵ect on yields of safe assets. In the same example,
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safe long term bond yields will increase from the carry-trade strategy while safe short
term bond yields decline. As a result, safe and investment grade bonds will respond
much more to this monetary policy shock than riskier bonds. In summary, the degree
of substitutability between the short term interest rate which is controlled by the
Federal Reserve and Treasuries is much greater than the substitutability between the
short and long rates of corporate bonds.
A more recent theory which builds on this decoupling in term structure and re-
places risk-averse arbitrageuers with investors themselves is the recruitment channel
posited by Hanson and Stein (2015). Under their framework, news of an increase in
the short term interest rate lead investors to rebalance their portfolio from long term
assets to short term assets in an e↵ort to maximize their portfolio’s yield. This will,
in turn, create reduced buying pressure on long term bonds and increase term yields.
To fit this narrative with my empirical results, there should again be su cient risk
aversion of investors against rebalancing towards risky short term assets - leading to
an attenuated pass-through e↵ect on risky bond yields.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have documented that tightening surprises induced by FOMC
meetings are associated with an overall decline in credit spreads and that this is pri-
marily driven by a reduction in risk premia. Whereas conventional economic theory
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would suggest that surprise increases in the risk free rate should tighten credit con-
ditions and curtail borrowing, my empirical results show the opposite. This result is
supported in event studies using monthly changes in credit spreads, where decompos-
ing its e↵ect into risk premia and expected default is possible, as well as by using daily
changes around FOMC announcements. My results lend credence to theories which
suggest unexpected tightening is perceived to be good news to the macroeconomy as
well as those that suggest a di↵erential pass-through e↵ect to bond yields of di↵erent
riskiness. A future research direction could be to incorporate this empirical result
in a “Fed information” type model of Nakamura and Steinsson (2018). While it is
di cult to write down models in which higher interest rate is good news for bonds
but not for stocks, one possible channel is if firms borrow through a single bond.
Under this framework, a higher interest rate lowers the present value of what must
be paid back through the bond and lowers the stock price through the standard dis-
count rate channel. This, however, makes it more di cult to fit with reality, because
firms can return to the capital markets again in the future and borrow with other
bonds. A central purpose of monetary policy is to e↵ectively manage the economy by
influencing investment, consumption, and borrowing decisions. My results shed light
on this transmission mechanism by showing that if policy influences the price of bor-
rowing di↵erently for risky and safe assets, perhaps it will also a↵ect the investment




Investment Channel of Monetary
Policy using Credit Spreads
3.1 Introduction
While the heterogenous e↵ects of monetary policy has been widely studied in the
context of financial frictions, few papers can agree on a reasonable proxy of this fric-
tion. Under the Modigliani and Miller (1958) paradigm, credit spreads are driven
entirely by a firm’s expected default and risk premia. However, the Great Recession
has taught us that movements in spreads can also reflect financial frictions, whereby
a deterioration of bank balance sheets led to a lower supply of credit. Our goal in
this paper is to study the investment channel of monetary policy by allowing firm
sensitivity to depend on credit spreads. The corporate debt market continues to be
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a large source of funding and accounts for about 37% of net worth for nonfinancial
businesses (Figure 3.1). Using information on the spread between the interest a firm
must pay to its creditors and a risk-free rate as a proxy for borrowing costs, we take
an additional step and decompose this spread into two components: expected losses
and risk premia. With heterogeneity of these two components, we ask our main ques-
tion of how investment responds to monetary policy shocks across firms with higher
expected losses and risk premia. While we are unable to disentangle which component
of credit spreads matter more for firm investment, our research shows that firms with
higher credit spreads face a smaller sensitivity to monetary policy.
Figure 3.1: Time Series of Corporate Debt as a Percentage of Net Worth for Non-
financial Corporate Business
This paper seeks to answer the key question raised in the traditional financial
accelerator model of Bernanke et al. (1999) of how credit market imperfections a↵ect
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the aggregate investment response to monetary policy. Under their framework, an
expansionary monetary policy shock not only raises investment but also more impor-
tantly, the price of capital. This rise in asset prices increases the net worth of firms
which drives down their external borrowing costs and further stimulates investment.
It is this latter channel of driving down a firm’s external borrowing cost that gives rise
to the classic amplification e↵ect in the accelerator model. While a number of papers
have used size (Oliner and Rudebusch (1996)) and bank credit access (Kashyap et al.
(1994)) as an empirical proxy for this external finance, our measure of credit spreads
is arguably the most straight forward because it is the actual cost of borrowing that
firms pay.
Contrary to the accelerator model which has found that firms with higher costs
of financing are more a↵ected by monetary policy, we find that firms with higher ex-
pected losses and risk premia face a smaller e↵ect on their investment. In particular,
following a 1% expansionary shock, firms with a one standard deviation higher credit
spread face a smaller investment impact of 2% four quarters ahead. The departure
from the accelerator model comes from the di↵erent pass through e↵ects of monetary
policy onto corporate bond yields. The argument towards why there should be an
amplified investment e↵ect relies on expansionary shocks being passed through di-
rectly in the form of lower interest expenses and therefore the firm’s need for external
financing. This argument, however is challenged under the preferred habitat theory
of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), where investors value safe securities
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more than they otherwise would during times when Treasury securities or other safe
assets are scarce. Expansionary shocks, synonymous with a lower supply of safe as-
sets, drive investors to pursue safer corporate bonds which push down their yields
more than riskier bonds. As a result, expansionary monetary policy shocks dispro-
portionately lower the yields of safe bonds relative to riskier bonds which could be
a possible reason why riskier firms do not change their investment as much. Riskier
firms do not fully benefit from lowered corporate bond yields. We show that over a
one day window around Federal Open Market Committee Meetings, a 1% expansion-
ary surprise lowers the yield of safe bonds by 37 basis points and by 10 basis points
for high yield risky bonds.
The next section provides a brief survey of related literature. Section 3.3 describes
the decomposition methodology. Section 3.4 provides details on the corporate bond
data set and monetary policy shocks. Section 3.5 reports the main empirical results
and Section 3.6 o↵ers evidence of the pass through e↵ects of monetary policy and
Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
There are a number of papers that have studied the cross sectional e↵ects of mon-
etary policy. Early work by Kashyap et al. (1994) found that bank dependent firms
cut their inventories by more than non bank dependent firms in response to monetary
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tightening. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Kashyap and Stein (1995), and Oliner and
Rudebusch (1996) all find that small firms contract substantionally more than large
firms during periods of tightening. These papers rely on two complementary theories
of how financial factors a↵ect the propogation of monetary policy. The first is the
“balance sheet theory” which says that capital market imperfections lead to borrow-
ing becoming closely tied to one’s balance sheet or net worth. Policies that raise
interest rates will weaken the firm’s balance sheet and this propogates to a↵ect the
firm’s spending. The financial accelerator model of Bernanke et al. (1999) develops
how adverse e↵ects on one’s balance sheet can amplify shocks to the macroeconomy.
The second theory that has been empirically tested is the “bank lending channel”
of Bernanke and Blinder (1992). In this channel, banks want to hold more reserves,
which are insured liabilities, in order to alleviate adverse selection problems. During
periods of tight money, there is a lower issuance of these reserves, which tighten liq-
uidity constraints and ultimately contracts lending to the broader economy. Under
this framework, small firms, which are more likely to borrow from banks, will become
more a↵ected by this loan contraction.
The most relevant paper to ours is Ottonello and Winberry (2018) who interact
monetary policy surprises with a firm’s leverage to exploit how heterogeneities in this
dimension of risk a↵ects its investment sensitivity. They find that firms with low
leverage, or safer firms, change their investment much more in response to monetary
policy shocks than firms with higher leverage. In other words, higher risk firms which
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are defined as those with more leverage, have a dampened investment response to
monetary policy because they face a steeper marginal cost curve. This result is very
much in line with ours except we use the actual price of debt issued by firms as a mea-
sure of risk. We feel this is reasonable because this is determined by the market and
therefore by e cient markets, reflects all relevant information about the riskiness of a
firm. Because Ottonello and Winberry (2018) do not find significant heterogeneities
of investment past one quarter, they focus on heterogeneities immediately during the
shock impact. We, however, focus on firm investment four quarters ahead which has
been shown to be the time frame for which aggregate investment responds (Gertler
and Karadi (2015)).
Our paper also connects with another strand of literature on credit spreads and
applying Campbell and Shiller (1988a) decompositions to bonds. While Bongaerts
et al. (2010) applied a decomposition to the returns on corporate bond indices, this
paper uses micro-level data to study the cross section of corporate bond spreads.
Elton et al. (2001) account for di↵erences in credit spreads between di↵erently rated
bonds based on the average probability of default and loss given default. This paper,
however, decomposes credit spreads and allows for time varying expected losses and
risk premiums. Gilchrist and Zakraǰsek (2012) o↵er an aggregate decomposition of
credit spreads into an expected losses and risk premium component. Their measure
of expected losses, however, only uses information based on distance to default and is
not an unbiased forecast of realized credit loss. As we will show in the next section,
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we use all information in our state vector to derive an in sample unbiased estimator
of realized credit loss.
It is worth noting that much of the previous literature has relied on using quarterly
changes in the federal funds rate as a proxy for monetary policy shocks (Bernanke
and Blinder (1992)). This makes identification of an exogenous surprise inherently
di cult if we believe that the Federal Reserve also chooses the federal funds rate as
a response to developments in the economy. However, we borrow from the literature
on identifying monetary policy surprises by measuring interest rate futures changes
around a narrow window of FOMC meetings which Kuttner (2001), Gürkaynak et al.
(2005), and Gilchrist and Zakraǰsek (2012) have shown are reasonable measures of
exogenous shocks.
3.3 Decomposition of Corporate Bond Credit
Spreads
3.3.1 Log Linearization of Bond Excess Returns
In order to obtain a linear relationship among credit spreads and its two compo-
nents (bond expected excess returns and credit loss), we follow Nozawa (2017) by log
linearizing the bond’s excess return. We consider investors who take a long position
on individual corporate bond i until it matures or defaults and a short position on a
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Treasury bond with the same cash flows as the corporate bond. Upon default of the
corporate bond, the investor sells o↵ that position and buys the Treasury bond with
the same coupon rate and time to maturity as the defaulted bond.
Let Pi,t be the dirty price (includes acrrued interest) of corporate bond i at time t






Consider a matching Treasury bond with the same coupon rate and maturity as
corporate bond i. If we similarly let P fi,t and C
f
i,t be the price and coupon rate, then
the return to this Treasury bond is given by:
Rfi,t+1 =





We assume that the rate of credit loss (defined below) for coupons is the same as the
rate for the principal because of the lack of information on coupon recovery rates.
After log linearizing Ri,t+1 and R
f
i,t+1 around the same expansion point ⇢ 2 [0,1), we
can express the log return on corporate bond i in excess of the log return on the
matching Treasury bond as:
rei,t+1 = log(Ri,t+1)  log(R
f
i,t+1) ⇡  ⇢si,t+1 + si,t   li,t+1 + const (3.3)
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where si,t is the credit spread and li,t is the credit loss of bond i at the time t. Details
on the derivation of Equation 3.3 are provided in Appendix C.1 and rely heavily on
the decomposition of Campbell and Shiller (1988a).





















if t = tD
0 otherwise
where tD is the time of default.
The credit spread, si,t is defined using bond prices rather than yields. This choice
was made for two reasons. First, spreads based on bond prices are easier to compute
and under the linear structure in Equation 3.3, less prone to approximation errors.
Using yields, on the other hand, would require us to compute numerically which makes
it hard to express bond returns using a linear function of yield spreads. Second, using
price spreads is closely related the commonly used yield spreads, as price changes are
approximately equal to yield changes multiplied by duration.
The credit loss, li,t, includes information on both the incidence of default and the
loss given default. It is computed using the market prices of corporate bonds upon
default and represents the loss investors face when corporate bond i defaults.
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Having shown that the excess log return for corporate bond i follows the di↵erence








⇢j 1li,t+j + const (3.4)
Since Equation 3.4 holds for each period t, the expression also holds under expecta-















where Ft is the information set of agents at time t. Equation 3.5 shows that variations
in credit spreads can be decomposed into long run expected excess returns (rei ) or
credit loss (lti). Since corporate bonds have fixed cash flows, the only source of cash
flow risk is credit loss.
3.3.2 Estimation of Decomposition
Having decomposed credit spreads into a linear relationship between expected
excess returns and expected losses, we can estimate the conditional expectations in
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which follows the dynamics:
Xi,t+1 = AXi,t +Wi,t+1 (3.7)





i,t ) such that d
✓
i,t is a dummy for rating ✓, ⌧i,t is the duration of bond i,
PDi,t is its probability of default, and r
EQ
i,t is the issuer’s excess equity return, and
bmi,t is its book to market ratio. We take the product between the bond’s duration
(⌧) and the probability of default (PD) given by Merton (1974)’s model because price
spreads and risk premia decrease further out in the horizon. We adjust for this fact
by including this term. The interaction term between the bond’s spread and credit
rating allows the coe cients to be a function of the bond’s credit rating.
We define selection vectors e
1
= (1 0 0 ... 0 ) and e
2
= (0 1 0 ... 0 ) which







Consider the re-arranged Equation 3.3 and taking the conditional expectation,
this can be expressed as
E [li,t+j|Xi,t] = E
⇥
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(3.8)




. With this, we now apply Equation 3.8




We construct the panel data of U.S. corporate bond prices from January 1973 to
December 2016 combining the Lehman Brothers Fixed Income Database, the Mergent
FISD/NAIC Database, TRACE, DataStream and Merrill Lynch. Overall, prices are
reasonably close to each other and we do not see any trends in gaps in historical data
across databases.
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When there are overlaps among the five databases, we prioritize in the following
order: the Lehman Brothers Fixed Income Database, TRACE, Mergent FISD/NAIC,
DataStream and Merrill Lynch. If the observation for a defaulted bond is missing in
the databases above, we use Moody’s Default Risk Service to complement the price
upon default. For the exercise of calls and call prices, we use Mergent FISD, and for
bonds that are in Lehman Brothers Fixed Income Database but not in Mergent FISD,
we use the changes in amount outstanding to identify the exercise of calls and assume
that the call price is the market price. We remove junior bonds, bonds with floating
rates, and with option features other than callable bonds.
We apply three filters to remove observations that are likely to be subject to
erroneous recording. First, we remove the price observations that are higher than
matching Treasury bond prices which would suggest a negative credit spread. Sec-
ond, we drop price observations below one cent per dollar. Third, we remove return
observations that show a large bounceback. Specifically, we compute the product of
the adjacent return observations and remove both observations if the product is less
than  0.04. After applying the filters, the resulting sample is an unbalanced panel
data of 937,418 bond month observations for 20,820 bonds over 528 months. In order
to compute excess returns and credit spreads, we construct the prices of the synthetic
Treasury bonds that match the corporate bonds using the Federal Reserve’s constant-
maturity yields data. The methodology is detailed in Appendix C.2.1. CRSP and
Compustat provide the stock prices and accounting information. In Appendix C.2.3,
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we describe the matching procedure between bond data and firm balance sheet vari-
ables. We obtain economic activity data from FRED.
3.4.2 Monetary Policy Shocks
Monetary policy shocks are measured as intradaily changes in various futures con-
tracts around a window of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcement
dates. The literature has shown that by focusing on the unanticipated changes of
interest rate futures around a narrow announcement interval, we can better isolate
changes in market expectations of policy (Kuttner (2001), Gürkaynak et al. (2005),
and Gertler and Karadi (2015)). Because these changes are measured in a su ciently
narrow window, they are uncontaminated by other sources of information besides
monetary policy. More importantly, this approach disentangles the impact of policy
response towards changes in economic developments which is an endogeneity issue
that can plague studies using lower frequency data. We compute shocks over a tight
window which is measured 10 minutes prior to the announcement and 20 minutes
after the announcement. Details on the construction of these shocks are provided in
Appendix C.2.2. We consider FOMC meetings from February 1984 to May 2, 2018
which is a total of 333 meetings. Among all the futures contracts, we choose to focus
on the first federal funds rate and the fourth eurodollar. From the monthly time series
in Figure 3.2, it is clear that during the ZLB period (right of black dashed line), there
was no surprise movements in the federal funds rate (green line) and more variation
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in the fourth eurodollars futures contract (orange line). The fourth eurodollar futures
contract corresponds to a bet on what the short term London Inter-bank O↵ered Rate
(LIBOR) will be fourth quarters, or one year ahead. Thus, it paints a better picture
of the market perception on the future path of policy one year out.
Figure 3.2: Monetary Policy Shocks
This time series shows the monthly average monetary policy shocks of MP1, the scaled surprise in
current month federal funds rate futures contract, and ED4, the surprise in the fourth eurodollar
futures contract. The green line corresponds to MP1 and the orange line corresponds to ED4.
The pre-ZLB period is to the left of the black dashed line and the ZLB period is to the right of it.
Appendix C.2.2 provides details on its construction.
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3.4.3 Summary Statistics
Having completed the matching process between a bond and the balance sheet
information of its issuer, we now explore the heterogeneities that exist in the data.
In particular, we’re interested in di↵erences between the two components of bond
spreads, investment, and other balance sheet variables. Table 3.1 reports the summary
statistics of two components of credit spreads, bond maturity, investment, and various
characteristics of the firm that will be used as controls. Figure 3.3 plots the histograms
of all the variables computed and shows large heterogeneities that exist across firms.
N Mean SD 25-Percentile 50-Percentile 70-Percentile 95-Percentile
Expected Credit Loss 9247 0.025 0.025 0.005 0.020 0.038 0.071
Excess Return 9247 0.084 0.060 0.047 0.071 0.106 0.196
Maturity 9247 12.615 6.179 7.046 11.963 17.915 22.636
Investment 8878 0.013 0.021 0.001 0.012 0.025 0.049
Book to Market Ratio 7552 1.026 0.521 0.570 0.995 1.429 1.918
Leverage 8390 0.362 0.108 0.278 0.368 0.446 0.525
Sales Growth 8651 0.022 0.142 -0.049 0.025 0.104 0.257
Size (log Assets) 9244 7.977 1.298 7.074 7.874 8.789 10.393
Current Assets as a Share of Total Assets 8138 0.292 0.194 0.114 0.247 0.444 0.635
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Bond Characteristics
The table reflects quarterly data from Compustat from 1973Q4 - 2016Q4. All variables are
winsorized at the 2nd and 98th percentile. Definitions of each variable are described in Appendix
C.2.3.
119
CHAPTER 3. INVESTMENT CHANNEL OF MONETARY POLICY USING
CREDIT SPREADS
Figure 3.3: Histogram of Bond Characteristics
3.4.4 Aggregate Relationship
3.4.4.1 Investment
How well does the aggregate investment that we compute align with what FRED
reports? We compute the market weighted average of investment across all firms in
our sample from 1976-2016 and compare this with annual changes in Real Private
Nonresidential Fixed Investment attained from FRED. This measure corresponds
to changes in spending on plant and equipment and is closely related to our firm
level measure from Compustat of quarterly changes in capital (plant, property, and
equipment).
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Figure 3.4: Time Series of Aggregate Investment
This figure is an annual time series from 1976-2016 of our Aggregated Investment and National
Income and Product Accounts of the United States (NIPA) Investment (FRED Code: PNFI PCH)
minus Research and Development (FRED Code: Y006RC1Q027SBEA) minus Equipment (FRED
Code: Y033RC1Q027SBEA). The Aggregated Investment is computed as the market weighted
average of firm level investment where firm level investment scaled by total assets is winsorized at
the 5th and 95th level. NIPA Investment is defined as the seasonally adjusted annual percentage
change in real private nonresidential fixed investment.
Figure 3.4 plots the two series, where the solid line corresponds to a value weighted
average of firm investment and the dashed line is obtained from FRED and adjusted
to better match our definition. The correlation between the two series is 61%. There
are several reasons to account for the di↵erence between our measure and the raw
investment data from FRED. One, the measure reported by FRED comes from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis and consists of expenditures on structures, equipment,
and intellectual property and other subcategories within them. The measure we
use from Compustat, however, only includes expenditures on plant, property, and
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equipment. We attempt to mitigate this problem by removing intellectual property
(research and development) as well as equipments to better match our definition from
Compustat. Second, our investment is computed from a subsample of firms who issue
corporate bonds and thus, those who do not rely solely on bank financing.
Figure 3.5: Time Series of Aggregate Gross and Net Investment
This figure is an annual time series from 1976-2016 of our Aggregated Net Investment (ppentq)
and Aggregated Gross Investment (ppegtq). The Aggregated Investment is computed as the
market weighted average of firm level investment where firm level investment scaled by total assets
is winsorized at the 5th and 95th level. NIPA Investment is defined as the seasonally adjusted
annual percentage change in real private nonresidential fixed investment.
The aggregation by NIPA, however, consists of all firms indiscriminatly. De-
spite these di↵erences, the aggregate investment that we compute matches reasonably
well with the reported measure with a sharp decline during the Great Recession of
2008. It is worth mentioning that what is deemed investment on FRED is actually
capital expenditure in our sample. Therefore we treat the level of investment reported
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in FRED as k and compute annual changes on this measure and plot this as the
dashed line in Figure 3.4. As described in Appendix C.2.4, we use net investment
rather than gross investment. While gross investment (ppegtq) is more closely tied
to the investment decisions a firm makes, we are constrained by the significantly
fewer observations that exist. Net investment (ppentq), which considers changes in
net plant, property, and equipment has much more observations and is also used by
Ottonello and Winberry (2018). We include a comparison between gross and net
investment in Figure 3.5 and it is clear that there is a large outlier and spike in the
early 2000s. This gives us another reason to focus on net investment.
3.4.4.2 Credit Spreads
Having shown that our aggregated investment variable matches well with what is
reported in NIPA, we now turn our attention to our measure of credit spreads. Our
measure of credit spread and its components (expected default and risk premium) is
closely related to that of Gilchrist and Zakraǰsek (2012). In their paper, they first
regress firm level credit spreads on a firm specific measure of default as well as a vector
of bond specific characteristics to isolate a predicted level of credit spread attributed
to expected default risk (analogous to expected losses in our framework). They then
compute an unweighted cross sectional average of these fitted values to denote the
average predicted spreads each month (Ŝt
GZ
). They then construct an aggregate
monthly credit spread index, (GZ Spread hereafter) by taking an unweighted cross
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sectional average of credit spreads across all firms and their liabilities and define the
excess bond premium (analogous to expected excess return) as the component of GZ
Spread net of expected defaults. In essence, Gilchrist and Zakraǰsek (2012) provide
an aggregate measure of credit spread and decompose it into a component related
to expected default risk and a residual component to capture risk compensation over
and above default. Therefore, it is natural to aggregate our measure of expected
losses (sdi,t) and expected excess returns (s
r
i,t) which came from the decomposition in
Section 3.3 and compare it with fitted values of the GZ-Spread and the Excess Bond
Premium, respectively. The GZ Spread and excess bond premium is also a widely
used benchmark in the literature (Gertler and Karadi (2015)).
Figure 3.6: Time Series of Aggregate Credit Spreads s and GZ-Credit Spread
This figure is a monthly time series of our excess return component which is computed as an
unweighted cross sectional average across all firms each month. It is compared with the GZ Credit
Spread from Gilchrist and Zakraǰsek (2012) which is attained from Simon Gilchrists’ website.
Figure 3.6 plots the time series of our aggregate credit spread and the GZ-Spread
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collected from Gilchrist and Zakraǰsek (2012). The two series are highly correlated
at 90% which shows that our sample is representative of what was used in their
study. The GZ credit spread is simply an arithmetic average of the credit spreads
on outstanding bonds each month. An important distinction between our sample is
that Gilchrist and Zakraǰsek (2012) include callable bonds (about two-thirds of their
sample) which means that the issuer has the right to pay back interest and principal
ahead of schedule. We remove callable bonds because it interacts with monetary
policy is a meaningful way. When interest rates are lowered, this raises the likelihood
of issuers calling their bonds and refinancing their debt at lower rates. By removing
callable bonds, we remove this additional channel1.
Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 show the time series between our two components (sr
and sd) with the GZ-Excess Bond Premium and Expected Default, respectively. The
correlation in Figure 3.7 between the expected excess returns component and GZ-
Excess Bond Premium is 66%. The expected excess returns component matches
many of the peaks and troughs present in GZ EBP. The correlation in Figure 3.8 is
81%. A key di↵erence worth noting is that the expected default computed from GZ
(orange line in Figure 3.8) is limited to information from distance to default, whereas
our measure uses all information in the state vector from Equation 3.6. In addition,
our measure of expected losses is an in-sample unbiased estimator of realized credit
loss whereas GZ’s measure is not an unbiased forecast.
1We do not remove make-whole callable bonds which include provisions that su ciently compen-
sate the holder of the bond in the event the call option is executed. This compensation removes any
economic benefit from early execution.
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Figure 3.7: Time Series of Expected Excess Returns sr and GZ-Excess Bond Pre-
mium
This figure is a monthly time series of our expected excess return component which is computed as
an unweighted cross sectional average across all firms each month. It is compared with the GZ
Excess Bond Premium from Gilchrist and Zakraǰsek (2012) which is attained from Simon
Gilchrists’ website.
Figure 3.8: Time Series of Expected Losses sd and GZ-Expected Default
This figure is a monthly time series of our expected loss component which is computed as an
unweighted cross sectional average across all firms each month. It is compared with the GZ
Expected Default from Gilchrist and Zakraǰsek (2012) which is attained from Simon Gilchrists’
website. This measure is not directly reported in the data base but is easily computed as the
di↵erence between the spread and excess bond premium, both of which are reported.
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3.5 Empirical Analysis
3.5.1 Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism
In this section, we revisit the widely studied question of how monetary policy
a↵ects firm investment. However, given the large endogeneity concerns of policy
responding to aggregate investment, we focus on the surprise and unexpected com-
ponent of monetary policy2. Studying the transmission mechansim is an important
first step to ensure that the shocks and investment variable that we use are sensible
and generate results in line with what the literature has found. An early paper by
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) estimated a VAR and found that residential and business
fixed investment declined around six months following a monetary tightening. Us-
ing a model with nominal rigidities, Christiano et al. (2005) and Gertler and Karadi
(2011) also conclude that monetary policy tightening surprises reduce investment.
Given the large di↵erences in the macroeconomy between the period prior to the zero
lower bound (1986Q1-2008Q4) and the period during it (2009Q1-2016Q4), we sepa-
rate these periods in our analysis. Although we are interested in understanding the
investment response at the individual firm level, it is worth first examining whether
the relationship holds in the aggregate. We do this by taking a value weighted aver-
age of investment across all firms each quarter and estimate the following time series
2We also consider the relationship between aggregate investment and quarterly changes in the
short term interest rates (3 month, 1 Year, and 2 Year Constant Maturity Treasury Yields) and find
statistically insignificant results. This perhaps arises because of the endogeneity issue discussed and
motivates focusing on the surprise component of monetary policy.
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regression:
 log Kt+1 =  0 +  1MPSt +  2Zt + ✏t+1 (3.9)
where Kt+1 =
PN
i=1 wi,t log ki,t+1, the market weighted average of investment in
quarter t + 1, is measured as the change in capital from quarter t to quarter t + 1
and MPSt is the normalized monetary policy shock such that positive values denote
easing surprises. If the transmission mechanism is to work as the literature sug-
gests, we expect a positive coe cient - that is, expansionary surprises lower borrowing
costs and investment increases. Like much of the literature, we use MP1, the surprise
component in the current month federal funds rate futures contract, as a proxy for
monetary policy shocks during the Pre-ZLB period. In addition, we also include the
residuals from the projection of ED4, the surprise component in the fourth eurodollar
futures contract, onto MP1 and denote this as the “path” surprise. Zt is a vector
of aggregate firm controls including the book to market ratio, leverage, sales growth,
size, and current assets as a share of total assets.
We first estimate Equation 3.9 without controlling for these additional variables
and present the results for three sample periods in Table 3.2a. Column (1) shows that
a 1% expansionary surprise leads to a statistically significant 3% increase in aggre-
gate investment. This e↵ect can also be seen during the pre-ZLB period (Column 2).
In Column (3), the e↵ect reverses where expansionary surprises lead to a decline in
investment. One potential reason why this reversal occurs is the “information e↵ect”
of unconventional monetary policy documented by Nakamura and Steinsson (2018).
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Under their framework, expansionary surprises lead to decreased optimism about eco-
nomic fundamentals and a drop in expected output growth. While we include the
zero lower bound period in our subsequent analysis, we draw stronger statistical sig-
nificance by focusing on the Pre-ZLB period. Table 3.2b shows that by controlling
for additional firm characteristics and macroeconomic variables, the results remain
largely the same. We next examine whether the transmission of policy on aggregate
investment holds in subsequent quarters. Table 3.3 reports the results of regressing
changes in aggregate investment two, three, and four quarters ahead on the monetary
policy surprises. While the results are insignificant for the two (Panel 3.3a) and three
(Panel 3.3b) quarter ahead investment, the positive coe cient on the path shock con-
firms the intuition that easing surprises lead to higher investment. More importantly,
four quarter ahead aggregate investment shows the strongest significance in response
to monetary policy shocks - a result in line with that of Gertler and Karadi (2015).
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Constant 0.00966⇤⇤⇤ 0.0110⇤⇤⇤ 0.00721⇤⇤⇤
(0.000684) (0.000803) (0.00106)
Observations 113 81 32
R2 0.0396 0.0342 0.0907
Controls No No No














Constant 0.0598⇤ 0.0536 -0.000526
(0.0321) (0.0364) (0.172)
Observations 113 81 32
R2 0.395 0.434 0.238
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Table 3.2: One Quarter Ahead Aggregate Investment
This table presents the results of estimating Equation 3.9 for both without controlling (Panel 3.2a)
and with controlling (Panel 3.2b) for other aggregate variables Z. These controls include firm level
such as book to market ratio, leverage, sales growth, size, and current assets as a share of total
assets. Aggregate controls include GDP growth, unemployment rate, and inflation. Investment is
winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile prior to the aggregation. Column (1) reports estimates
using the full sample (1986Q1-2016Q4), Column (2) reports from the Pre-ZLB period
(1986Q1-2008Q4), and Column (3) the period during the zero-lower bound (2009Q1-2016Q4).
Standard errors are White standard errors.
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Constant 0.0473 0.0473 -0.423⇤⇤
(0.0471) (0.0471) (0.157)
Observations 112 112 31
R2 0.116 0.116 0.345
Controls Yes Yes Yes














Constant 0.0837⇤⇤ 0.0837⇤⇤ 0.0692
(0.0357) (0.0357) (0.198)
Observations 111 111 30
R2 0.159 0.159 0.0699
Controls Yes Yes Yes














Constant -0.00795 -0.00846 0.130
(0.0253) (0.0302) (0.138)
Observations 109 81 28
R2 0.398 0.394 0.298
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Table 3.3: Aggregate Investment Monetary Policy Transmission
This table presents the results of estimating Equation 3.9 for di↵erent quarters ahead while
controlling for other aggregate variables Z. The sample is winsorized at the 5th and 95th
percentile on the variable of investment relative to market assets prior to the aggregation. Column
(1) reports estimates using the full sample (1986Q1-2016Q4), Column (2) reports from the
Pre-ZLB period (1986Q1-2008Q4), and Column (3) the period during the zero-lower bound
(2009Q1-2016Q4). Standard errors are White standard errors.
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The results in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 reveal that the transmission mechanism
largely behaves in the way others have found in the literature during normal times.
Given the ambiguities relying on aggregate data, we next turn our attention to the
cross section and ask whether the e↵ect is stronger at the individual firm level. We
do this by focusing on the disaggregated panel and estimate the following pooled
regression, which is an analog of Equation 3.9:
 log ki,t+1 =  0 +  1MPSt +  2Zi,t + ✏i,t+1 (3.10)
where  log ki,t+1 is investment in quarter t+1 measured as the change in capital from
quarter t to quarter t+1 andMPSt is the normalized monetary policy shock such that
positive values denote easing surprises. As in the aggregate, we also include various
firm controls (Zi,t) such as its book to market ratio, leverage, sales growth, size, and
current assets as a share of total assets and estimate results in the period before
and during the ZLB. Because there exists correlation within quarters, we cluster our
standard errors by quarter. Clustering standard errors at the quarterly level allows
for correlation within a quarter but rules out correlation across quarters.
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Constant 0.0368⇤⇤⇤ 0.0358⇤⇤⇤ 0.0267⇤⇤⇤
(0.00242) (0.00261) (0.00475)
Observations 25672 17701 7971
R2 0.0234 0.0260 0.0259
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Table 3.4: Firm Level Monetary Policy Transmission of Investment
Results from estimating Equation 3.10 using sample of non-financial firms that are matched to
bonds. Column (1) reports estimates using the full sample (1984Q1-2016Q4), Column (2) reports
from the Pre-ZLB period (1984Q1-2008Q4), and Column (3) the period during the zero-lower
bound (2009Q1-2016Q4). MP1 is the surprise component in the current month federal funds rate
futures contract scaled by the number of days relative to the FOMC meeting. ED4 is the surprise
component of the fourth eurodollar futures contract. Both shocks are normalized so that positive
values correspond to expansionary shocks (decrease in interest rates). For more details on the
construction of MP1 and ED4, see Gürkaynak et al. (2005). Firm controls include book to market
ratio, leverage, sales growth, size, and current assets as a share of total assets. Standard errors are
clustered by quarters.
Table 3.4 shows the results of estimating Equation 3.10 over various sample peri-
ods. We find that, much like the aggregate response, an expansionary surprise leads
to an increase in investment for the full sample and prior to the zero lower bound.
The results are quite similar to the one quarter ahead results on the aggregate level
in Table 3.2. Given that the aggregate results in Table 3.3 shows the strongest sta-
tistical significance for four quarter ahead investment, we continue focusing on this
time horizon in the subsequent sections.
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3.5.2 Heterogeneities of the Transmission
Mechanism
In this section we allow the investment sensitivity to monetary policy shocks to
vary with firm level credit spreads (si,t). In particular, we interact the shocks with
credit spreads and estimate the following regression:
 log ki,t+4 =  0 +  1MPSt +  2si,tMPSt +  1Zi,t 1 +  2Yt 1 + ✏i,t+4 (3.11)
where  log ki,t+4 is four quarter ahead investment defined as ki,t+4-ki,t+3, si,t is firm
i’s normalized credit spread at quarter t, MPSt is the intradaily monetary policy
shock aggregated at the quarterly level, Zi,t is a vector of firm level controls (book-to-
market ratio, leverage, sales growth, size, and current assets as a share of total assets)
in quarter t, and Yt 1 is a vector of aggregate controls (GDP growth, unemployment
rate, and inflation) one quarter before the shocks. We control variables one quarter
prior to the realization of the shock to avoid them reacting to the monetary policy
shock. The coe cient of interest is  
2
which describes how investment sensitivity
changes for firms with one standard deviation higher credit spread. The results for
estimating Equation 3.11 is reported in Table 3.5 and suggests that a one standard
deviation higher level of credit spreads reduces the investment sensitivity to monetary
policy surprises by 2.14% in the full sample (Column 1) and 2% in the pre-ZLB period
(Column 2). During the ZLB period (Column 3), however, there is an insignificant
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e↵ect. Having conditioned the sensitivity on the overall level of credit spreads, we now
ask whether this e↵ect can be decomposed into expected default (sdi,t) and expected
excess returns (sri,t). We use the two components of credit spreads to examine the
role they play in the investment channel of monetary policy. We exploit the rich
heterogeneity that we observe in the expected loss and risk premium component
across bonds of di↵erent firms to ask the following question: are firms that with higher
















Constant 0.0352⇤⇤⇤ 0.0472⇤⇤⇤ 0.00979
(0.00414) (0.00617) (0.00868)
Observations 21224 15059 6165
R2 0.0249 0.0303 0.0273
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Table 3.5: Heterogeneity of Transmission Mechanism using  ki,t+4
Results from estimating Equation 3.11 using sample of non-financial firms that are matched to
bonds. Column (1) reports estimates using the full sample (1984Q1-2016Q4), Column (2) reports
from the Pre-ZLB period (1984Q1-2008Q4), and Column (3) the period during the zero-lower
bound (2009Q1-2016Q4). MP1 is the surprise component in the current month federal funds rate
futures contract scaled by the number of days relative to the FOMC meeting. ED4 is the surprise
component of the fourth eurodollar futures contract. Both shocks are normalized so that positive
values correspond to expansionary shocks (decrease in interest rates). sd and sr are standardized
to have mean 0 and standard deviation of 1. For more details on the construction of MP1 and
ED4, see Gürkaynak et al. (2005) and Appendix C.2.2. Firm controls include book to market ratio,
leverage, sales growth, size, and current assets as a share of total assets. Aggregate controls include
GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, and inflation. Standard errors are clustered by quarters.
135
CHAPTER 3. INVESTMENT CHANNEL OF MONETARY POLICY USING
CREDIT SPREADS
The empirical specification is :



















Zi,t 1 +  2Yt 1 + ✏i,t+4
(3.12)
where  log ki,t+4 is four quarter ahead investment,
P
j ⇢
j 1lt+j is the expected long
run expected credit loss of firm i’s bond denoted as sd,
P
j ⇢
j 1ret+j is the expected
excess return (risk premium) of firm i’s bond denoted as sr, MPSt is the intradaily
monetary policy shock aggregated at the quarterly level, Zi,t is a vector of firm level
controls (book-to-market ratio, leverage, sales growth, size, and current assets as a
share of total assets) in quarter t, and Yt 1 is a vector of aggregate controls (GDP
growth, unemployment rate, and inflation) one quarter before the shocks. In addition
to reporting the results of Equation 3.12 which focuses on the four quarter change in
capital, we also consider di↵erent horizons such as log ki,t+j   log ki,t+j 1, j = 0 ...
3 and provide the results in Appendix C.3. These results are reported in Table C.1,
Table C.2, Table C.3, and Table C.4 where the sum of coe cients vary in magnitude
and statistical significance.
Table 3.6 reports the results of Equation 3.12 and considers the e↵ects of mon-
etary policy on the four quarter change in investment. It shows that by including
both interactions with expected default (sd) and expected excess returns (sr), the
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coe cients are insignificant individually. The results suggest that we cannot dis-
entangle which component of credit spreads matter more in explaining the smaller
e↵ect of monetary policy. This arises because of the high correlation among the two
series. However, the sum of coe cients for the full-sample and pre-ZLB are negative
and statistically di↵erent from zero. In particular, Column (1) finds that for the full
sample (1984Q1-2016Q4), in response to a 1% expansionary shock, firms with a one
standard deviation higher exposure to both components face a smaller sensitivity of
four quarter ahead investment by 2%. In the pre-ZLB period (Column 2), firms are
1.88% less responsive to monetary policy shocks. To put these magnitudes into con-
text, Ottonello and Winberry (2018) find that firms with a one standard deviation
higher leverage reduce their sensitivity by 74 bp one quarter ahead, or 2.96% four
quarters ahead. However, they do not find statistical significance past one quarter
and continue their entire analysis for a quarter ahead. Column (3) of Table 3.6 re-
ports results for the zero-lower bound period and finds a reduced sensitivity of 2.8%
although it is not statistically significant.
The results in Table 3.6 report standard errors that are clustered at the (quar-
terly) date level. This means that observations may be correlated within each quarter
but uncorrelated across quarters. This seems reasonable given that monetary policy
surprises in quarter t will a↵ect firms similarly in that quarter but di↵erently one or
two quarters ahead. However, this also raises potential concerns of serial correlation
if firm i has residuals that are correlated across time. We test for serial correlation by
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regressing residuals for each firm i on its one quarter lag. We estimate the following
regression for each firm i.
✏̂i,t = ⇢✏̂i,t 1 + ⌘i,t (3.13)
We find that the average absolute value of ⇢ across all firms is 0.263 suggesting that
serial correlation is not a big problem. Furthermore, the left hand side variables do
not overlap (e.g. ki,t+4   ki,t+3 does not overlap with ki,t+3   ki,t+2) which alleviates
some concerns of serial correlation. If however, we tried to forecast investment as
ki,t+4   ki,t, using MPSt, this will give rise to serious concerns of serial correlation.
More specifically, the residuals ✏i,t+4   ✏i,t and ✏i,t+5   ✏i,t+1 would each contain the
shock ✏i,t+4   ✏i,t+1 which is a concern addressed by Hodrick (1992).
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sd ⇥MP1 0.00840 -0.0000532
(0.0212) (0.0200)




sd ⇥ ED4 -0.00920
(0.0370)
sr ⇥ ED4 -0.0188
(0.0503)
Constant 0.0349⇤⇤⇤ 0.0481⇤⇤⇤ 0.00858
(0.00424) (0.00613) (0.00916)
Coe cient Sum -0.0202 -0.0188 -0.0280
SE Sum 0.00767 0.00834 0.0227
t-stat -2.636 -2.252 -1.232
Observations 20890 14862 6028
R2 0.0247 0.0299 0.0281
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Table 3.6: Heterogeneity of Transmission Mechanism with Credit Spread Compo-
nents
Results from estimating Equation 3.12 using sample of non-financial firms that are matched to
bonds. Column (1) reports estimates using the full sample (1984Q1-2016Q4), Column (2) reports
from the Pre-ZLB period (1984Q1-2008Q4), and Column (3) the period during the zero-lower
bound (2009Q1-2016Q4). MP1 is the surprise component in the current month federal funds rate
futures contract scaled by the number of days relative to the FOMC meeting. ED4 is the surprise
component of the fourth eurodollar futures contract. Both shocks are normalized so that positive
values correspond to expansionary shocks (decrease in interest rates). sd and sr are standardized
to have mean 0 and standard deviation of 1. For more details on the construction of MP1 and
ED4, see Gürkaynak et al. (2005) and Appendix C.2.2. Firm controls include book to market ratio,
leverage, sales growth, size, and current assets as a share of total assets. Aggregate controls include
GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, and inflation. Standard errors are clustered by quarters.
As an additional robustness check to see whether four quarter ahead investment
is meaningfully impacted, we consider a di↵erent left hand side variable that holds an
initial capital level prior to the monetary policy surprise log ki,t 1 fixed and measures
changes in capital j quarters ahead. We compute the following di↵erence, log ki,t+j  
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log ki,t 1 for j = 1 ... 5 and substitute that as our left hand side variable in Equation
3.12.




This is essentially Jordà (2005)’s local projections methodology of estimating impulse
response functions, which as he discusses, has several advantages. Using this method,
we avoid extrapolation and compounding errors in the parameter estimates  j as we
increase the horizon. Rather than reporting the regression results in a table, we plot
the coe cient sums on the interaction term,  j,d +  j,r as well as a 95% confidence
interval in Figure 3.9. From Figure 3.9, we can see that the impact increases as we go
further out into longer horizons with the 1-Quarter ahead leading to a 2.3% reduced
sensitivity on investment and the 4-Quarters ahead leading to a 4.8% reduction.
Furthermore, at the 5-Quarter ahead horizon, the impact is no longer statisically
significant. We repeat the exercise for the pre-ZLB sample (Figure 3.10) and find
similar results.
In particular, for the pre-ZLB sample, 1-Quarter ahead investment falls by 1.8%
from higher exposure to the credit spread components and 4.3% 4-Quarters ahead.
Similarly, looking past four quarters does not yield statistically significant results
which again implies that monetary policy has strong e↵ects just one year out. The
results in Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10 have much larger magnitudes than the regression
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results reported earlier. This is because of the way we define investment as being
changes in capital relative to one quarter before period t. Thus, it’s likely that
capital accumulates much more yielding larger estimates of investment. In results
not reported, we re-estimate these regressions using gross investment and find that
the results are insignificant. This again, could be due to the much fewer observations
and large outliers that exist in the data.
Figure 3.9: Impulse Response Function Full Sample
This figure plots the sum of coe cient on sd ⇥ MP1 and sr ⇥ MP1 for the full sample (1984Q1 -
2016Q4) as a function of the time horizon j. For example, the 2-Quarter ahead coe cient
corresponds to a left hand side variable of log ki,t+2   log ki,t 1 while the 4-Quarter ahead
coe cient corresponds to log ki,t+4   log ki,t 1. The black line is the point estimate while the
dashed lines are a 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.10: Impulse Response Function Pre-ZLB Sample
This figure plots the sum of coe cient on sd ⇥ MP1 and sr ⇥ MP1 for the pre ZLB sample
(1984Q1 - 2008Q4) as a function of the time horizon j. For example, the 2-Quarter ahead
coe cient corresponds to a left hand side variable of log ki,t+2   log ki,t 1 while the 4-Quarter
ahead coe cient corresponds to log ki,t+4   log ki,t 1. The black line is the point estimate while
the dashed lines are a 95% confidence interval.
3.6 Pass-Through E↵ects of Monetary
Policy
The previous section showed that monetary policy has a dampened e↵ect on in-
vestment for firms with a higher expected losses and risk premium component. In this
section, we explore whether the di↵erential impact occurs because firms with higher
credit spreads face an unequal pass through e↵ect on their corporate bond yields dur-
ing monetary easing compared with those that are deemed safer. Figure 3.11 shows
the daily time series of corporate bond spread and yields by di↵erent ratings.
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(a) Corporate Bond Spread
(b) Corporate Bond Yield
Figure 3.11: Corporate Bond Spreads and Yields by Ratings
This figure is a daily time series of average corporate bond spreads (Panel A) and average
corporate bond yields (Panel B) from January 1997-December 2016 (5,042 observations). The blue
line corresponds to High Yield (HY) risky bonds, the orange line corresponds to Baa bonds, and
the green line corresponds to an average of Aa+ and Aa bonds. We remove callable bonds and
financial firms (SIC:6000-7000). We take a weighted average of observations by the face value of
the bond and winsorize spreads and yields at the 2nd and 98th percentile level to remove outliers.
The data comes from Merrill Lynch.
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The High Yield (HY) blue line corresponds to bonds with lower credit ratings
than Baa while the orange (Baa) and green (A) lines are investment grade bonds
3. Unsuprisingly, the overall level of spreads and yields are noticeably higher for
riskier bonds. One theory as to why there could be an unequal pass through of
monetary policy is the preferred habitat theory of Vayanos and Vila (2009) where
the term structure results from an interaction between investor clienteles and risk
averse arbitrageurs. The corporate-bond class system very much exists in the real
world where many types of mutual funds have mandates to hold investment grade
bonds 4. Under this theory, the propogation of changes in expectation of short term
rates towards corporate bond yields is weakened for bonds which investors are more
risk averse towards. As a result, the monetary policy transmission mechanism is
dampened and risky corporate bonds underreact.
Another complementary theory of the unequal pass-through e↵ect of monetary
policy is the safety premium theory of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012).
Under this theory, investors value safety qualities inherent in Treasuries during times
when the supply of Treasuries are especially low. As a result, the yield on Treasuries
is low relative to riskier bonds when the quantity of Treasuries is low. This logic also
extends to corporate bonds that di↵er in their safety. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2012) empirically find that when the supply of Treasuries are low, yields
on AA bonds fall more than yields on BAA resulting in the spread (yBAA-yAA) to
3The high yield market in the United States is now worth about $ 1.2 trillion.
4“Buttonwood: Scavenging in the junk yard” The Economist December 1st, 2018
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rise. This points to evidence of a priced long-term safety attribute which is driven
solely by the supply of Treasuries. A detailed discussion of these theories is provided
in my second chapter.
We address these implications by estimating an event study regression of the one
day change in corporate bond yields on changes in the fourth eurodollar futures con-
tract (ED4 monetary policy surprise). The underlying assumption of this regression
is that ED4, the fourth eurodollars futures contract, is a reasonable proxy for the
path of future policy. We estimate this regression for investment grade safe bonds
(Aa+ and A), intermediate bonds (Baa), and high yield risky bonds (HY). Under
the preferred habitat and safety premium theory, we would expect to see a smaller
sensitivity on corporate bond yields for riskier bonds. Table 3.7 present the regres-
sion results for one day and two day changes in corporate bond yields. If we focus
on Table 3.7a, we see that a 100 basis point decline in the fourth eurodollar futures
corresponds to a 37 basis point fall in the safest corporate bond yields, 36 basis points
in intermediate bonds, and 10 basis point for the riskiest bonds. A similar pattern
emerges for the two day change in Table 3.7b where moving from the safest to riskiest
bonds lead to a lower pass through onto yields. It is interesting to note that the pass
through for the two day change is also larger than that of the one day change which
can attributed to potential stale prices over the one day change.
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ED4 -0.368⇤⇤⇤ -0.359⇤⇤⇤ -0.107⇤
(0.0540) (0.0497) (0.0567)
Constant 0.00112 0.00696 0.00638
(0.00504) (0.00437) (0.00689)
Observations 92 92 92
R2 0.321 0.382 0.0242











ED4 -0.446⇤⇤⇤ -0.445⇤⇤⇤ -0.265⇤⇤
(0.0994) (0.0983) (0.112)
Constant -0.00277 0.00336 0.00308
(0.00884) (0.00848) (0.0104)
Observations 90 90 90
R2 0.197 0.214 0.0643
Table 3.7: Pass Through E↵ect on Corporate Bond Yields
Results from estimating a regression of the one day (Panel 3.7a) and two day (Panel 3.7b) change
in corporate bond yields during FOMC meetings on changes in the fourth eurodollar futures
contract (ED4) for the pre-ZLB period (February 5, 1997 - December 11, 2007). We exclude the
September 17, 2001 meetings due to the terrorist attacks. We remove callable bonds and financial
firms (SIC:6000-7000). We take a weighted average of observations by the face value of the bond
and winsorize spreads and yields at the 2nd and 98th percentile level to remove outliers. The data
comes from Merrill Lynch. Column (1) reports estimates using a sample of the safest bonds (Aa),
Column (2) reports estimates using a sample of intermediate rated bonds (Baa), and Column (3)
reports estimates using a sample of the riskiest bonds (HY). ED4 is the surprise component of the
fourth eurodollar futures contract which is normalized so that positive values correspond to
expansionary shocks (decrease in interest rates). Robust white standard errors are reported in
parenthesis.
The results in Table 3.7a and Table 3.7b use data from Merrill Lynch which could
raise concerns of stale prices, where the reported price does not accurately reflect
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information that occurs on the actual FOMC day. One possibility of why this occurs
is because the bond prices we see on an FOMC day was actually agreed upon a day
or two prior to the FOMC announcement. If that is the case, we won’t see accurate
movements in yields in our sample which focuses on announcement dates. We consider
the two day change in Table 3.7b which still yields statistically significant results. To
further mitigate these concerns, we turn to TRACE data which reports dates on
when the exact transaction terms are agreed upon. This is as opposed to the delivery
date when the bond is actually passed on to the counter party and where stale prices
are a concern. We re-estimate these daily regressions using execution dates that fall
on FOMC meetings and report the results in Table 3.8. Using transactions prices
that are executed on FOMC announcement dates, we see that there is a limited pass
through e↵ect of 60bp to safe bonds and 23 basis points to riskier bonds.
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ED4 -0.602⇤⇤⇤ -0.577⇤⇤⇤ -0.229
(0.184) (0.168) (0.481)
Constant -0.0110 0.0147 0.00185
(0.0163) (0.0216) (0.0482)
Observations 44 44 44
R2 0.231 0.135 0.00499
Table 3.8: Pass Through E↵ect on Two-Day Corporate Bond Yields using TRACE
Results from estimating a regression of the two day change in corporate bond yields during FOMC
meetings on changes in the fourth eurodollar futures contract (ED4) for the pre-ZLB period
(February 5, 1997 - December 11, 2007). We exclude the September 17, 2001 meetings due to the
terrorist attacks. We remove callable bonds and financial firms (SIC:6000-7000). We take a
weighted average of observations by the face value of the bond and winsorize spreads and yields at
the 2nd and 98th percentile level to remove outliers. The data comes from TRACE and use trade
execution dates. Column (1) reports estimates using a sample of the safest bonds (Aa), Column
(2) reports estimates using a sample of intermediate rated bonds (Baa), and Column (3) reports
estimates using a sample of the riskiest bonds (HY). ED4 is the surprise component of the fourth
eurodollar futures contract which is normalized so that positive values correspond to expansionary
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Table 3.9: Pass Through E↵ect on Risky minus Safe Bonds
Column (1) reports results from estimating a regression of the one day change in risky bond yields
minus safe bond yields during FOMC meetings on changes in the fourth eurodollar futures
contract (ED4) for the pre-ZLB period (February 5, 1997 - December 11, 2007). Column (2)
repeats the same regression except using risky spreads minus safe spreads. We exclude the
September 17, 2001 meetings due to the terrorist attacks. We remove callable bonds and financial
firms (SIC:6000-7000). We take a weighted average of observations by the face value of the bond
and winsorize spreads and yields at the 2nd and 98th percentile level to remove outliers. The data
comes from Merrill Lynch. ED4 is the surprise component of the fourth eurodollar futures contract
which is normalized so that positive values correspond to expansionary shocks (decrease in interest
rates). Robust white standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
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The empirical results above suggest a di↵erential pass-through monetary policy ef-
fect between risky and safe firms. A more direct test is to take the di↵erence of yields
(and spreads) between risky and safe assets and directly regress the 1-day change
on the monetary policy shock. In Table 3.9, we test the hypothesis that there are
di↵erences in pass-throughs on yields and spreads between risky and safe bonds. In
particular, I take the di↵erence between risky and safe yields (spreads) and compute
the one day change of this di↵erence. The null hypothesis is that the coe cient on
ED4 is zero - that is, there are no significant di↵erences between risky and safe yields
(spreads) chnages in response to monetary policy shocks. The regression results in
Table 3.9 suggest that we can reject this null hypothesis. Furthermore, the positive
coe cient on ED4 for both yields and spreads show that in response to expansionary
surprises, safe yields (spreads) fall by much more than risky yields (spreads), thus
suggesting a di↵erential pass through e↵ect between risky and safe bonds.
3.7 Conclusion
By applying a Campbell-Shiller decomposition, we are able to disentangle the di-
rect cost of external finance into a component related to expected losses and another
to risk premium. We show empirically that firms with higher expected losses and
risk premium component of credit spreads face a dampened investment response to
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expansionary surprises, although we are unable to disentangle which piece matters
more. Our paper contributes to the voluminous literature on the monetary policy
transmission mechanism by conditioning on these two components and documenting
the opposite of an amplification e↵ect that the previous literature has found. We
relate this dampened investment response to a growing literature on the pass through
e↵ects of monetary policy whereby Federal Reserve announcements di↵erentially im-
pact risky and safe securities. In particular, the safety premium and preferred habitat
theory postulates that expansionary shocks pass through more easily for safer bonds
because of a safety premium that investors value. A future research direction could
be to directly model the empirical results of our paper. One possible mechanism is
such that firms with higher expected losses are closer to default and face an intensified
conflict between bond and equity holders, leading to a decline in investment.
Our paper is also of topical interest in the context of the unintended consequences
of monetary policy. The dual mandate of monetary policy has always been price
stability and employment but in recent years, more attention has been paid on the
e↵ects on inequality and welfare5. While inequality in the context of individuals and
consumers is not applicable in our context, we can consider a channel by which firms
are a↵ected di↵erentially. More specifically, is it the case that monetary policy is pro-
moting industry concentration of larger firms at the expense of smaller firms? Our
results do not provide a definitive answer to this complicated question but the results
5Innocent bystanders? Monetary policy and inequality in the US (2014 VOX) and Monetary
Policy and inequality: A new channel (2018 VOX)
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of my second chapter suggests that monetary policy does not pass through equally
to the bond yields of risky and safe firms. This chapter suggests that this di↵eren-
tial pass-through can carry over and have an impact on firm investment and allow
firms with lower credit spreads to invest more. Larger firms, which have better access
to funding, will benefit disproportionately to expansionary policy and can perhaps
lead to greater concentration of large firms. This is related to the normative issue
of “creative destruction” of undesirable firms, whereby better firms replace outdated
ones. Our results again, are only indicative that policy disproportionately benefits
safe firms relative to riskier ones.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Solving the Bank’s Problem
⇡ = max
S,iL,iD
(1 + iL)L+ (1 + i)S   (1 + iD)D
subject to L+ S = D + E
0
(i)
 LL  ⇡
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In order to solve the bank’s problem, first write the Lagrangian:
L = (1 + iL)L+ (1 + i)S   (1 + iD)D   µ(L+ S  D   E
0
(i)) +  D(S    DD)
+ L((1 + iL)L+ (1 + i)S   (1 + iD)D    LL)
(A.2)
Taking the first-order condition with respect to S:
µ = (1 + i)(1 +  L) +  D (A.3)
Taking the first-order condition with respond to iL:
L+ (1 + iL)L
0   µL0 +  L(L+ (1 + iL)L0)   L LL0 = 0
(1 + iL)(L
0
(1 +  L)) = µL
0   (1 +  L)L+  L LL0









We can substitute Equation A.3 and define L
0
L
= -✏L as the semi-elasticity to get:
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Taking the first-order condition with respond to iD:
 D   (1 + iD)D0 + µD0    D DD0    L(D + (1 + iD)D0) = 0
D + (1 + iD)D
0
+  L(D + (1 + iD)D
0
) = µD
0    D DD0
(1 + iD)(D
0
(1 +  L)) = µD
0   (1 +  L)D    D DD0









We can substitute Equation A.3 and define D
0
D
= ✏D as the semi-elasticity to get:




























A.2 Solving the Household’s Problem
The household chooses the amount of deposits to hold at bank i, Di by taking as
given the mark-up or spread of the bank si subject to the constraint that aggregate
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Let   be the Lagrange multiplier on the aggregate deposit constraint. Then, taking

















































We can substitute in the expression from Equation A.9 of si into the definition of s
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which is the household demand function for deposits. This expression can be substi-


















































As an auxiliary equation for further use, we can take the derivative of Equation A.13
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We’re now ready to derive an expression of market power for banks. We can di↵er-































































































































A.3 Deriving the Optimal Deposit Spread
This section derives Equation 1.18, the aggregate deposit elasticity and uses this to
find a closed form solution for the bank’s optimal deposit spread (Equation 1.19). We
begin by expressing three first order conditions that must be true for the household.
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where sl ⌘ Ml i +
D
l
s - the weighted average foregone interest cost that households
incur to obtain liquidity. The proof requires a number of auxiliary equations which
will be useful.




























where the last equality comes from taking the limit   ! 0.
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A.4 Deriving Campbell and Shiller (1988)
(Equation 1.24)
This section outlines the decomposition proposed by Campbell and Ammer (1993)
and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) on unexpected stock returns. The holding period





Taking logs on both sides and substituting ht+1 for ln(1+Ht+1), we get:
ht+1 = ln(Pt+1 +Dt)  ln(Pt) (A.29)
Applying a log-linearization to ln(Pt+1+Dt) and defining ⇢ as the steady state value
of P
D+P
, we can express the first di↵erence as the weighted sum of the log di↵erences:
 ln(Pt+1 +Dt) ⇡ ⇢ pt+1 + (1  ⇢) dt (A.30)
We can “integrate” this expression to get
ln(Pt+1 +Dt) ⇡ k + ⇢pt+1 + (1  ⇢)dt (A.31)
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Substituting to Equation A.29 simplifies to:
ht+1 ⇡ k + ⇢pt+1 + (1  ⇢)dt   pt
⇡ k + ⇢pt+1 + dt   ⇢dt   pt + dt 1   pt| {z }
 t
 dt 1 + pt
⇡ k   ⇢(dt   pt+1) + dt 1   pt + dt   dt 1
⇡ k   ⇢( t+1) +  t + dt
ht+1 ⇡ k + (1  ⇢L 1) t + dt
(A.32)
We can solve for  t as follows:















A.5 Are FOMC Days Unique?
This paper studies how monetary policy surprises a↵ect bank stock returns. How-
ever, it is important to address whether the e↵ects work through the surprises or
normal fluctuations of interest rates. Is it the case that bank stock returns respond
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the same way to monetary policy surprises as they do to interest rates?
If the e↵ect of daily interest rate changes outside of FOMC days are similar to the
results that I find on FOMC announcements using intradaily data, this suggests that
only interest rate movements matter in explaining bank returns. However, if using
interest rate changes outside of FOMC meetings yield di↵erent results, this suggests
something unique about policy surprises. Because there are severe data limitations in
studying intradaily changes of the eurodollar futures contracts on non-FOMC days, I
use daily changes in Treasury yields starting from January 1984 to Decemnber 2017
to study bank stock returns on non-FOMC days. In order to justify that changes in
Treasury yields are a good proxy, I first test whether bank returns on FOMC days
using these changes provide similar results to my intradaily event study using the
fourth eurodollars future contract. I run the following regression:
Ri,t =  0 +  1 it + ✏i,t (A.35)
where Ri,t is the daily return of bank i’s stock return on date t,  it is the daily change
in the 2, 5, and 10 Year Constant Maturity Treasury yield on date t. I estimate  
1
for both t during FOMC announcement days and during non-FOMC days.
The results for FOMC days is shown in Table A.1 where Panel (a) considers
the period prior to the zero lower bound and Panel (b) during it. As Table A.1a
shows, using changes in the two, five, and ten year Treasury results in a negative and
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statistically insignificant decline in bank stock returns. The magnitudes, however,
are much smaller than the cross-sectional results of Table 1.3b with declines of 5 to
7 basis points. Moving forward into the zero-lower bound period in Table A.1b, we
can see the similar reversal in coe cient sign. A 100 basis point increase in the 2
and 5 Year Treasury yield leads to a 57 and 28 basis point increase in bank stock
returns, respectively. I now consider the same regression but on days in which there
are no FOMC announcements. The results, shown in Table A.2, reveal that there is
not the same robust reversal e↵ect that we find on FOMC days. While there does
exist such a switch using 10 Year Treasury yield changes, using the other two yields
generate positive e↵ects for bank stock returns both before and during the zero-lower
bound period. These pooled regression results suggest that FOMC days yield di↵erent
responses of bank stock returns to non-FOMC days and in particular, show that the
reversal channel exists only on FOMC days.
In order to test whether these di↵erences in sign are significant, I run the following
time series regression:
Rb,t =  0 +  0DDt +  1 it +  1DDt it + ✏b,t (A.36)
where Rb,t is the daily value-weighted return of the Bank Industry portfolio from
Kenneth French’s dataset, Dt is a dummy variable that is equal to one on FOMC
days and 0 otherwise, and  it are the daily changes in various Treasury yields. I’m
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interested in the significance of coefficient β1D which tests whether there are significant
differences in bank stock return sensitivities to yield changes between FOMC and
non-FOMC days. I break the sample period into three parts: 1984-1996, 1997-2009
(pre-ZLB), and 2009-2015 (ZLB). The reason for this additional time period is because
unconditionally, bank stock returns and changes in interest rates have been positively
correlated since 1997 (See Figure A.1).
Figure A.1: Correlation Over Time
This figure plots the correlation between bank stock returns (Panel A) and the 10-year bond yield
and the correlation between the market stock return and 10-year bond yield (Panel B).
The regression results for the three time periods are presented in Table A.3, Ta-
ble A.4, and Table A.5 respectively. Table A.3 shows that there were no significant
differences for bank return sensitivities to interest rate changes between FOMC and
non-FOMC dates. Table A.4 and Table A.5, however, shows a negative and statis-
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tically significant coe cient of  
1D (shown in the red box), which suggests that on
average, bank returns displayed a more negative sensitivity with respect to changes
in Treasury yields on FOMC days than on non-FOMC days. For example, during
the pre-ZLB period (Table A.4), a 1% increase in the 2-Year Treasury yield had a
5.5% larger negative e↵ect on FOMC days relative to non-FOMC days. The negative
coe cient on  
1D is consistent with the pooled regression and alludes to the fact that
FOMC days are unique. It can perhaps be the case that on non-FOMC days, the
positive e↵ect of yields on bank returns is due in large part to a macroeconomic e↵ect
where a stronger economy is associated with higher yields and returns. Thus, it is
especially di cult to disentangle the endogeneity between yields and returns. The
negative e↵ect that we find on actual FOMC days, however, could be related in large
part to actual changes in the stance of monetary policy and speaks to the fact that
higher yields are perceived as bad news for banks.
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(a) Pre-ZLB Results
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Daily Return (preZLB) Daily Return (preZLB) Daily Return (preZLB)
  2-Year Treasury -0.007
[0.005]
  5-Year Treasury -0.007
[0.005]
  10-Year Treasury -0.005
[0.006]
Constant 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 41,203 41,203 41,203
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.000
Cluster Date Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(b) ZLB Results
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Daily Return (ZLB) Daily Return (ZLB) Daily Return (ZLB)
  2-Year Treasury 0.058***
[0.021]
  5-Year Treasury 0.029*
[0.015]
  10-Year Treasury 0.041**
[0.017]
Constant 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Observations 7,234 7,234 7,234
R-squared 0.022 0.015 0.027
Cluster Date Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.1: The Response of Daily Bank Stock Returns to Changes in Treasury
Yield on FOMC Days
The table reports the results of a regression of daily returns on FOMC meeting t for both the
period before the zero lower bound (Panel A) and the period during the ZLB (Panel B). There are
537 banks in this sample. All variables are expressed in decimal form and are interpreted as the
response of stock returns to a 100bp in the Treasury Yield. Column (1) uses the 2-Year Constant
Maturity Treasury Yield, Column (2) uses the 5-Year Constant Maturity Treasury Yield, and
Column (3) uses the 10-Year Constant Maturity Treasury Yield. Standard errors are clustered at
the FOMC date level.
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(a) Pre-ZLB Results
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Daily Return (preZLB) Daily Return (preZLB) Daily Return (preZLB)
  2-Year Treasury 0.003**
[0.001]
  5-Year Treasury 0.001
[0.001]
  10-Year Treasury -0.002*
[0.001]
Constant 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 1,347,135 1,347,135 1,347,135
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01
Cluster Date Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(b) ZLB Results
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Daily Return (ZLB) Daily Return (ZLB) Daily Return (ZLB)
  2-Year Treasury 0.116***
[0.008]
  5-Year Treasury 0.081***
[0.005]
  10-Year Treasury 0.083***
[0.004]
Constant 0.000** 0.000** 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 221,476 221,476 221,476
R-squared 0.032 0.047 0.058
Cluster Date Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.2: The Response of Daily Bank Stock Returns to Changes in Treasury
Yield on non-FOMC Days
The table reports the results of a regression of daily returns on non-FOMC meeting t for both the
period before the zero lower bound (Panel A) and the period during the ZLB (Panel B). There are
537 banks in this sample. All variables are expressed in decimal form and are interpreted as the
response of stock returns to a 100bp in the Treasury Yield. Column (1) uses the 2-Year Constant
Maturity Treasury Yield, Column (2) uses the 5-Year Constant Maturity Treasury Yield, and
Column (3) uses the 10-Year Constant Maturity Treasury Yield. Standard errors are clustered at
the RSSD level.
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(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Banks Banks Banks
Dt 0.194 0.190 0.192
[0.130] [0.131] [0.131]
  2-Year Treasury -3.654***
[0.250]
Dt  2-Year Treasury -1.365
[1.299]
  5-Year Treasury -4.245***
[0.218]
Dt  5-Year Treasury -1.072
[1.403]
  10-Year Treasury -4.618***
[0.236]
Dt  10-Year Treasury -1.690
[1.609]
Constant 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.063***
[0.016] [0.015] [0.015]
Observations 2,636 2,636 2,636
R-squared 0.106 0.145 0.159
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.3: Daily Time Series Regression of 1984-1996
This table reports the results of estimating Equation A.36, a time series regression to test
significance between FOMC meeting dates and non-FOMC meeting dates. Dt is a dummy variable
that represents FOMC meeting dates. Column (1) uses the 2-Year Treasury yield, Column (2) uses
the 5-Year Treasury yield, and Column (3) uses the 10-Year Treasury yield.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in the bracket.
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(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Banks Banks Banks
Dt 0.179 0.186 0.192
[0.122] [0.122] [0.124]
  2-Year Treasury 2.329***
[0.489]
Dt  2-Year Treasury -5.545***
[1.742]
  5-Year Treasury 1.807***
[0.451]
Dt  5-Year Treasury -4.665**
[1.828]
  10-Year Treasury 1.093**
[0.480]
Dt  10-Year Treasury -2.566
[2.407]
Constant -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
[0.024] [0.025] [0.025]
Observations 2,356 2,356 2,356
R-squared 0.017 0.012 0.004
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.4: Daily Time Series Regression of 1997-2009
This table reports the results of estimating Equation A.36, a time series regression to test
significance between FOMC meeting dates and non-FOMC meeting dates. Dt is a dummy variable
that represents FOMC meeting dates. Column (1) uses the 2-Year Treasury yield, Column (2) uses
the 5-Year Treasury yield, and Column (3) uses the 10-Year Treasury yield.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in the bracket.
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(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Banks Banks Banks
Dt 0.019 0.070 0.049
[0.167] [0.176] [0.174]
  2-Year Treasury 13.689***
[0.977]
Dt  2-Year Treasury -3.214
[3.838]
  5-Year Treasury 9.774***
[0.616]
Dt  5-Year Treasury -6.035**
[2.548]
  10-Year Treasury 9.973***
[0.571]
Dt  10-Year Treasury -5.454**
[2.778]
Constant 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.079***
[0.026] [0.025] [0.025]
Observations 1,653 1,653 1,653
R-squared 0.119 0.169 0.198
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.5: Daily Time Series Regression of 2009-2015 (ZLB)
This table reports the results of estimating Equation A.36, a time series regression to test
significance between FOMC meeting dates and non-FOMC meeting dates. Dt is a dummy variable
that represents FOMC meeting dates. Column (1) uses the 2-Year Treasury yield, Column (2) uses
the 5-Year Treasury yield, and Column (3) uses the 10-Year Treasury yield.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in the bracket.
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A.6 Robustness Check: Identification by
Heteroskedasticity
The seminal work by Rigobon and Sack (2004) addresses endogeneity concerns
by defining a heteroskedasticity-based estimator of the response of asset prices to
monetary policy. More specifically, it assumes that the variance of monetary policy
shocks is higher on days of FOMC meetings and exploits this di↵erence in volatility
to measure the response of asset prices to monetary policy. While Rigobon and Sack
(2004) proxies asset prices with the S&P 500 and NASDAQ, I focus again on Kenneth
French’s Bank industry portfolio and use daily changes in various Treasury yields. In
addition to Equation A.35, Rigobon and Sack (2004) posits that interest rates also
respond to developments in asset markets so that we have the following two equations.
Rb,t = ↵ it + ⌘t
 it =  Rb,t + ✏t
(A.37)
Let ⌦F and ⌦f denote the variance covariance matrix between treasury yields  it
and bank returns Rb,t on FOMC days and non-FOMC days, respectively. In other
words, ⌦F = E[[ itRb,t][ itRb,t]|t 2 F ] and ⌦f = E[[ itRb,t][ itRb,t]|t 2 f ]. Our
goal is to get an estimate of ↵ and with some further assumptions, we can show that
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where  Tx represents the variance of shock x estimated using the sample T 2 {F , f}.
In order to estimate ↵, I first define the following variables to include both FOMC
and non-FOMC samples:
 i ⌘ { it, t 2 F} [ { it, t 2 f}
Rb ⌘ {Rb,t, t 2 F} [ {Rb,t, t 2 f}
(A.39)
where each are (TF + Tf ) x 1 vectors that include values of yield changes and bank
returns both on FOMC days (F) and non-FOMC days (f). In order to estimate ↵,
the parameter of interest, I estimate a standard instrumental variables regression of
Rb on  i using as an instrument wi, where
wi ⌘ { it, t 2 F} [ {  it, t 2 f} (A.40)
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Table A.6 shows the coe cient ↵̂het which considers the heteroskedasticity of policy
shocks on FOMC days. The first three rows correspond to the three sample periods
I consider and shows that during 1984-1996, bank returns fell by 3.588% upon a
1% increase in the two-year treasury yield. It is interesting to note that during the
period 1997-2009, bank portfolio returns increased along with interest rate rises which
is surprising considering the fact that previous results suggest a negative relationship.
When considering the entire pre-ZLB period (1984-2009), however, we see that bank
returns decline by 1.312% upon a 100 basis point interest rate rise. During the
zero-lower bound, however, we see a significant and positive increase of 14% of bank
returns. While the magnitude is certainly large, Rigobon and Sack (2004) find an
11% decline using the NASDAQ index and a 7% decline using the S&P 500.
Coef Std Error Observations R-squared
1984-1996 -3.588*** 0.225 2,636 0.105
1997-2009 2.737*** 0.450 2,356 0.0090
2009-2015 13.968*** 1.061 1,653 0.119
pre-ZLB (1984-2009) -1.312*** 0.229 4,991 0.0109
ZLB (2009-2015) 13.968*** 1.061 1,653 0.119
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.6: The Response of Bank Portfolio Return to Monetary Policy
(Heteroskedasticity-Based Estimator)
This table reports the results of estimating the Rigobon and Sack (2004) instrumental variable
regression of ˆ↵het for the three periods: 1984-1996, 1997-2009, and 2009-2015 as well as prior to and
during the zero-lower bound. The interest rate used in the regression is from the 2-Year Treasury.
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The results in this section suggest that FOMC days are certainly important when
understanding the response of bank returns to monetary policy surprises. In order
to better understand why bank returns reveal a reversal from prior to and during
the zero-lower bound period and the characteristics that explain cross-sectional dif-
ferences, I consider a model in which banks have market power and decide how much
interest to charge borrowers and the interest to pay its depositors which is described
in Section 1.5.
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A.7 Data Appendix
Interest Earning Assets
Count Call Report RIS Data Maturity Type FDIC File
1 RCFDA549 RCONA549 SCNM3LES 3mo or less Govt FTS
2 RCFDA550 RCONA550 SCNM3T12 3-12 months Govt
3 RCFDA551 RCONA551 SCNM1T3 1-3 years Govt
4 RCFDA552 RCONA552 SCNM3T5 3-5 years Govt
5 RCFDA553 RCONA553 SCNM5T15 5-15 years Govt
6 RCFDA554 RCONA554 SCNMOV15 over 15 years Govt
7 RCFDA555 RCONA555 SCPT3LES 3mo or less Mortgage Pass Through FTS
8 RCFDA556 RCONA556 SCPT3T12 3-12 months Mortgage Pass Through
9 RCFDA557 RCONA557 SCPT1T3 1-3 years Mortgage Pass Through
10 RCFDA558 RCONA558 SCPT3T5 3-5 years Mortgage Pass Through
11 RCFDA559 RCONA559 SCPT5T15 5-15 years Mortgage Pass Through
12 RCFDA560 RCONA560 SCPTOV15 over 15 years Mortgage Pass Through
13 RCFDA561 RCONA561 SCO3YLES 3 years or less Other Mortgage-Backed Securities FTS
14 RCFDA562 RCONA562 SCOOV3Y over 3 years Other Mortgage-Backed Securities
15 RCONA564 LNRS3LES 3mo or less Fixed/Float Rate Secured by first lien 1-4 family resid FTS
16 RCONA565 LNRS3T12 3-12 months Fixed/Float Rate Secured by first lien 1-4 family resid
17 RCONA566 LNRS1T3 1-3 years Fixed/Float Rate Secured by first lien 1-4 family resid
18 RCONA567 LNRS3T5 3-5 years Fixed/Float Rate Secured by first lien 1-4 family resid
19 RCONA568 LNRS5T15 5-15 years Fixed/Float Rate Secured by first lien 1-4 family resid
20 RCONA569 LNRSOV15 over 15 years Fixed/Float Rate Secured by first lien 1-4 family resid
21 RCFD570 RCONA570 LNOT3LES 3mo or less All other loans and leases (other than resid) FTS
22 RCFD571 RCONA571 LNOT3T12 3-12 months All other loans and leases (other than resid)
23 RCFD572 RCONA572 LNOT1T3 1-3 years All other loans and leases (other than resid)
24 RCFD573 RCONA573 LNOT3T5 3-5 years All other loans and leases (other than resid)
25 RCFD574 RCONA574 LNOT5T15 5-15 years All other loans and leases (other than resid)
26 RCFD575 RCONA575 LNOTOV15 over 15 years All other loans and leases (other than resid)
TOTAL RCFD2170 RCON2170 ASSET Total Assets FTS
Interest Paying Liabilities
Count Call Report RIS Data Maturity Type FDIC File
1 RCON6810 NTRSMMDA Money market deposit accounts held in domestic o ces FTS
2 RCON0352 NTRSOTH All other savings deposits account (exclude mmda) held in d.o.
3 RCONA579 RCONHK07 CD3LESS 3mo or less Time Deposits $250K or less FTS
4 RCONA580 RCONHK08 CD3T12S 3-12 months Time Deposits $250K or less
5 RCONA581 RCONHK09 CD1T3S 1-3 years Time Deposits $250K or less
6 RCONA582 RCONHK10 CDOV3S over 3 years Time Deposits $250K or less
7 RCONA584 RCONHK12 CD3LES 3mo or less Time Deposits OVER $250K FTS
8 RCONA585 RCONHK13 CD3T12 3-12 months Time Deposits OVER $250K
9 RCONA586 RCONHK14 CD1T3 1-3 years Time Deposits OVER $250K
10 RCONA587 RCONHK15 CDOV3 over 3 years Time Deposits OVER $250K
11 RCON2215 TRN Total Transaction Accounts held in domestic o ces FTS
TOTAL RCFD2948 RCON2948 LIAB Total Liabilities FTS
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Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Using Swanson (2017) Shocks
Building upon the framework of Gürkaynak et al. (2005) who posited that mone-
tary policy can be represented by a target and path factor, Swanson (2017) includes
an additional dimension of large scale asset purchases. This is done by first creating
a T ⇥ n matrix called X of intradaily changes in asset prices where T is each FOMC
announcement date and n are the changes. These changes include the federal funds
futures (current and future six month), eurodollar futures (current and future eight
quarters), Treasury bond yields (across various term structures), the stock market
index, and exchange rates. Swanson (2017) then imposes a factor structure on X as
follows:
X = F⇤+ ✏ (B.1)
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where F is a T ⇥k matrix of unobserved factors, ⇤ is a k⇥n matrix of loadings (asset
price response from factor k), and ✏ is a T ⇥ n matrix of residuals. Previous work
by Gürkaynak et al. (2005) consider k=2, where intradaily asset price changes are
well captured by two dimensions of monetary policy: changes in the target rate and
the path of future policy (forward guidance). By imposing structure on ⇤, Swanson
(2017) is able to decompose monetary policy shocks into an additional third dimension
related to large scale asset purchases1. Having these three dimensions (Target, FG,












































1Derivations and details on this structure can be found in Section 2 of Swanson (2017).
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(a) Full Sample Time Series Regression
August 1991 - October 2015
(1) (2) (3)
Spread Expected Default Risk Premium
Target Factor -0.0304⇤⇤⇤ -0.00589⇤⇤⇤ -0.0213⇤⇤⇤
(0.0106) (0.00224) (0.00736)
FG Factor 0.0104 0.00336 0.00592
(0.0116) (0.00258) (0.00813)
LSAP Factor 0.0264 0.00723 0.0138
(0.0335) (0.00810) (0.0204)
R2 0.073 0.058 0.091
Observations 109 109 109
(b) Pre-ZLB Time Series Regression
August 1991 - December 2008
(1) (2) (3)
Spread Expected Default Risk Premium
Target Factor -0.0285⇤⇤⇤ -0.00552⇤⇤ -0.0207⇤⇤⇤
(0.0108) (0.00224) (0.00748)
FG Factor 0.00186 0.00161 -0.000102
(0.0113) (0.00250) (0.00808)
LSAP Factor -0.0112 -0.00133 -0.00136
(0.0299) (0.00750) (0.0200)
R2 0.078 0.054 0.098
Observations 81 81 81
(c) ZLB Time Series Regression
January 2009 - December 2016
(1) (2) (3)
Spread Expected Default Risk Premium
Target Factor 0.368 0.0824 0.200
(0.271) (0.0694) (0.155)
FG Factor 0.0860⇤⇤ 0.0191⇤⇤ 0.0557⇤⇤⇤
(0.0358) (0.00857) (0.0206)
LSAP Factor 0.0982 0.0237 0.0477
(0.0598) (0.0147) (0.0342)
R2 0.369 0.324 0.380
Observations 28 28 28
Table B.1: Monthly Changes in Credit Spreads (and two components) Time Series
Regression using Swanson (2017) Shocks
This table reports results from estimating Equation B.2 which regresses monthly change in credit
spreads, expected default, and risk premium on TARGET , PATH, and LSAP . Column (1)
reports the results for monthly changes in credit spreads, Column (2) for monthly changes in
expected default, and Column (3) for monthly changes in risk premium. Panel B.1a presents the
results the full sample from August 1991-October 2015, Panel B.1b presents the pre-ZLB sample
from August 1991-December 2008, and Panel B.1c presents the ZLB sample from January
2009-October 2015. Standard errors are robust White standard errors.
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PATH -0.0888 -0.0859 -0.111
(0.0649) (0.0679) (0.138)
Constant 0.00319 0.00113 0.00977
(0.00289) (0.00322) (0.00640)
Observations 283 219 64
R2 0.0290 0.0345 0.0112
Table B.2: Time Series Regression of Stock Returns
This table reports results from a time series regression of monthly stock returns on the sum of
monetary policy surprises MP1 and PATH. Column (1) reports results for the full sample from
February 1984 - December 2016, Column (2) for the Pre-ZLB period from February 1984 -
December 2008, and Column (3) for the ZLB period from January 2009 - December 2016.
Standard errors are robust White standard errors.
B.3 Model with Expected Default and Risk
Premia
This section derives Merton (1974) using some adjustments described by Chen et
al. (2008) to allow for the study of credit spreads and expected default. It is used to
derive the comparative static relationship in Figure 2.1. I assume that asset values
(V ) follow a Geometric Brownian Motion under the natural measure (P ) and risk
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= (µ   )dt+  dW Pt
dVt
Vt
= (r    )dt+  dWQt
(B.3)
where   is the dividend yield, µ is the expected return on the firm’s assets, r is the
risk-free rate, and   is asset volatility. I assume that a zero-coupon risky bond can
only default at its maturity T and will occur if the value of its assets V (T ) fall below
a certain threshold D which can be thought of as a debt level. However, like for
most bonds, default does not completely wipe out the value of the firm and bond-
holders are able to recover a fraction R which I assume to be constant. Therefore,





$1 if V (T ) > D
$R if V (T ) < D
(B.4)









which can be interpreted as the inverse of leverage which is important for the study
of di↵erent levels of risk. I apply Itô’s Lemma to Equation B.5 which gives the
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It then follows that v(T ) is normally distributed under both measures




















From Equation B.5, it is clear that default will occur if v(T ) < 0. Therefore, the


































































The price of a zero-coupon risky bond maturing at T is equal to :
P Tzc = e
 rT ⇥(1  ⇡Q) + ⇡QR
⇤
(B.9)
and if we write the price in terms of its yield, P Tzc = e
 yT , we can solve for the credit
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(1  ⇡Q) + ⇡QR
⇤
= yT
























Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Details of Decomposition
C.1.1 Assumptions





• After default occurs, the investor buys Treasury bond with the coupon rate
equal to the original coupon rate Ci and shorts the same bond so that the
credit spreads and excess returns are always zero
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C.1.2 Step 1: Write return to bond from t to t+ 1



































Take logs, expressing logs in lower case:
ri,t+1 = ci,t   pi,t + ci,t+1 + log(1 + epi,t+1 ci,t+1) (C.3)
C.1.3 Step 2: Linearize the return expression
ri,t+1 =  (pi,t   ci,t) + ci,t+1 + log(1 + epi,t+1 ci,t+1) (C.4)
Taylor expand final term around mean log(P/C)
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ri,t+1 ⇡  (pi,t   ci,t) + ci,t+1 + log(1 + elog(P/C)) +
1
1 + elog(P/C)
elog(P/C)(pi,t+1   ci,t+1   log(P/C))
⇡  (pi,t   ci,t) + ci,t+1 + log(1 + elog(P/C)) +
P/C
1 + P/C
(pi,t+1   ci,t+1   log(P/C))




(pi,t+1   ci,t+1   log(P/C))  (pi,t   ci,t) + ci,t+1 + log(1 + elog(P/C))
ri,t+1 ⇡ ⇢ i,t+1    i,t + ci,t+1 + const
where
• ⇢ = P/C
1+P/C
•  i,t = log(Pi,tCi,t )
C.1.4 Step 3: Repeat for Treasury Bond
We know have:








If we subtract the two, we get:
ri,t+1   rfi,t+1 ⇡  ⇢( 
f
i,t+1    i,t+1) + ( 
f
i,t    i,t)  ( c
f
i,t+1   ci,t+1) + const (C.5)
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If we focus on the second term of the right hand side
















= si,t if t 6= tD
0 if t = tD
If we focus on the last term on the right hand side and use the first assumption













C.1.5 Step 4: Plug in all Equations
rei,t+1 = log (Ri,t+1)  log (R
f
i,t+1) ⇡  ⇢si,t+1 + si,t   li,t+1 + const (C.6)
This decomposition has no term that involves coupon rates Ci,t or C
f
i,t because
the coupon rates are equal and cancel out.
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C.1.6 Step 5: Solve the Di↵erence Equation
rei,t+1 ⇡  ⇢si,t+1 + si,t   li,t+1 + const
si,t ⇡ rei,t+1 + ⇢si,t+1 + li,t+1 + const
si,t+1 ⇡ rei,t+2 + ⇢si,t+2 + li,t+2 + const








Since this holds path-by-path, it must also hold under expectations.
C.2 Data
C.2.1 Corporate Bond Database
In this section, we provide a more detailed description of the panel data of corpo-
rate bond prices by following the methodology of Nozawa (2017). We obtain monthly
price observations of senior unsecured corporate bonds from the following four data
sources. For the period from 1973 to 1997, we use the Lehman Brothers Fixed Income
Database, which provides month-end bid prices. Since Lehman Brothers used these
prices to construct the Lehman Brothers bond index while simultaneously trading it,
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the traders at Lehman Brothers had an incentive to provide correct quotes. Thus,
although the prices in the Lehman Brothers Fixed Income Database are quote-based,
they are considered reliable.
In the Lehman Brothers Fixed Income Database, some observations are dealers’
quotes while others are matrix prices. Matrix prices are set using algorithms based on
the quoted prices of other bonds with similar characteristics. Though matrix prices
are less reliable than actual dealer quotes (Warga and Welch (1993)), we choose to
include matrix prices in our main result to maximize the power of the test.
Second, for the period from 1994 to 2014, we use the Mergent FISD/NAIC
Database. This database consists of actual transaction prices reported by insurance
companies. Third, for the period from 2002 to 2014, we use TRACE data, which pro-
vides actual transaction prices. TRACE covers more than 99% of the OTC activities
in U.S. corporate bond markets after 2005. The data from Mergent FISD/NAIC and
TRACE are transaction-based data, and therefore the observations are not exactly
at the end of months. Thus, we use only observations that are in the last five days
of each month. If there are multiple observations in the last five days, we use the
latest one and treat it as a month-end observation. Fourth, we use the DataStream
database, which provides month-end price quotes from 1990 to 2011. Lastly, we use
the Merrill Lynch database which provides month-end quotes from 1998 to 2014.
TRACE includes some observations from the trades that are eventually cancelled
or corrected. We drop all cancelled observations, and use the corrected prices for the
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trades that are corrected. We also drop all the price observations that include dealer
commissions, as the commission does not reflect the value of the bond, and these
prices are not comparable to prices without commissions.
Since there are some overlaps among the five databases, we prioritize in the
following order: the Lehman Brothers Fixed Income Database, TRACE, Mergent
FISD/NAIC , DataStream and Merrill Lynch. To classify the bonds based on credit
ratings, we use the ratings of Standard & Poor’s when available, and use Moody’s
ratings when Standard & Poor’s rating is not available.
To identify defaults in the data, we use Moody’s Default and Recovery Database,
which provides a historical record of bond defaults from 1970 onwards. The same
source also provides the secondary-market value of the defaulted bond one month
after the incident. If the price observation in the month when a bond defaults is
missing in the corporate bond database, we add the Moody’s secondary-market price
to our data set in order to include all default observations in the sample.
C.2.2 Constructing Monetary Policy Shocks
As mentioned in the paper, we use two proxies for monetary policy shocks: the
current month surprise in the federal funds rate futures contract (MP1) for the pre-
ZLB period and the fourth eurodollar futures contract (ED4) in the ZLB period.
While ED4 is simply the intradaily change in that contract around the FOMC meet-
ing, the construction of MP1, which relies on the e↵ective federal funds rate, requires
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scaling for the amount of days in a particular month. The settlement price for a
federal funds rate futures contract is based on the monthly average federal funds rate
1. In order to construct MP1, we need to consider the fact that part of the month
has already passed prior to the FOMC meeting. Suppose there are D days in the
month and the FOMC meeting occurs on day d of month m. Let f 1t  t be the price of
the current month’s federal funds rate futures contract ten minutes before the FOMC
meeting and let f 1t be the price twenty minutes after the meeting. Also, let rm, 1 be
the average federal funds rate in month m up until the announcement and rm,0 the
average federal funds rate in month m for the remainder of the month following the





































f 1t   f 1t  t
⇤
For example, on the FOMC meeting that occurred on 9/21/2011, we compute the
intradaily change in the futures contract as 0.0025. In order to compute MP1, the
monetary policy shock on that day, we multiply 0.0025 by the scaled factor 30
30 21
which is equal to 0.00834. One notable exception is if there is a meeting at the end of
the month. In this case, MP1 is equal the intradaily change that occurs next month.
1Federal funds rate futures contracts have been traded since 1988 and the e↵ective rate is quoted
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York every business day
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For example, on the FOMC meeting that occurred on 10/29/2014, we assign the
intradaily change that month as 0 but set MP1 = 0.005, the intradaily change of the
two month ahead federal funds futures contract.
C.2.3 Firm Balance Sheet
In order to attain firm balance sheet information (Compustat) for each bond
(CRSP), we need to match identifiers in both data bases. For each bond, we use a
linking table between CRSP identified by its PERMNO and Compustat identified by
its GVKEY. There may, however, be duplicate matches in which one PERMNO cor-
respond to multiple GVKEY s. When this occurs, we resort to the linktype variable
in the table which describes how well a match exists. We keep those whose value cor-
responds to LC (Link Research Complete) and remove those of LD (Duplicate Link)
and LX (Link to a security traded on another exchange not included in CRSP). This
initial PERMNO-CRSP match results in 937,286 bond-date observations.
Daily prices and shares outstanding come from CRSP and is matched seamlessly
with the bond’s PERMNO. After deleting missing prices, we are left with 648,657
bond-date observations. In order to complete the match on firm balance sheet infor-
mation, we turn to quarterly Compustat data. In order to match monthly bond data
with quarterly balance sheet data, we first take an average across months to generate
89,583 quarterly data of a firm’s price, shares outstanding, credit spread and its two
components, maturity, and its rating.
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C.2.4 Data Construction
We winsorize and trim all the balance sheet data at the 2nd and 98th percentile
level, follow various authors on data construction, and describe them in detail below:
1. Investment (Ottonello and Winberry (2018)):  log ki,t+1, where ki,t denotes the
capital stock of firm i in quarter t. We initialize ki,t as the first reported value
on the level of gross property, plant, and equipment (ppegtq). For subsequent
periods, we compute the evolution of ki,t+1 as the sum of ki,t and changes in
the net property, plant, and equipment (ppentq) which has significantly more
observations. We linearly interpolate missing values of ppentq if it is between
two non-missing values. Finally, we compute investment as the change in log
capital ( log ki,t+1) and require firms to have at least 30 quarters of invest-
ment. Gross investment (ppegtq) is not used because there are much fewer
observations than net investment.
2. Market Equity: me is equal to the product of price (prc) and shares outstanding
(shrout) from CRSP
3. Book Equity (Hou et al. (2015)): be is shareholders’ equity plus deferred and in-
vestment tax credit (TXDITCQ) minus the book value of preferred stock (PSTKQ).
For shareholders’ equity, we define it in the following order. First, we use stock-
holders’ equity (SEQQ). Second, if that is unavailable, we define it as common
equity (CEQQ) plus the book value of preferred stock (PSTKQ). Finally, if the
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above two are still unavailable, we define it as total assets (ATQ) minus total
liabilities (LTQ).
4. Leverage (Ottonello and Winberry (2018)) : lev is the ratio of total debt - debt
in current liabilities (DLCQ) and long term debt (DLTTQ) to total assets (ATQ).
5. Sales Growth : sales growth is the change in log sales (SALEQ)
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sd ⇥MP1 0.0433⇤⇤ 0.0354⇤⇤
(0.0171) (0.0158)




sd ⇥ ED4 -0.00161
(0.0232)
sr ⇥ ED4 0.000249
(0.0259)
Constant 0.0347⇤⇤⇤ 0.0442⇤⇤⇤ 0.0210⇤⇤
(0.00434) (0.00571) (0.00813)
Coe cient Sum -0.0230 -0.0188 -0.00136
SE Sum 0.00860 0.00882 0.0153
t-stat -2.671 -2.128 -0.0890
Observations 24513 16971 7542
R2 0.0259 0.0298 0.0254
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Table C.1: Heterogeneity of Transmission Mechanism using  ki,t
Results from estimating Equation 3.12 using sample of non-financial firms that are matched to
bonds. Column (1) reports estimates using the full sample (1984Q1-2016Q4), Column (2) reports
from the Pre-ZLB period (1984Q1-2008Q4), and Column (3) the period during the zero-lower
bound (2009Q1-2016Q4). MP1 is the surprise component in the current month federal funds rate
futures contract scaled by the number of days relative to the FOMC meeting. ED4 is the surprise
component of the fourth eurodollar futures contract. Both shocks are normalized so that positive
values correspond to expansionary shocks (decrease in interest rates). sd and sr are standardized
to have mean 0 and standard deviation of 1. For more details on the construction of MP1 and
ED4, see Gürkaynak et al. (2005) and Appendix C.2.2. Firm controls include book to market ratio,
leverage, sales growth, size, and current assets as a share of total assets. Aggregate controls include
GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, and inflation. Standard errors are clustered by quarters.
195










sd ⇥MP1 0.0282 0.0193
(0.0174) (0.0156)




sd ⇥ ED4 -0.0177
(0.0203)
sr ⇥ ED4 -0.00352
(0.0335)
Constant 0.0435⇤⇤⇤ 0.0577⇤⇤⇤ 0.0137⇤
(0.00479) (0.00580) (0.00797)
Coe cient Sum -0.0218 -0.0193 -0.0212
SE Sum 0.0110 0.0108 0.0209
t-stat -1.977 -1.784 -1.014
Observations 23348 16325 7023
R2 0.0216 0.0296 0.0153
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Table C.2: Heterogeneity of Transmission Mechanism using  ki,t+1
Results from estimating Equation 3.12 using sample of non-financial firms that are matched to
bonds. Column (1) reports estimates using the full sample (1984Q1-2016Q4), Column (2) reports
from the Pre-ZLB period (1984Q1-2008Q4), and Column (3) the period during the zero-lower
bound (2009Q1-2016Q4). MP1 is the surprise component in the current month federal funds rate
futures contract scaled by the number of days relative to the FOMC meeting. ED4 is the surprise
component of the fourth eurodollar futures contract. Both shocks are normalized so that positive
values correspond to expansionary shocks (decrease in interest rates). sd and sr are standardized
to have mean 0 and standard deviation of 1. For more details on the construction of MP1 and
ED4, see Gürkaynak et al. (2005) and Appendix C.2.2. Firm controls include book to market ratio,
leverage, sales growth, size, and current assets as a share of total assets. Aggregate controls include
GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, and inflation. Standard errors are clustered by quarters.
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sd ⇥MP1 0.0240 0.0162
(0.0157) (0.0147)




sd ⇥ ED4 0.0146
(0.0281)
sr ⇥ ED4 -0.0462
(0.0366)
Constant 0.0433⇤⇤⇤ 0.0552⇤⇤⇤ 0.0154⇤
(0.00445) (0.00601) (0.00806)
Coe cient Sum -0.00908 -0.00667 -0.0316
SE Sum 0.0110 0.0112 0.0159
t-stat -0.826 -0.594 -1.982
Observations 22281 15686 6595
R2 0.0242 0.0327 0.0199
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Table C.3: Heterogeneity of Transmission Mechanism using  ki,t+2
Results from estimating Equation 3.12 using sample of non-financial firms that are matched to
bonds. Column (1) reports estimates using the full sample (1984Q1-2016Q4), Column (2) reports
from the Pre-ZLB period (1984Q1-2008Q4), and Column (3) the period during the zero-lower
bound (2009Q1-2016Q4). MP1 is the surprise component in the current month federal funds rate
futures contract scaled by the number of days relative to the FOMC meeting. ED4 is the surprise
component of the fourth eurodollar futures contract. Both shocks are normalized so that positive
values correspond to expansionary shocks (decrease in interest rates). sd and sr are standardized
to have mean 0 and standard deviation of 1. For more details on the construction of MP1 and
ED4, see Gürkaynak et al. (2005) and Appendix C.2.2. Firm controls include book to market ratio,
leverage, sales growth, size, and current assets as a share of total assets. Aggregate controls include
GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, and inflation. Standard errors are clustered by quarters.
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sd ⇥MP1 0.00725 -0.0000995
(0.0139) (0.0130)




sd ⇥ ED4 0.00434
(0.0197)
sr ⇥ ED4 0.00135
(0.0298)
Constant 0.0416⇤⇤⇤ 0.0530⇤⇤⇤ 0.0105
(0.00461) (0.00636) (0.0102)
Coe cient Sum -0.0156 -0.0146 0.00569
SE Sum 0.00744 0.00737 0.0203
t-stat -2.093 -1.985 0.280
Observations 21582 15267 6315
R2 0.0226 0.0290 0.0221
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Table C.4: Heterogeneity of Transmission Mechanism using  ki,t+3
Results from estimating Equation 3.12 using sample of non-financial firms that are matched to
bonds. Column (1) reports estimates using the full sample (1984Q1-2016Q4), Column (2) reports
from the Pre-ZLB period (1984Q1-2008Q4), and Column (3) the period during the zero-lower
bound (2009Q1-2016Q4). MP1 is the surprise component in the current month federal funds rate
futures contract scaled by the number of days relative to the FOMC meeting. ED4 is the surprise
component of the fourth eurodollar futures contract. Both shocks are normalized so that positive
values correspond to expansionary shocks (decrease in interest rates). sd and sr are standardized
to have mean 0 and standard deviation of 1. For more details on the construction of MP1 and
ED4, see Gürkaynak et al. (2005) and Appendix C.2.2. Firm controls include book to market ratio,
leverage, sales growth, size, and current assets as a share of total assets. Aggregate controls include
GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, and inflation. Standard errors are clustered by quarters.
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